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1.1. Influence of Emotions and Emotion Regulation
on Decision Making
Individuals systematically deviate from theoretic predictions when coming to economic
decisions, and frequently these deviations are explained by the influencing role of emo-
tions (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). In fact, there is a broad account of experimental
and field studies which demonstrate that emotional states of high arousal can become
unmanagable, adversely affecting decision makers (e.g. Ku et al., 2005; Lo et al., 2005).
Already since the middle of the 20th century it became evident that the neo-classical,
purely consequentialist economic perspective struggles with a lot of empirical findings.
Consequently, the characterization of humans’ behavior according to the always rational
homo economicus is probably now discussed more controversial than ever before.
With the advent of behavioral economics, economists’ perspective broadened and be-
gan to incorporate aspects from the field of cognitive psychology. Concepts such as
bounded rationality helped to widen the picture and to raise awareness that human
cognition is intertwined with decision processes, and may also be a limiting factor (Kah-
neman, 2003; Rabin, 1998). Complementary, also the influence of emotions on cognition,
risk taking and decision making was recognized (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein
and Lerner, 2003). Thereby, economic literature has typically regarded emotions as the
opposite of rationality and hence focused on its negative effects, such as biasing one’s
original preferences, skewing one’s information retrieval and eventually shifting one’s
decision making behavior. And the explanatory power of emotions seems manifold as
1
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economists suspect emotions to be the underlying driving force of a whole set of decision
biases such as the disposition effect1, loss and regret aversion, or the phenomenon of auc-
tion fever (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2008; Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok, 2008; Ku et al., 2005). Whereas emotions certainly can have these draw-
backs on decision processes, theories bolstered by findings from economic psychology and
psychophysiology, have also recognized another, beneficial side of emotions for individ-
ual decision making. Isen (2001) argued that “positive affect” can be a primary source
for creative problem solving, cognitive processing and decision making under complex
or stressful situations. Bechara and Damasio (2005) argued that adequate emotional
processing is a necessary prerequisite for fast and advantageous decision making. In
summary, literature gives an account for both the beneficial but also the maladaptive ef-
fects of emotions, in fact often dependent on the context the decision maker faces. These
Janus-faced qualities of emotions need to be integrated in a more expanded conception:
maybe, asking whether an emotion is beneficial or maladaptive for decision making per
se is the wrong question (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011).
Seo and Barrett (2007, p. 923) observed in a study involving traders that subjects,
which “were better able to identify and distinguish among their current feelings achieved
higher decision performance.” The authors concluded that “emotion differentiation
and affective influence regulation are two essential process components of emotional
intelligence” which improve individual decision performance (Seo and Barrett, 2007, p.
934). Similarly, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011), among others (e.g. Heilman et al., 2010),
followed this conjecture: emotions should not be considered as always target-oriented
or disruptive. Rather, the ability to understand one’s emotions when they set in, and
to regulate them accordingly when necessary seems essential for beneficial decision
making. The construct of influence regulation traces back to the psychological concept
of emotion regulation, which has gained considerable attention in recent years (Gross,
2009). According to Gross (1998b) an emotion is not merely passively experienced,
but it unfolds along an emotion generation process and humans have continuously the
opportunity to interfer with this unfolding process. Essentially, the way we regulate
our emotions largely reflects how we experience them and therefore react upon them.
According to the concept of emotion regulation, subjects regulate emotional stimuli
1The disposition effect is defined by Shefrin and Statman (1985) as an investor’s tendency to sell
winning stocks too early, while riding losing stocks too long. This effect can be observed in many
empirical stock data sets.
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by applying specific regulation strategies, e.g., reappraisal or suppression (Gross and
John, 2003). For instance, one may or may not down-regulate a burgeoning timidity
during a bumpy flight. Suppression of this timidity could unfold in one experiencing
high fear of a plane crash, but not expressing this fear. Reappraisal on the other
hand might result in becoming aware that for the pilot a bumpy flight might be
nothing else than corrugations in the road surface for a car driver. Depending on the
employed strategy and the intensity of the stimulus, a subject might or might not be
successful in regulating a relevant or irrelevant stimulus. Emotion regulation manifests
in experience, expression and physiology (Gross, 1998a). Some studies could already
bring first insights into the question of whether emotion regulation also improves
decision making in economic contexts (Heilman et al., 2010; Fenton-O’Creevy et al.,
2012). It is a promising and exciting task to further disentangle the question of how
emotion regulation and decision making are intertwined and how emotion regulation
might improve our understanding of economic and financial decision making.
Occasions to actually experience emotions during economic and financial decision
making in the real world are multifaceted—and has potentially increased in the last
decades. Digitally enabled progress has fostered e-commerce since the 1990s, generating
a variety of new market platforms. Electronic markets with their manifestations in
electronic auctions or private online trading platforms have turned out to be highly
successful. Alone in late 2012 the share of self-directed investors amounted to almost 59
per cent of all investors in Germany.2 Especially participating in electronic auctions and
trading involves states filled with high emotional arousal which can eventually result in
financial losses (Adam et al., 2011; Lo and Repin, 2002; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011).
Platform operators’ strategies to boost emotional reactions seem manifold: Countdowns
induce time pressure in electronic auctions, switching their colour shortly before the
good is finally auctioned off. Other auction platforms display images likely to trigger
states of community or competition. In online market platforms, potential gains and
losses are indicated with green and red arrows—on some trading floors market events
or large transactions are even accompanied by the sound of roaring race cars. These
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market-engineering perspective it is necessary to better understand how these often
subliminal experienced events influence the users’ decision making in such electronic
markets (cf. Weinhardt et al., 2003).
While young private users are typically unaware of the coherence of the emotional state
and their decision behavior, interestingly, professional traders and experienced private
investors are meanwhile well aware of the coherence of emotions, emotion regulation
and decision making (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011). In their strive for profit, they do
know about the emotions involved in trading and the importance of understanding the
emotional state that evolves within the process. Trading platform operators such as
the investment bank SAXO Bank have recognized this shift and meanwhile developed
questionnaires and training sessions in order to provide their users with more knowledge
about emotion regulation and improve their capabilities to “remain level-headed” in
critical situations.3 Consequently, also for research it seems highly relevant to enhance
the theoretical understanding of how the concept of emotion regulation can contribute
to improving financial decision making.
1.2. Advances in Biosensor Technology
Traditional experimental economic research struggles—invariably of the emotion compe-
tent stimulus—with the assessment of what a subject actually experiences. One major
problem is that the measurement of emotions is difficult as self-reports can lack from
certain shortcomings, such as subjects being dishonest, social desirability, or the time
gap between the emotion experience and assessment may bias perception (Capra et al.,
2010). For that reason, many models, that employ emotions for their underlying theory,
are still hypothetical about the existence of emotions. And of course, a model can always
only be as good as the underlying theory.
Typically, emotions manifest in perception and behavior but also in psychophysiolog-
ical correlates, which were historically very slow and effortful to collect (Myers, 2004).
The rapid progress in the field of data storage, treatment and biosensor-technology now
offers the opportunity of fast and automated data acquisition and processing. Therefore
the close-grained time-accurate evaluation of emotional states during large scale exper-
imental sessions has the potential to significantly extend traditional research on the
3http://www.tradingfloor.com/topics/train-your-brain (retrieved on 08/19/2013)
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coherence of formerly invisible processes such as emotions and emotion regulation with
decision making. Moreover, the time-synchronous and continuous psychophysiological
data assessment and processing meanwhile allows the development of so called NeuroIS
tools (Vom Brocke et al., 2013). These tools can for instance employ biofeedback, i.e.,
the indication of one’s own emotional state, and in turn utilize these usually unperceiv-
able visceral processes to increase the decision makers awareness for her or his emotional
state.
1.3. Working Hypothesis and Research Questions
Adam (2010) developed a structured method for disentangling the coherence of emo-
tions, measured by physiological correlates such as heart rate or skin conductance, and
economic decision making in auction experiments. The method offers the potential to
answer many additional questions in fields were emotions affect our economic decision
behavior. Auctions are particularly suitable for investigating these relationships since
auction participants often experience states of strong arousal, and emotions experienced
in this context are often blamed for being the cause of suboptimal decisions. In addition,
auctions have a high economic relevance and are particularly well suited to systemati-
cally analyze economic decision making in laboratory experiments. Especially first-price
sealed-bid auctions are useful in this context, since they allow to decouple the exami-
nation of integral emotions, i.e. triggered through the auction mechanism (e.g. winning
and losing), and incidental emotions, i.e. not elicited by the auction mechanism (e.g.
influence of affective images). However, up to now it is not clear how successful psy-
chophysiology will prove in the pursuit to improve economic and Information Systems
(IS) theory. This thesis aims to inform research about the interrelationship of emotions,
emotion regulation and decisions by employing the potential and benefits of psychophys-
iology. Affirmative results would on the one hand strengthen the method as such in the
domain of economics and IS, on the other hand help to inform theory—and therefore
researchers’ understanding—of how emotions in economic contexts are experienced and
how they influence our decision making. Therefore, the underlying working hypothesis
for the Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis is that the consideration of emotions and emo-
tion regulation can help us in our ambition to understand individuals’ economic decision
making. Chapter 5 will extend this hypothesis towards the direction that emotional
5
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awareness and emotion regulation can be trained with the aim to actively improve eco-
nomic decision making. Therefore the gap is bridged from using psychophysiology ex
post as an explanatory tool towards the direction of how physiology (with its feature
live biofeedback) can be applied in order to inform the users of electronic markets about
their emotional state in real time and hence to improve emotional awareness during the
decision process.
This thesis will approach the solution process by employing economic experiments
whereas employing tools from NeuroIS in order to assess subjects’ physiological states
during their decision processes. Thereby a central idea is to elicit emotions by varying
feedback information or images within or between the treatment designs. The interrelat-
edness of subjects’ economic behavior, their emotions and emotion regulation strategies
will then be studied and discussed. It will become clear that psychophysiology provides
essential information regarding subjects’ ongoing emotional states. Furthermore the
concept of emotion regulation, which has not gained extensive consideration in economic
and IS research so far, turns out to have exploratory power of subjects’ underlying
decision patterns. The results contribute to a deeper understanding of how emotion
regulation strategies unfold physiologically and economically. Moreover, this thesis
provides new insights of how live biofeedback can be employed in adaptive information
systems in order to inform subjects about their emotional state and thereby aid their
decision making.
As mentioned above, the first-price sealed-bid auction with its auction mecha-
nism is suitable for the decipherment of indivuals’ emotional states and their decision
making, by employing psychophysiology. Constructs from economic and IS theory
dealing with emotions in auctions therefore lay the foundation for the following research
questions.
Research Question 1: Do bidders in first-price sealed-bid auctions experi-
ence regret, and if so, does regret influence bidders’ decision making?
Two forms of the emotion regret can be experienced in a first-price sealed-bid auction—
loser regret and winner regret. On the one side, a bidder may suffer from loser regret
when the auction is lost, whereas a higher bid could have resulted in a profitable out-
come. Winner regret, on the other side, may be experienced when the bidder wins the
6
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auction, but a lower bid may have resulted in a higher profit. In their work Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2008) infer that the aversion to regret may be a major reason
for “overbidding.” However, the authors’ explanation is hypothetical in nature and still
little is known about subjects’ actual experience and processing of the displayed regret
information during electronic auctions. Employing methods from psychophysiology help
to disentangle the coherence of bidders’ cognitive processing, emotional experience and
economic decision making, since it allows to objectively measure a subject’s response to
the regret feedback information within the auction process.
Research Question 2: Do “joy of winning” and “frustration of losing” in
first-price sealed-bid auctions occur, and if so, which one is more prevalent?
Research concerned with auction data frequently explains bidders’ decision making as
triggered by emotions such as “joy of winning” and “frustration of losing.” The underly-
ing debate yields the question which of the two emotional stimuli actually is the promi-
nent one (Delgado et al., 2008). However, little is known regarding about whether sub-
jects actually experience those emotional states during the auction process and whether
winning or losing an auction is independent of the potential profit that could have been
realized within the auction. Psychophysiology provides an opportunity to assess the
emotional intensity and valence related to the revealed auction outcome and therefore
to differentiate these distinct emotional patterns.
Research Question 3: What is the impact of incidental social images in
first-price sealed-bid auctions on emotions, emotion regulation and decision
making?
Previous research was predominantly concerned with emotions triggered by events that
occur within the auction process, i.e. integral emotions (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008).
However, many electronic auction platforms employ social images on their websites which
are completely unrelated to the present auction task. Recent research examined that
social images may manipulate experienced social presence, thereby affecting perception,
emotions and even decision making (Hassanein and Head, 2007; Cyr et al., 2009; Steffen
et al., 2009). Moreover, research from social psychology found that subjects continuously
aim to alter their emotional experience, i.e. use individual emotion regulation strategies
in order to deal with emotional stimuli (Gross and John, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary
7
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to examine the influence of social images on emotions and decision making, by controlling
for the moderating role of subjects’ individual emotion regulation strategies, which also
can be assessed by psychophysiological correlates.
Finally, a Design Science approach will be pursued, in order to develop a tool that
provides its users with information about their emotional state (by employing the heart
rate as a proxy) but also rewards emotion regulation skills. This challenge will be
tackeled by the following design objective.
Design Objective: Development of a NeuroIS tool which increases sub-
jects’ awareness for their emotional state and rewards emotion regulation
capabilities.
Additionally to a broad body of psychological research on emotion regulation, economic
experiments and field studies with practicioners found evidence for a correlation of good
emotion regulation skills and beneficial economic and financial decision making (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2008; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011). Since the inability to down-regulate
high levels of arousal (i.e. poor emotion regulation) manifests in psychophysiological
correlates such as increased heart rate, we attempt to design a NeuroIS tool that, firstly,
elicits high levels of physiological arousal in a financial decision scenario and, secondly,
rewards the down-regulation of such arousal. In order to satisfy the ensuing design
requirements it is necessary to build on advances in the fields of affective computing and
neuroergonomics with one of its core concept biofeedback (Nacke et al., 2011).
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis follows the previously mentioned research questions and is structured in four
main chapters, which all detail emotions or emotion regulation and their coherence with
decision making in electronic markets. All chapters are based on experimental studies
conducted at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Each study employs psy-
chophysiological indicators in order to assess emotional correlates which can, however,
differ depending on the focus of the respective research questions. The results in Chapter
2 and 3 are based on the same experiment. However since they investigate independent
research questions, they are introduced separately and can be read independently.
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 especially investigate the impact of emotions and emotion regulation
8
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
on users’ decisions in electronic markets. Chapter 5 extends the application set, since the
designed and evaluated tool in that chapter is used as built-in function that continuously
“adjust(s) to the affective state of the user” (Vom Brocke et al., 2013). Each chapter is
structured similarly. The reader is provided with a short introduction, the theoretical
background necessary for the topic presented, followed by a description of the design
and method. Next the results are presented, followed by a discussion and the conclusion.
In Chapter 2 we4 describe an experiment on regret. The emotional reactions
elicited by the loser and winner regret feedback information are compared with each
other and their influence on economic decision making is analyzed. Chapter 2 is based
on joint research with Marc T.P. Adam, Christine Caroline Jähnig and Stefan Seifert
(cf. Astor et al., 2011). Chapter 3 analyzes and compares the psychophysiological
patterns resulting from the “joy of winning” and “frustration of losing” in first-price
sealed-bid auctions. The remainder of the chapter discusses the results and balances
their implications. It is based on joint research with Marc T.P. Adam, Christine
Caroline Jähnig and Stefan Seifert (cf. Astor et al., 2013). Chapter 4 investigates
how incidental and even subliminal emotions affect physiology and economic decision
making, and then analyzes the moderating effects subjects’ emotion regulation strategies
have on the bidding process and the mediating effect of subjects’ affective responses.
It is based on joint research with Marc T.P. Adam and Jan Krämer (cf. Astor et al.,
2013). Chapter 5 describes the design, implementation and evaluation of a NeuroIS
tool for improving emotion regulation. Thereby, three design requirements are defined
which must be met along the game evaluation process of the tool. This chapter is based
on joint research with Marc T.P. Adam, Petar Jerčić, Kristina Schaaff and Christof
Weinhardt (cf. Astor et al., 2013) and on joint research with Petar Jerčić, Marc T. P.
Adam, Olle Hilborn, Kristina Schaaff, Craig Lindley, Charlotte Sennersten, Jeanette
Eriksson) (cf. Jerčić et al., 2012). Finally Chapter 6 summarizes the key contributions
of the thesis, discusses limitations of both the employed methodology and findings, and
outlines highly interesting topics for future work.
4The we refers to both; the readers of this work and my co-authors. I particularly thank Christof






Aspects of Auction Design
Recent research strengthens the conjecture that human decision making stems from a
complex interaction of rational judgment and emotional processes. A prominent exam-
ple of the impact of emotions in economic decision making is the effect of regret-related
information feedback on bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions. Re-
vealing the information “missed opportunity to win” upon losing an auction, results
in higher bids. Revealing the information “money left on the table” upon winning an
auction, results in lower bids. The common explanation for this pattern is winner and
loser regret. However, this explanation is still hypothetical and little is known about the
actual emotional processes that underlie this phenomenon. This chapter investigates
actual emotional processes in auctions with varying feedback information. Thereby,
we provide an approach that combines an auction experiment with psychophysiological
measures which indicate emotional involvement. Our economic results are in line with
those of previous studies. Moreover, we can show that loser regret results in a stronger
emotional response than winner regret. Remarkably, loser regret is strong for high values
of “missed opportunity.” However, the pattern for different amounts of “money left on
the table” is diametric to what winner regret theory suggests.
2.1. Introduction
Meanwhile auctions are “one of the greatest success stories of web-based services” (Ariely
and Simonson, 2003, quot. by Adam, 2010). However, our understanding of how rational
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and emotional processes of human decision making interact in the context of electronic
markets is rather limited. Over the last years theoretical research has provided sophisti-
cated economic models which investigate rational bidding behavior (e.g. Krishna, 2002).
However, these models do not consider emotional aspects of human decision making.
Moreover, experimental tests have shown that the models often fail to accurately pre-
dict human decisions. Besides their mathematical beauty, normative models alone are
thus not sufficient to fully capture human decision making.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) states that a bidder’s behavior in a FPSB auction does
not only depend on the monetary profit she expects to gain, but also on two specific
emotions, namely loser and winner regret. In a FPSB auction, each bidder submits
a single sealed-bid. The bidder who has placed the highest bid obtains the item and
has to pay the amount of her bid. The bidder suffers from loser regret if she loses
the auction, but learns that the object was sold for a price below her own valuation.
This means that with a higher bid she could have won the item and made a profit.
Contrariwise, a bidder suffers from winner regret if she wins a FPSB auction but gets
notice of the second highest bid. She then knows that she has paid more than necessary
because with any bid just slightly above the second highest bid she would have won
the item at a lower price. The prerequisite for experiencing winner or loser regret is
the feedback or the information provided in a FPSB auction. In order to experience
loser regret (winner regret), the highest bid (second-highest bid) must be revealed to
the bidders. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) confirm this theory by analyzing
in a laboratory experiment. However, so far little is known about the actual emotional
processes which are responsible for the observed change in behavior. In this chapter, we
seek to shed more light on the question to what extent different feedback provided after
an auction impacts the emotions and the decisions of human bidders. More specifically,
we conduct a laboratory experiment in which we vary the feedback provided to auction
participants and measure their physiological correlates of emotional processing. In line
with Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008), we find
a systematic relation between feedback information and bidding behavior. In addition,
our results provide psychophysiological evidence for the emotional processing of feedback
information in electronic auctions. In terms of psychophysiology, loser regret results in
higher physiological responses than winner regret. Thereby, we confirm the theoretical
assumption of (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008) that the intensity of loser regret
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increases with the amount of missed profit. In contrast to the theoretical assumptions of
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) however, winning an auction at an unfavorable
price does not significantly arouse bidders. Rather, winning the auction with exactly
the right bid or only one unit too much results in a very strong emotional response.
This finding can be explained by considering relief and rejoice as two intense and influ-
ential emotions in the bidding process. The remainder of this chapter is structured as
follows. In Section 21 we provide an overview of how feedback in Information Systems
can induce emotions of winner and loser regret. Section 3 presents the experimental
design of our study. In Section 4, we present and discuss the economic as well as the
psychophysiological results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2.2. Theoretical Background
2.2.1. Regret in Economic Decision Making
Famously Roth (2002) put it in the following quote that markets don’t always grow like
weeds—some of them are hothouse orchids. Thereby Roth targets the multitude of de-
sign parameters and mechanisms inherent in market platforms, and their influence on
the final market outcome. This applies analogously to electronic markets (Weinhardt
et al., 2003), where research has for instance also shown that different electronic auction
mechanisms can influence the auction outcome to an enormous extent (Lucking-Reiley,
1999). Single variations on auction parameters and mechanism can have material impact
on participants’ bidding decisions, thereby affecting the auction outcome and seller rev-
enue (Cox et al., 1985). While former theoretical and experimental research specifically
compared varying auction mechanisms and the resulting auction outcome in reference
to the predicted Nash Equilibrium (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), more recent research
has picked up to notion that the understanding of human decision making is a nec-
essary prerequisite for a successful prediction of the auction outcome—and hence for
successful auction or market design. Therefore it is essential to understand the agents’
behavior and also their emotional processes. Regret appears as one emotion that is
suspected to significantly influence subjects’ decision behavior in the context of auctions
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989).
1Section 2.2 is in close accordance with the work of Adam (2010) on regret, who provides an excellent
account on the coherence of this emotion and (auction) decision making.
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According to Zeelenberg (1999) “regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that we
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better,
had we decided differently.” From an economists’ perspective regret was first taken
into account by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982), who enhanced expected
utility theory by the incorporation of regret. In their model a subject’s utility also
depends on the regret someone can experience after the decision is taken. While this
experience is ex post, anticipated regret can already be taken into account when one is
evaluating the options at hand. Thereby, the decision maker tries to avoid the experience
of this emotion and changes her behavior towards a regret-minimizing choice (Zeelenberg
et al., 1996). The authors state that regret is essential for decision making, which
they show in a set of simple gambling experiments. Strikingly, Zeelenberg et al. (1996)
finds that subjects’ behavior is in accordance with their regret theory, regardless of
whether the decision scenario promotes risk-aversive, or risk-seeking choices. This is
highly interesting as, especially in the context of first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions,
risk-aversion is regularly employed as an underlying explanation for subjects’ bidding
behavior above the risk neutral Nash Equilibrium (Cox et al., 1988). With respect to
psychophysiology, Coricelli et al. (2007) state that regret seems also from a neuroscience
perspective to be central in human decision making.
2.2.2. Winner and Loser Regret in Auctions
Following the introduction of regret into the field of economics by Bell (1982) and Loomes
and Sugden (1982), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) introduced a model which accounts for
the emotion regret in FPSB auctions. It is argued that subjects’ utility does not simply
depend on the monetary profit, but also on the regret that can be experienced depending
on the taken decision. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) particularly refers to winner regret
and loser regret in the context of a FPSB auction. Winner regret can be experienced
after the bidder has won the auction upon being informed about the second highest
bid. The difference between the winning and the second highest bid is referred to as
the “money left on the table.” This is the amount of money which the winner of the
auction could have gained more by placing an even lower bid. To the contrary, loser
regret can be experienced only after losing an auction. After losing, the revelation of the
winning bid informs the bidder about the “missed opportunity”, i.e. about the amount
of money which the bidder could have won in the auction by placing a higher (optimal)
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bid. It is important to note that the experience of winner or loser regret may influence
subjects’ subsequent bids. However, even the information, that subsequently to the
FPSB auction the information of the highest or second highest bid will be revealed,
could potentially increase subjects’ anticipation of winner and loser regret, and thereby
shift their bidding strategies. In his developed model Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) shows
analytically, under the assumption of identical weights of winner and loser regret, that
a subject’s bidding strategy is invariant of the incorporation of regret. However, if, as
one might assume, loser regret exceeds winner regret, than this should be reflected in
on average higher bids compared to the risk neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE). It has
long been known that bidders in FPSB auctions place considerably higher bids, than
the symmetric RNNE bidding strategy by Vickrey (1961) would predict (Kagel, 1995).
Before emotions were taken into account, but also up to today, bids exceeding the RNNE
are typically explained by the RNNE. However, as shown above, also the anticipation
or experience of loser regret could be a major influencing factor for individuals decision
behavior. In this context, Kagel (1995) argues that “risk aversion is one element, but
far from the only element, generating bidding above the RNNE”(quot. by Adam, 2010).
Several studies have meanwhile examined the influence of winner and loser regret on
decision making in the context of FPSB auctions. Specifically two studies in recent years
have drawn much attention. In a laboratory experiment with between-subject design
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) specifically investigate the influence of anticipated regret
on subjects decision making in a one-shot FPSB auction. Depending on the assigned
treatment, subjects solely receive subsequently to the auction the information on the
second highest bid (winner regret), on the highest bid (loser regret), or no such infor-
mation. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) employ a one-shot design, in order to assure
that learning effects can be excluded and that anticipated regret has to be the driver for
subjects decision behavior. The authors find support for loser regret, but not for winner
regret, as they compare the two treatment groups against the control group which does
not receive any feedback information. Additionally, by the usage of post-auction ques-
tionnaires, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) state that loser regret is experienced stronger
than winner regret, whereas winner regret is still experienced to some extent. Contrary,
to the one-shot experiment by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2008) follow the intuition that regret needs to be experienced a couple of times
in the context of auctions, before one starts to anticipate it and before one incorporates
15
Chapter 2. Measuring Regret: Emotional Aspects of Auction Design
it into his or her decision process. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) employ a
between-subject design with similar treatment groups as Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007).2
Moreover, they control for learning effects, as participants participate in a series of FPSB
auctions. Independently of the observation that bids decrease in the four treatment con-
ditions over time, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) find significant support for
both winner and loser regret. However, it must also be mentioned that recently there
have been negating findings with respect to the influence of regret in auctions. Katušcák
et al. (2013) find no systematic influence of loser regret in their experimental data set.
The authors come up with two essential observations. First, subjects assigned to the
loser regret condition do not place higher bids than the control condition; Second, also
subjects in the control condition employ “overbidding” to a large extent.
The main focus of this chapter is to investigate the impact of different information
feedback elements on the emotional processing and bidding behavior of human individu-
als in electronic markets. In short we focus on the following research questions: (1) Can
the emotional processes of regret be manipulated by systematically varying information
feedback and (2) how are these emotions reflected in bidding behavior? Therefore, we
conduct a laboratory experiment, in which we manipulate the feedback information in
FPSB auctions.
2.3. Design and Method
The experiment is similar to the experiment conducted by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Ka-
tok (2008). However, while Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) cannot determine
to what extent the information feedback induces the emotion regret, we use psychophys-
iological measurements in order to directly determine the intensity of emotions in the
moment they actually occur. More specifically, we continuously measure the partici-
pants’ skin conductivity as a proxy for their emotional processing (cf. Dawson et al.,
2007). Skin conductivity is a reliable indicator for arousal as it reflects the intensity of
an ongoing emotional process. In compliance with the theory of induced values (Smith,
1976), all decisions in this experiment are directly related to real monetary payoffs. This
means that each bidder has to accumulate so-called monetary units (MU), which are in-
2Additionally, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) design a fourth treatment condition, which
receives both feedback information, loser regret and winner regret.
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dividually converted into Euro and paid out in cash after the experiment. Thereby, 1
MU is equivalent to e0.03. Initially subjects are endowed with 100 MU as a lump sum
payment. Monetary units were chosen to keep the payment scheme simple and that
feasible bids were integers. This procedure is state-of-the-art in economic experiments
(Guala, 2005). With respect to reliability of economic experiments Falk and Heckman
(2009) note that “behavior in the laboratory is reliable and real: Participants in the lab
are human beings who perceive their behavior as relevant, experience real emotions, and
take decisions with real economic consequences” (quot. by Adam, 2010).
2.3.1. Treatment Structure








Display of missed opportu-
nity (MO) yes no no
Display of money left on the
table (MLOTT) no no yes
Number of subjects per
treatment 24 30 24
Number of sessions 4 5 4
As depicted in Table B.1, the experiment comprises three treatments: Loser Regret
(LR),Winner Regret (WR), and No Regret (NR). The experiment is based on a between-
subject design (Kagel, 1995), i.e. subjects exclusively participate in the LR, WR, or
NR treatment. The treatments vary in the form of feedback information provided to
the bidders after an auction ends. In the LR treatment, bidders are provided with
information regarding the highest bid in case of losing an auction. The amount of “missed
opportunity” is provided, i.e. the maximum profit a bidder could have gained ex post by
placing a higher bid. This amount equals to the own valuation vi minus the highest bid.
Thereby, a bidder can learn ex post that she actually could have gained a profit by placing
a higher bid. In the WR treatment, bidders are provided with information regarding
the second-highest bid in case of winning an auction. The amount of “money left on the
table” is provided, i.e. the difference between the winning bid and the second highest
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bid. Thereby, a bidder can learn ex post that she actually paid too much and could
have gained a higher profit by placing a lower bid. In contrast, in the NR treatment,
bidders are only informed whether they won or lost an auction. They do not obtain any
information regarding bids of the other bidders. The experimental system is implemented
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In order to allow for analyzing physiological reactions
in response to single information events, the feedback information is provided in timed
intervals. After the end of an auction, first a bidder is only informed whether she won
or lost the auction. After 5 seconds, the “missed opportunity” and “money left on
the table” information is displayed in the LR and WR treatments, respectively. In the
NR treatment, no additional information is provided. Figure 2.1 illustrates the auction
process.
2.3.2. Auction Process
In the experiment, each bidder takes part in a series of 50 FPSB auctions. Similar
to Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008), each subject bids against two computerized
agents to exclude social preferences and other interpersonal effects. Thus, there is no
strategic interaction with other human bidders in this experiment. In each auction, the
human and the computerized bidders each receive an individual valuation vi for the item
for sale in the auction. Then, each bidder i individually has to decide for an integer bid
bi between 0 MU and 100 MU. The bidder who placed the highest bid wins the auction
and has to pay the amount of her bid. The incentive for participating is to obtain the
profit Πi = vi − bi in the case of winning. In the case of a draw, the human bidder
automatically wins. The computerized agents independently draw valuations form a
uniform distribution with support on the integer set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 100} MU. Following
the symmetric Nash equilibrium of Vickrey (1961), each computerized agent places a
bid bi according to the function bi(vi) = (2/3)vi, rounded to the nearest integer, in all
treatments. Thereby, the computerized agents assume that the valuations of the human
bidder stem from the same distribution as their own valuations. However, following
the approach of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008), the human bidder receives her
valuation from a permutation of the values 50 MU, 60 MU, 70 MU, 80 MU, and 90 MU.
The bidder keeps a randomly chosen valuation for 10 consecutive auctions. For instance,
a bidder receives the valuation of 80 in the first auction and then keeps this valuation
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until she receives a new valuation in the eleventh auction. Section 3.3.2 provides a more
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Figure 2.1.: Illustration of the Auction Process with the Regret Information being Dis-
played at ’Regret Information’
2.3.3. Procedure
This laboratory experiment was conducted at the KIT, Karlsruhe, Germany. Partici-
pants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students using the ORSEE software
environment (Greiner, 2004). Altogether 78 (19 female and 59 male) subjects partici-
pated in 13 sessions. Each session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. In this experiment,
the average payment was e19.82, with e12.30 and e23.01 being the minimum and max-
imum payments, respectively. During the whole experiment, participants’ skin conduc-
tance was measured with a constant current amplifier measurement system and Ag/AgCl
(silver/silver chloride) electrodes. The electrodes were attached on the thenar and hy-
pothenar eminences of the palm of the non-dominant hand by use of standard EDA
electrode paste (cf. Boucsein, 1992)). See Adam (2010) for a more detailed description.
Following the recommendations of Schmidt and Walach (2000) an initial five minute rest
period is conducted during this preparation phase for calibration purposes. Moreover,
participant interactions with the experimental system is limited to mouse inputs and
participants are equipped with a pair of ear-muffs to avoid sensitivity to background
noise. All sessions were conducted in spring 2010 with an average room temperature
of 25 °C (77 °F). These values are within the methodological recommendations of the
Society for Psychophysiological Research (cf. Fowles et al., 1981). One subject had to
be removed from the whole dataset due to failed comprehension. For one session in the
NR treatment, physiological measurements failed to operate. Moreover, 12 participants
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turned out to be non-responders regarding electrodermal activity, i.e. they do not show
physiological responses. Hence, the economic analysis is based on 77 participants. The
physiological analysis is based on 59 participants.
2.3.4. Measures
We accounted for the bids in the respective treatment conditions. The emotional re-
sponse is assessed by analyzing the skin conductivity data. The skin conductance re-
sponse amplitude (SCR.amp) is a proxy for the intensity of immediate emotions induced
by a discrete stimulus. Since this response usually occurs 1 to 3 seconds after the re-
spective event (Boucsein, 1992; Schmidt and Walach, 2000), only those amplitudes that
were observed within that time frame were taken into account. Furthermore and in line
with Fowles et al. (1981), only amplitudes greater or equal to .01 µS were considered.
The SCR amplitudes were obtained by decomposing skin conductivity into its tonic and
phasic components using the Ledalab analysis software (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010).
Following the recommendation of Venables and Christie (1980), all SCR.amp values x
were then transformed according to log(x+ 1) in order to reduce the inherent left skew-
ness of the SCR.amp. In the analysis, we focus specifically on the average SCR.amp
in response to learning different feedback information in the LR and WR treatment,
respectively. Additionally, we assessed demographic factors such as age and sex.
2.4. Results
In this section we present and discuss the economic as well as the psychophysiological
results of the experiment. The key focus of the analysis is to investigate how the provision
of loser and winner regret information changes the emotional processing of participants,
and if this emotional process is linked to actual bidding behavior. For more information
regarding subjects’ general bidding behavior see Section
2.4.1. Feedback Information and Bidding Behavior
First we focus on how different feedback information influences bidding behavior. Fol-
lowing the theoretical predictions of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), providing the bidders
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with the loser (winner) regret information should result in higher (lower) bids. This is
reflected in the Hypotheses H1a and H1b:
H1a: Bidders place higher bids, if they are informed about missed opportu-
nities (LR treatment) in comparison to the NR treatment.
H1b: Bidders place lower bids, if they are provided with the information how
much money they “left on the table” (WR treatment) in comparison to the
NR treatment.
Figure 2.2 depicts box plots for the distribution of bids in the three treatments of
the experiment. The box plots show the quartiles of the bids, as well as the minimum
and maximum observation. As stated in hypothesis H1a, the bids in the LR treatment
are above the bids in the NR treatment. Moreover, and in line with hypothesis H1b,
the bids in the WR treatment are below the bids in the NR treatment. In order to
analyze whether the results are comparable with previous work, we calculate the ratio
of a bidder’s valuation and her actual bid, the so-called bid/value ratio (b/v).
The average bid/value ratios of our experiment are summarized along with the pre-
vious results in the literature in Table 2.2. In parentheses, the standard deviations are
given. Our economic results are in line with those of previous studies. Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay (2007) observe bid/value ratios of .79 and .77 for subjects in the NR and LR
treatments, respectively.








Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) (4
bidders per auction) .87 .79 .77
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2008) (3 bidders per auction) .776 (.048) .715 (.069) .697 (.065)
Present study (3 bidders per
auction) .756 (.057) .729 (.061) .696 (.050)
In contrast, subjects in the LR condition place significantly higher bids (.87).
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) report average bid-value ratios of .77 for LR
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Figure 2.2.: Bids for Each Treatment
bids. Subjects exposed to LR and NR place bids of .72 and .70, respectively. In all three
experiments, the bidders on average place their bids above the theoretical benchmark of
the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy.
We use an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model, in order to test the sta-
tistical significance of loser regret and winner regret on the bidders’ bids. Different to
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) we explicitly look at the valuation {50, 60, 70,
80, 90} as independent and the bid as dependent variable rather than only the bid/value
ratio as dependent variable. Thus, with 77 subjects in the economic analysis and 5 ob-
servations per subject, the regression is based on 385 observations. Table 2.3 shows
the results of the OLS regression. In line with hypothesis H1a, bidders place higher
bids in the LR treatment in comparison to the NR treatment (B = 1.858, se = .651,
t = 2.853, p < .01). Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that “missed oppor-
tunity” feedback information has no impact on bidding behavior in favor for hypothesis
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Table 2.3.: Regression Model for Bids
Dependent Variable Bid
Independent variables B SE t-Stat p-value Sig.
value .465 .651 24.480 <.001 ∗∗∗
Loser Regret (LR) 1.858 .651 2.853 .005 ∗∗
Winner Regret (WR) -2.292 .767 -3.520 <.001 ∗∗∗
c (constant) 18.888 1.991 9.488 <.001 ∗∗∗
n = 77 x 5
R2 = .626
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
H1a. Moreover, and in line with hypothesis H1b bidders place lower bids in the WR
treatment in comparison to the no regret treatment (B = −2.292, se = .767, t = −3.520,
p < .001). Therefore, we can also reject the null hypothesis that “money left on the
table” feedback information has no impact on bidding behavior in favor for hypothesis
H1b. In summary, we conclude from the economic data that bidders place higher bids
in the LR treatment (hypothesis H1a) and lower bids in the WR treatment (hypothe-
sis H1b). When taking a closer look at the constant term c of the regression, one can
observe that c is above zero (18.888). Thus, including a bidder’s valuation v in the anal-
ysis allows for a more finely grained analysis than the simplified bid/value ratio used
for reasons of comparability with the other studies in Table 2.3 which implicitly assume
that c is zero.
2.4.2. Feedback Information and Emotional Intensity
The bidders’ log transformed average SCR.amp in response to receiving the “missed
opportunity” and “money left on the table” feedback information for the LR and WR
treatment are depicted in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. As by construction there is no such
feedback information provided in the NR treatment, there are also no physiological
responses to feedback information in the NR treatment. Little is known about subjects’
actual emotional processing in response to varying regret feedback information in FPSB
auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) argue that the utility a bidder derives
from a FPSB auction does not only depend on the monetary gains and losses, but also
on the degree of winner and loser regret. According to Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2008) the perceived ex ante expected utility of a bidder with valuation v and bid b is
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Π(b, v) ≡ (v − b)F (b) −
∫
z:z≤b α(b− z)dF (z) −
∫
z:b≤z≤v β(v − z)dF (z)
where z denotes the highest bid made by the competitors (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok, 2008). F denotes the cumulative distribution function of z. The first part of
the formula refers to the expected monetary payoff as postulated by standard auction
theory. The latter part takes into account the disutility of winner regret and loser
regret, respectively. The amount of “missed opportunity” translates into (v − z). The
amount of “money left on the table” translates into (b − z). The coefficients α and β
refer to the weight of winner and loser regret, respectively. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2008) theoretically show that if bidders equally weigh winner and loser regret
(α = β), then regret has no influence on decision making in FPSB auctions. However,
the authors conclude from their experimental results that “participants put more weight
on the loser’s regret than on the winner’s regret” (α < β). We specifically analyze the
bidders’ emotional response in the very moment the bidders learn about their “missed
opportunity” and “money left on the table,” respectively. Thereby, we test the conjecture
that the loser regret is weighted stronger than winner regret (α < β). This translates
into hypothesis H1c.
H1c: The emotional response to the feedback information in the LR treat-
ment (“missed opportunity”) is stronger than in the WR treatment (“money
left on the table”).
As depicted in Figure 2.3, and in line with H1c, the physiological response to the
feedback information in the LR treatment is stronger than the response to the feedback
information in the WR treatment. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of
H1c (.104 vs. .076, n = 185, t(183) = 2.092, p < .05). The bidders in fact show a
stronger emotional response to the feedback information in the LR treatment. This is in
line with the assumption of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) that the participants
weigh the loser regret information stronger than the winner regret information (α < β).
After observing the differences between the WR and LR treatment, we will now turn





























Figure 2.3.: Average SCR.amp to Loser Regret Information and Winner Regret
Information
2.4.3. Emotional Intensity of the Loser Regret Information
First we take a closer look on the emotional processing of the LR feedback information.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) state that “regret enters additively into the
bidder’s utility function, and that the effect of regret on the bidder’s utility function
is proportional to the amount of regret suffered.” Following this statement, we would
assume that the experienced regret increases with the value of the “missed opportunity.”
In the utility function of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) as depicted in Section
2.4.2, this translates into the term β(v−z) If this is true, the bidders’ emotional response
should be stronger for increasing values of (v − z) This translates into hypothesis H1d:
H1d: The emotional response to the feedback information in the LR treat-
ment is stronger for high amounts of “missed opportunity” than for low
amounts of “missed opportunity.”
The bidders’ log transformed average SCR.amp in response to learning the regret
information in the LR treatment for different amounts of “missed opportunity” is de-
picted in Figure 2.4. Each class consists of similar sample sizes. Figure 2.4 indicates
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Figure 2.4.: Average SCR.amp to Different Classes of Loser Regret Information
that the psychophysiological response increases with higher amounts of “missed oppor-
tunity.” This is in line with our hypothesis H1d. The correlation between the emotional
response and the increasing degrees of “missed opportunity” is not significant for these
4 classes. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. We attribute this to the high
between-subject variability of skin conductivity and the low number of observations for
different degrees of “missed opportunity.” However, when merging observations into two
classes with similar sample sizes, a one-sided t-test reveals that the emotional response
to the two different classes of MO is marginally significantly different (.087 vs. .110,
n = 174, t(172) = −1.363, p < .10).3 At this stage, we can conclude that “missed op-
portunity” leads an intense emotional response, which is stronger than the “money left
on the table” information. The question whether higher amounts “missed opportunity”
result in stronger emotional responses will have to be investigated in future research.
3Note, that this analysis is slightly modified compared to Astor et al. (2011) as four physiological non-
responders were excluded; however, the main results are invariably robust against this procedure.
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2.4.4. Emotional Intensity of the Winner Regret Information
In the next step the emotional processing of the WR feedback information will be an-
alyzed. According to Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) the winner regret should
also rise with increasing amounts of “money left on the table.” In the utility function as
depicted in Section 2.4.2, this is reflected in the term β(b − z). When regret increases
with the amount of money left on the table this also should be observable within the
physiological data. This translates into hypothesis H1e:
H1e: The emotional response to the feedback information in the WR treat-
ment is stronger for high amounts of “money left on the table” than for low
amounts of “money left on the table.”
 
Figure 2.5.: Average SCR.amp to Different Classes of Winner Regret Information
In contrast to the last section, the physiological data does not support the model
of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) regarding the winner regret. Quite to the
contrary, the bidders experience high intensities of emotional processing for low values
of (b − z). The bidders’ log transformed average SCR.amp in response to learning the
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regret information in the WR treatment for different amounts of “money left on the
table” is depicted in Figure 2.5. Very small values of “money left on the table” (i.e.
values of 0 or 1) induce very high physiological responses. On the other hand, high
amounts of “money left on the table” result in relatively small responses (.116 vs. .066,
n = 395, t(393) = 2.484, p < .05). Taking into account the physiological data, it seems
that actually the experience of winning an auction with a very small amount ahead
reveals relief or a thrill of winning and is central to participants. Suffering from winner
regret on the other hand, when winning at a not optimal price, does not seem to be
central in subjects’ emotional experience. Therefore, we state that winner regret is only
minor and not that important in subjects’ emotional processing compared to loser regret.
This high response can be interpreted as relief or even thrill of winning instead of winner
regret, since the bidder won by a very small amount.
2.5. Discussion and Conclusions
2.5.1. Theoretical Implications
The hypotheses in the present study are closely linked to those of Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok (2008). The majority of the initial hypotheses are supported by our data.
This confirms the view that emotions, more specifically regret, can be deliberately
elicited by well planned design features of Information Systems. In addition our data
strengthens the claim that these design features can also influence bidding decisions.
Our results do not only support the original view of how regret effects bidding behavior.
The original hypothesis that the intensity of winner regret increases with the amount
of “money left on the table” is challenged by the present study. With the support of
physiological measures it becomes apparent that bidders show a stronger reaction to
near gains, than to huge amounts of “money left on the table.” Different explanations
for this deviation from theory are possible. It is possible that feelings of relief and rejoice
outweigh the importance of winner regret. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) point
to a similar explanation. Regarding their experiment Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2008) state “that subjects tend to anticipate loser’s regret, but tend not to anticipate
winner’s regret until they have experienced it a couple of times.” Since loser regret is
more intuitive than winner regret, this could be an explanation for the differing emo-
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tional responses. Alternatively, loser regret after losing an auction could simply be more
arousing than winner regret after the experience of winning. The good experience of
winning cannot be distracted by the information of how much “money (was) left on the
table.”
2.5.2. Limitations
With respect to the economic analysis the valuation, which subjects received, picks up
lots of explanatory power in this experiment, each subject entered the regression with
five observation points—one for each valuation. Reducing the statistical analysis to one
observation per subject leads to weaker results due to the limited number of participants.
With respect to psychophysiology, 20 subjects were analyzed for each treatment condi-
tion. Similarly to the economic analysis the comparison of loser versus winner regret
was based on five responses per subject—one for each valuation of each subject. With
respect to the more detailed analyses on winner and loser regret, observations were taken
independently into account. Due to this procedure, the exploratory power of tests and
regressions employed in this experiment might be limited. Therefore, the explanatory
power of our findings have to be taken with a grain of salt.
2.5.3. Conclusions
Including emotions into economic models of human behavior in electronic markets has
been long overdue. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) developed such a model for
bidding in FPSB auctions that includes two very decision relevant emotions, namely loser
regret and winner regret. Although the model has been tested empirically the integration
of emotions into the bidding process is based on purely theoretical assumptions. The
present chapter fills this gap by actually measuring bidders’ physiological reactions to
regret relevant information. Resulting from the cited previous work on regret in FPSB
auctions two major research questions were posed: (1) Can the emotional processes
of regret be manipulated by systematically varying information feedback and (2) how
are these emotions reflected in bidding behavior? The first questions can be answered
with a clear “yes.” As depicted in Figure 2.3 bidders experience more intense emotions,
upon receiving loser regret information compared to receiving winner regret information.
The second research question can only be answered in parts. Even though different
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feedback information elicits different physiological patterns and significantly different
bidding behavior, the relationship between bidding behavior and emotional response is
a complex interaction of cognitive and emotional processes, including regret and relief.
In order to better understand this relationship, there is a need for future research. In
the present chapter we have only reported on skin conductance as an indicator for the
intensity of emotions. In the next chapter also the question how winning and losing itself
is experienced in a FPSB auction. Thereby, the physiological parameter heart rate will
be employed as it is especially of use to gain more insight about the valence associated
with the auction outcome.
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The Joy of Winning and the
Frustration of Losing
As examined in the last section subjects experience regret in response to a feedback in-
formation indicated ex post after they already know about the auction outcome. There
is also literature which suggests that the auction outcome itself elicits an aversive “frus-
tration of losing,” as well as a rewarding “joy of winning” response. However, little is
known about the intensity of these emotional reactions and how they relate to other
factors in the auction process. In this chapter, we continue our investigation of how
subjects experience winning and losing in the FPSB auction. The psychophysiological
measures SCR and heart rate (HR) were recorded as proxies for both the intensity and
the valence of emotions. Our results show that the deceleratory responses in HR when
losing an auction are stronger than when winning an auction. The drop in HR itself
can be interpreted as a reaction to stimuli with negative emotional valence. Moreover,
we find that winning an auction induces a stronger SCR compared to losing an auction.
An explanation for this pattern is that subjects try to inhibit or regulate their negative
emotions after losing an auction—the concept of Emotion Regulation will be examined
more deeply in Chapter 4. Interestingly, this distinction in emotional response between
winning and losing even holds for different value classes and different amounts of payoffs.
Moreover, we can show that bidders’ SCR.amps increase in the relation to the amount
of money at stake. However, it is not possible to definitely determine as to whether the
valuation triggers this effect or the potential nominal payoff.
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3.1. Introduction
Auctions, especially online auctions, have become increasingly popular in the last decade
(Ariely and Simonson, 2003). What makes auctions so attractive despite the fact that
they sometimes result in even higher prices than fixed price offers on retail sites (Lucking-
Reiley, 1999; Malmendier and Szeidl, 2008)? According to Bapna et al. (2001), the
purchase decision of consumers is based on whether they want to buy something at an
unexciting fixed price (e.g., amazon.com) or experience the “bazaar-like competitive at-
mosphere” of an online auction (quot. by Adam, 2010). Stafford and Stern (2002) argued
that the emotions bidders experience in online auctions are a source of hedonic shopping
value, and thus a distinctive feature of online auctions in comparison to fixed price retail
sites. Lee et al. (2009, p.93) claimed that the “thrill of bidding, excitement of winning,
[and the] stimulation of beating competitors” play an important role in why consumers
choose to participate in online auctions (quot. by Adam, 2010). In this regard, they
supported Herschlag and Zwick (2000) conjecture that “winning is the aphrodisiac that
gets the shopping juices flowing” and that the joy of winning is the main driver of the
special shopping experience of online auctions. In this chapter, we analyze the emotions
or, more concisely, the immediate emotions that bidders experience when winning or
losing an auction. In the literature, these emotions are commonly referred to as the “joy
of winning” (Andreoni et al., 2007) and the “frustration of losing” (Ding et al., 2005).
However, only little is known about how bidders actually experience these emotions
and what their determinants are. Therefore, we argue that a deeper understanding of
the bidders’ emotions may facilitate building more sophisticated economic models that
include the valence and intensity of emotions in the bidders’ utility functions. In par-
ticular, this study looks at whether winning or losing an auction has a greater impact
on bidders in terms of emotional intensity and how the different emotional values of
winning and losing are reflected in the distinct patterns of HR changes. In order to do
this, we conducted a laboratory experiment, in which subjects participated in a series of
FPSB auctions. Some prominent examples of FPSB auctions include auctions of U.S.
treasury bills, Japanese Fish Markets, or closed bids for real estate in the private sector.
In an FPSB auction, each bidder submits a single sealed bid. The bidder who places the
highest bid obtains the item and has to pay the amount of his or her bid (Vickrey, 1961).
In order to monitor the emotional reactions that accompany the bidding process, we ac-
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tually measure the galvanic skin conductance of the subjects and an electrocardiogram
is used to record their response to the auction outcome. These physiological parame-
ters are well-established proxies for emotional processing in psychophysiology (Boucsein,
1992; Berntson et al., 2007).
The results provided in this chapter allow us to draw conclusions about how people
experience auctions. Since emotions may significantly impact the behavior of individ-
uals (Zeelenberg, 1999), analyzing emotional reactions in auctions will help to better
understand consumer behavior. The applied methodology in terms of galvanic skin
conductance response resulted in physiological data which showed a stronger response
to winning an FPSB auction than to losing an auction. This indicates that winning
an auction is processed more intensely than losing an auction. Moreover, participants
experience winning and losing more intensely when the valuation for the good being
auctioned is higher. The physiological data also gives some indication regarding the
valence of the respective emotions. In fact, losing an auction causes a significant drop in
HR. This response is similar to the phasic changes in HR that were observed in previous
studies. For instance, Bradley et al. (2008) reported deceleratory responses when partic-
ipants were shown pleasant and unpleasant pictures. These deceleratory responses were
stronger for unpleasant pictures in comparison to pleasant pictures. Thus, we suspect
that the observed drop in HR in response to losing a FPSB auction is also a reflection
of an unpleasant emotion, which we interpret as a sign of frustration. The remainder of
this chapter is structured as follows: We first provide an overview of the emotions that
bidders may experience when winning or losing an auction.1 Based on this theoretical
background, we outline the experimental design of our study. Then, we present and
discuss the results of the experiment. Finally, the last section concludes and discusses
the outlook for future research.
3.2. Theoretical Background
3.2.1. The Joy of Winning and the Frustration of Losing
Emotions play an important role in human decision making (Elster, 1998; Rick and
Loewenstein, 2008; Steffen et al., 2009). In this chapter, we define an emotion according
1Parts of Section 3.1 and 3.2 are in strong accordance with Adam (2010), who provides a very good
account of the emotions afflicted to winning and losing in the context of auctions.
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to Myers (2004, p. 500) as a subjectively experienced state that is characterized by
conscious experience, which is generally accompanied by expressive behavior and phys-
iological arousal. Emotionally arousing stimuli usually elicit physiological responses
(Boucsein, 1992; Bechara et al., 2005). This means that the subjectively experienced
emotion is related to objectively observable physiological parameters which can be in-
terpreted as proxies of the actual emotion. Emotional stimuli are often characterized
in the two dimensions of valence and arousal (Gläscher and Adolphs, 2003). These two
dimensions are reflected in different physiological indices (HR and SCR) and serve to
index emotional processing (Lang et al., 1993). We measure these physiological reactions
of human bidders while they are participating in a series of FPSB auctions.
In particular, we focus on the physiological reactions exhibited when the auction out-
come is revealed (Adam et al., 2011). In single unit auctions, the auction outcome
determines which bidder obtains the commodity for sale and how much he or she has to
pay for it. Traditional auction theory, which is based on game theory and mathemat-
ical models, only considers the monetary utility associated with this auction outcome
(Vickrey, 1961; McAfee and McMillan, 1987). However, the bidders may also derive
(non-monetary) utility from winning the inherent competition of an auction that is
“over and beyond any monetary payoffs” (Cooper and Fang, 2008, Roider and Schmitz,
2012, quot. by Adam, 2010). In our experiment, we emphasize the competitiveness of
auctions by referring to the bidder who obtains the item as the “winner” and all other
bidders as the “losers” of an auction. This terminology is based on the perceptions of
bidders as reported by Ariely and Simonson (2003) who found in an Internet survey that
76.8 per cent of the respondents considered other bidders as “competitors” and referred
to auction outcomes as “winning” or “losing“ (quot. by Adam, 2010).
In the literature, the emotion triggered by the event of winning an auction and receiv-
ing a positive monetary payoff has been referred to as the “joy of winning” (Goeree and
Offerman, 2003; Andreoni et al., 2007). According to Ockenfels et al. (2006), this util-
ity stems from the “thrill of competing against other bidders” (quot. by Adam, 2010).
Similarly, Fliessbach et al. (2007) argued that in addition to a monetary reward, “outper-
forming someone else” can also induce the joy of winning (quot. by Adam, 2010). Ertaç
et al. (2011) suggested that the “joy of winning” explains the willingness-to-pay to enter
an auction of male bidders to a greater extent than it explains the willingness-to-pay
of female bidders. Other authors also refer to this non-monetary incentive component
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as a “love of winning” (Morgan et al., 2003, Kogan and Morgan, 2009, quot. by Adam,
2010). In contrast, if a bidder loses an auction, he or she may experience the “frustration
of losing” (Ding et al., 2005). Adam et al. (2012) found that due to the “click-to-win”
characteristic of Dutch auctions, the frustration of losing a Dutch auction is experienced
stronger than the joy of winning a Dutch auction. According to Cramton et al. (2012),
internalized “fear of losing” can lead to higher bids in clock auctions (quot. by Adam,
2010). Following the reasoning of Delgado et al. (2008), this frustration stems from
“losing the social competition” (quot. by Adam, 2010). Therefore, it is an inherent
characteristic of auctions that the shopping experience results in either a “rewarding”
or an “aversive” emotion (Frijda, 1986) at the end of the auction. Table 3.1 provides an
overview of selected literature on the joy of winning and the frustration of losing.
While the joy of winning or the frustration of losing are rather intuitive concepts,
there is a debate in the literature as to which of these two emotions has a greater impact
on bidders and how these emotions influence future bidding behavior (Ku et al., 2005;
Delgado et al., 2008). In this regard, one should keep in mind that the joy of winning
and the frustration of losing only have an indirect influence on bidding behavior. The
two emotions are triggered in response to an auction outcome; therefore they occur only
after the bidders have placed their bids. At the moment of placing a bid, the joy of
winning or the frustration of losing can only be anticipated or expected based on the
individual’s previous experience of auction outcomes. In psychological terms, the joy
of winning is an immediate emotion, while the expected joy of winning is an expected
emotion (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008; Adam et al., 2012).
Understanding these kinds of emotions and their role in auctions can help decipher be-
havioral patterns which cannot be explained by rational theory, e.g., the phenomenon of
overbidding. Although the research on auctions has started to consider emotions as pos-
sible determinants of the behaviors exhibited in auctions, the mechanisms through which
emotions influence the bidding process remain rather unclear. For example, Cooper and
Fang (2008) reported that the expected joy of winning and spitefulness can explain the
phenomenon of overbidding to some extent. In contrast, Andreoni et al. (2007) found
that, at most, the expected joy of winning is only the source of the overbidding observed
in 10 per cent of the cases. Goeree and Offerman (2003) did not find support for the the-
ory of the expected joy of winning; they attribute their results to loss aversion. Delgado
et al. (2008) argued that the “anticipation of the unpleasant state associated with loss”
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3.3. Design and Method
and the expected frustration of losing cause participants to increase their bids (quot. by
Adam, 2010).
It is important to note, however, that there are also explanations for overbidding in
the literature that are not directly related to emotions. Cox et al. (1988) introduced
a model of CRRA that provides a partial explanation of why bidders place bids above
the risk neutral RNNE bidding strategy derived by (Vickrey, 1961). However, Kagel
(1995, p. 525) argued that “risk aversion is one element, but far from the only element,
generating bidding above the RNNE“ (quot. by Adam, 2010). Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok (2009, p. 82) explicitly tested the CRRA model against an emotion based
regret model in a laboratory experiment and found “virtually no support for CRRA,”
but strong support for their regret model (quot. by Adam, 2010). These findings are
also in line with our results presented in Chapter 2. An alternative explanation for
overbidding in auctions is that bidders “might feel a bit like already owning the item”
and therefore are willing to place higher bids (Ehrhart et al., 2008, p. 3).
By recording physiological measures during FPSB auctions, we aim to apply psy-
chophysiological methods to the field of auction research to develop a better understand-
ing of how bidders actually experience the outcome of an auction. This can contribute
to more sophisticated economic models that incorporate the emotions of bidders in their
utility functions.
3.3. Design and Method
We employed Smith’s induced value theory in our study and real monetary payoffs
for all the bids placed (cf. Smith, 1976). Subjects were initially endowed with 100 MU.
Throughout the experiment they accumulated profits (and potential losses) from bidding
in the auctions. After the end of a session, the final balance of the experimental accounts
was converted into euros at an exchange rate of e 0.03/MU and paid out in cash to the
respective participants. The experiment described in this chapter was initially designed
to analyze the impact of different informational feedback mechanisms with regard to the
bidding behavior of participants in FPSB auctions. The results regarding the different
feedback have been reported in Chapter 2. This Chapter presents the physiological
responses to the events of winning and losing for all subjects that were recorded in the
37
Chapter 3. The Joy of Winning and the Frustration of Losing
same experiment. Since the analysis in this chapter covers all subjects similarly the
Auction Process and Procedure will be described here in more detail.
3.3.1. Treatment Structure
Core elements of the study design were inspired by an experiment carried out by
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008). However, some changes to their original set
up were made in order to facilitate the analysis of the physiological parameters. The
main difference was that in the experiment conducted by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Ka-
tok (2008, p. 812), a subject’s bid was automatically submitted in ten consecutive
auctions with independent valuations and bids of the competing computerized bidders.
While that design is supposed to speed up learning “by experiencing a large number
of auctions”, we were interested in the immediate emotional response to an individual
auction result rather than a reaction to an average of several past outcomes. Thus,
in our experiment, the subjects submitted individual bids in each auction. Moreover,
in the physiological measurements, we sought to reduce the noise caused by the body
movements of the participants in handling the keyboard and mouse as they entered
bids. Therefore, we restricted the bids (of both humans and computers) to integers and
our participants only had a mouse but no keyboard to operate the software. Bids were
submitted by clicking on the button that represented the respective integer amount. In
detail, each subject took part in a series of 50 FPSB auctions with two computerized
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Figure 3.1.: Illustration of the auction process with the result information being dis-
played at ’Result Information’
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3.3.2. Auction Process
In every auction, the human bidder and the two computerized bidders each received
an individual valuation vi for the item being sold in the auction. Each bidder i then
submitted a bid bi. The bidder who submitted the highest bid made a profit Πi = vi−bi.2
A losing bidder made a profit of zero. In each auction, the computerized agents were
assigned independently drawn valuations from a uniform distribution with support on
the integer set {0 MU, 1 MU, 2 MUs, . . . , 100 MUs}. Like in the experiment carried
out by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008), the human bidders received one of only
five distinct valuations from the set {50 MUs, 60 MUs, 70 MUs, 80 MUs, and 90 MUs}
in each auction. Moreover, each human bidder was assigned each of these valuations
exactly ten times in consecutive auctions, i.e., a human bidder had the same valuation
in auctions 1 to 10, in auctions 11 to 20, and so on. Only the order of the five valuation
levels was randomly permutated from bidder to bidder.3 This auction mechanism was
explained to the participants in a previous instruction. The participants knew that
they bid against computerized agents and were told that the computerized agents were
programmed in a way that would maximize their expected earnings if they bid in an
auction with two other identically programmed computers. A bidding function was
implemented, in which the computers bid 2/3vi, rounded to the nearest integer.4 Due
to the asymmetry of the valuations, if a human bidder were to maximize his or her
expected payoff, then he or she would win about half (51 per cent) of the auctions.5
2If the human participant’s bid came to a tie with the high computer bid, the human bidder won the
auction (see Neugebauer and Selten (2006) for a similar procedure). The advantage of this approach
compared to breaking ties at random is that the outcome of any auction can be clearly classified
in terms of the regret of the human bidder: If the human loses the auction, he or she will usually
experience loser regret (no regret if the computer’s bid equals the human bidder’s valuation), no
regret in the case of a tie and winner regret if the human bidder’s bid is strictly larger than the
opponents’ bids. This is less clear with a random tie breaking rule.
3Note that this is slightly different from the design of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008).
4Strictly speaking, the symmetric risk-neutral equilibrium with the given discrete valuations and in-
teger bids would have been [2/3vi], where [x] denotes the largest integer not exceeding x. To the
authors’ knowledge, there is neither a general formula for bidding equilibria in discrete FPSB auc-
tions, nor a compact analytical proof for our case. We verified the equilibrium conditions on a
complete numerical evaluation.
5Given the implemented strategy of the computerized opponents and the tie breaking rule which
favors the human bidder, the best (risk-neutral) response by the human bidders were b(50) = 33,
b(60) = 39, b(70) = 47, b(80) = 53, b(90) = 59.
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3.3.3. Procedure
In order to investigate the participants’ emotional activation, the “mobile Body % Mind
Monitoring System” was used (Gharbi et al., 2008). Over the course of the experiment,
the participants’ skin conductivity was recorded with a constant current amplifier mea-
surement system and Ag/AgCl electrodes. The electrodes were attached on the thenar
and hypothenar eminences of the palm of the non-dominant hand with standard elec-
trodermal activity electrode paste (Boucsein, 1992). Following the recommendations of
Schmidt and Walach (2000), each session started with an initial five minute rest period
for calibration. All of the sessions were conducted in spring 2010 with an average room
temperature of 25°C (77°F). These values are within the methodological recommenda-
tions of the Society for Psychophysiological Research (Fowles et al., 1981). The HR was
derived from an electrocardiogram recording device using a lead I method with single
use electrodes placed on the left and right wrist (Berntson et al., 2007). After every
auction, a prompt on the computer screen informed the bidder of whether or not he or
she had won the auction. In order to allow for analyzing the physiological responses and
distinguishing the physiological effects of bidding and being informed of the result, the
auction outcome was revealed only six seconds after the bidder had placed his or her bid.
As mentioned before, the participants’ interactions with the experimental system were
limited to mouse inputs (Adam et al., 2011). In order to avoid measurement artifacts
due to background noise, all the participants were equipped with earmuffs.
As described in Section 2.3.3 the experiment was conducted at the KIT. The software
interface was implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the information regard-
ing the point in time (in milliseconds) that the auction outcome was revealed to a bidder
was written into a separate log file by the experimental system so that the behavioral
data could be linked to the physiological measurements. The ORSEE software envi-
ronment was used to recruit participants from a pool of university students (Greiner,
2004). A total of 78 (19 female and 59 male) subjects participated in 13 sessions with
6 subjects each. Each session lasted for approximately 1.5 hours. The average payment
was e 19.82, with the minimum and maximum payment in the amount of e 12.30 and
e 23.01, respectively. After the instructions were read to the participants, they had to
complete a quiz of four to five questions regarding the auction mechanism before they
were allowed to start with 3 practice auctions, which were then followed by the actual se-
ries of 50 auctions. Due to a failure in comprehension, one (1) subject had to be removed
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from the dataset. In one session, the physiological measurements failed to operate and
therefore 6 participants had to be excluded from the physiological analyses. Moreover,
12 additional participants had to be removed from the skin conductance dataset because
their values were either outside the range of the measurement system or because they
did not show any physiological response (non-responders). This is a common problem
when measuring skin conductance (Boucsein, 1992; Dawson et al., 2007). With respect
to the HR, the measurement results of 5 subjects had to be removed from the data
sample because of too much noise on the signal. Consequently, the dataset contains 59
measurements for skin conductance and 66 for HR.
3.3.4. Measures
The intensity of the emotional response was assessed by analyzing the skin conductance
data. In the analysis, we investigate the impact of different auction outcomes on the
intensity of the physiological response. The SCR.amp was calculated for every bidder
subsequent to each of the 50 auction outcomes. Data treatment with respect to SCR.amp
was done analogously to Section 2.3.4. Additionally, in order to get a better account of
how strong the result information is actually processed, the data was normalized.6 This
is suitable as we are especially interested in the quality of joy of winning and frustration
of losing. Also the measured values for the retrieved for SCR.amp data vary greatly
between individuals. Therefore the normalization facilitates an interpersonal analysis of
the data. For the normalization, each of the measured values is divided by the subject’s
individual average SCR.amp in response to the event of being informed of their valuation.
Also, to some extent, considering only the relative change of the SCR.amp also allows
to control for differences in individual sympathetic activity with respect to the response
to new information on the computer screen We then computed the average SCR.amp
value for each bidder for the event of winning and losing an auction. Skin conductivity
is directly innervated by the sympathetic branch of the autonomous nervous system
(ANS) (Wallin, 1981), which provides important insight into the intensity of immediate
emotions. However, it does not provide any information regarding the valence of the
emotion, i.e., whether the subject regards the emotion as positive or negative.
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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In contrast, the heart is also innervated by the parasympathetic branch of the ANS
(Berntson et al., 2007). The parasympathetic activation subsequent to sensory intake is
usually reflected in an initial deceleration in HR, in which negative stimuli typically elicit
the strongest deceleratory responses (Bradley et al., 2008). Analyzing phasic changes in
HR allows an evaluation of the perceived valence of external stimuli. Thus, the aversive
event of losing an auction should result in a more pronounced drop in HR than winning an
auction. We follow the recommendations of the Society of Psychophysiological Research
(Jennings et al., 1981) for assessing HR by measuring the time between the successive
R-waves (i.e., the inter-beat intervals) in the electrocardiogram. This approach provides
an accurate measure of HR, which is indispensable in analyzing the phasic changes in
the signal. The HR for each bidder and every auction is referenced to the HR at the
moment that the auction outcome was revealed. Additionally, we assessed demographic
factors such as age and sex.
3.4. Results
Our analysis focuses on the bidders’ physiological reactions to different auction outcomes.
In particular, we investigated whether winning or losing an auction is more strongly
reflected in the physiological data. Before looking at the physiological data, results for
bidding behavior are presented.
3.4.1. General Bidding Behavior
Each subject participated in a series of 50 auctions with two computerized opponents.
A total of 82.6 per cent of the auction outcomes were efficient, i.e., won by the bidder
(human or computerized) with the highest valuation; inefficient outcomes of 17.4 per
cent were due to overly defensive (3.2 per cent) and overly aggressive (14.2 per cent)
bids placed by the human participants. Figure 3.2 depicts all of the bids placed by the
77 participants.
Most of the bids (3,020 of 3,850 bids, or 78.4 per cent) were placed within the (risk
averse) range of two thirds of the bidder’s valuation and his or her actual valuation.
Hence, the participants bid somewhat more aggressively than the theoretical risk-neutral
Nash equilibrium of a standard FPSB auction. This is also reflected in the fact that




Figure 3.2.: All Bids Placed by the 77 Human Participants for the Induced Valuations
{50, 60, 70, 80, 90}. The Top Line Shows all the Points where the Bids equal
the Valuations. The Bottom Line shows the Theoretical Optimal RNNE in
a Standard FSPB Auction with Three Bidders
best-response benchmark (51 per cent; see Section 3.3.2), were won by humans. A
balanced ratio of the two possible auction outcomes is necessary for a valid physiological
examination since the bidder may expect both outcomes equally. On average, human
participants bid 50.90 MU, which corresponds to an average bid/value ratio of 72.7 per
cent. This is consistent with the ratio observed by (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok,
2008).
3.4.2. Emotional Intensity of Winning and Losing
The normalized, average SCR.amps are depicted in the left bar chart in Figure 3.3. The
bar chart indicates that the physiological response to winning an auction is stronger
than the respective response to losing an auction. A paired sample two-sided t-test
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Figure 3.3.: The Left Bar Chart shows the Normalized Average SCR.amp in Response
to the Auction Outcome. The Right Bar Chart indicates the Normalized
Average SCR.amp in Response to the Auction Outcome for Different Valu-
ations {50, 60, 70, 80, 90}. The Bars Represent a Confidence Interval (CI)
of 95 Per Cent
shows that the difference in SCR.amp for different auction outcomes is significant (1.744
vs. 2.206, n = 59, t = −3.543, p < .001). At first glance, this is a somewhat surprising
result since rewarding and aversive stimuli are usually reflected in the SCR.amp in a
similar way (Lang et al., 1993)). We will return to this result in the discussion. In
order to gain a more fine-grained insight into the physiological data, we now take into
account the assumption that the emotional intensities experienced may also be subject
to the valuation of a bidder or his or her respective nominal payoff. For the 5 possible
valuations, it can easy be controlled for, since they were induced by the experimental
design. We take the normalized data for each bidder once again and compute an average
SCR.amp for whether the auction was won or lost. However, this time we calculate the
average SCR.amp for each subject and each valuation for both the auctions won and
lost. This results in ten average SCR.amp values for each bidder.7 The right bar chart in
Figure 3.3 depicts the normalized average SCR.amp in response to winning and losing an
auction for the five different valuations. The figure shows that the measured SCR.amp
is stronger if an auction was won compared to when an auction was lost and that this
7Some of the bidders did not win (or lose) an auction for a specific valuation; in these cases, it was
not possible to compute ten average SCR.amp values for the bidders. Therefore, those specific cases
were omitted in the subsequent analysis.
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result holds for each individual valuation. Remarkably, the emotional intensities seem
to become stronger as the valuations increase. In order to test the statistical significance
of this result, we use an OLS regression with adjusted standard errors for clusters in
subjects. The results of the regression are summarized under the first average SCR.amp
section in Table 3.2. Additional robustness checks can be found in Appendix .
Table 3.2.: Regression Models for Normalized Average SCR.amp in Response to Winning
and Losing and for Varying Valuations and a Varying nominal Payoff (n =
576; Standard Errors adjusted for 59 clusters in subject)
Dependent variables
Average SCR.amp Average SCR.amp
Independent variables B SE t-Stat Sig. B SE t-Stat Sig.
dummy_winner .326 .154 2.119 ∗ .418 .159 2.626 ∗
value_class .137 .051 2.705 ∗∗
avg_nominal_payoff .026 .008 3.327 ∗∗
auction_sequence -.125 .049 -2.579 ∗ -.136 .049 -2.782 ∗∗
c (constant) 1.844 .194 9.475 ∗∗∗ 1.568 .153 10.216 ∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
A regression analysis is done for each bidder’s normalized average SCR.amp on the
auction outcome (dummy_winner) and the value class (value_class). Moreover, we
check for mitigation effects of SCR.amp over time by taking into account the sequence
in which a bidder was endowed with the different valuations (auction_sequence).8 The
results of the regression reveal that both the auction outcome (winner or loser), as
well as the different valuations (50, 60, 70, 80, 90), have a significant influence on the
SCR.amp. While this result may lead to the conclusion that higher valuations per se
result in increased physiological responses, this effect could actually also be triggered
by the nominal payoff, which is also higher for higher valuations.9 In this chapter, we
define the nominal payoff pi as the amount of money a bidder i would get if his or her
bid bi was successful, that is, pi = vi − bi. Thus, in contrast to the profit Πi, the nominal
8In the regression, the five different valuations are encoded as value classes 0 (the valuation is 50), 1
(60),. . . 4 (90). Analogously, the auction sequence number is encoded by the values 0 to 4, i.e., for
the first valuation that a bidder has in the experiment, the variable auction_sequence is set to 0,
for the second valuation it is set to 1, and so forth.
9Note that avg_nominal_payoff and value_class are highly correlated at Pearson’s r = .799, p = .001.
Apparently, by the experimental design, higher valuations usually result in higher realized payoffs.
Due to the high correlation, the two values cannot be analyzed simultaneously in the regression.
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payoff pi is independent of whether the auction was actually won or lost. The second
average SCR.amp section (on the right) in Table 3.2 shows a respective analysis which
substitutes the variable avg_nominal_payoff for value_class. This variable indicates
the average nominal payoff a subject could have realized for the distinct valuations
with the respective bids that she or he placed. The analysis shows that—similar to
the variable value_class—the variable avg_nominal_payoff also influences the subjects’
physiological reactions significantly; and consequently, higher nominal payoffs result in
stronger responses while the rest of the results remain unchanged. We will come back
to this result in the discussion.
3.4.3. Valence of Winning and Losing
Even though we identified the differences in SCR.amp upon winning and losing an auc-
tion, the valence of an emotion, i.e., whether an emotion is positively or negatively
perceived by the subject, is typically more clearly reflected in the phasic changes in HR
(Lang, 1993). Figure 3.4 depicts the change in the average HR in response to the auc-
tion outcome. The left graph shows the time period of up to 6 seconds after the auction
outcome. The blue line depicts the change in average HR after losing an auction. At
its peak, the drop in HR is significantly stronger than the drop in HR subsequent to
receiving the valuation information. This provides evidence that the auction outcome
does, in fact, lead to a strong physiological reaction. The bars in the graph on the right
of Figure 3.4 represent the 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 seconds subsequent to when the auction
outcome was revealed. This indicates that the deceleratory response in HR is stronger
for losing than for winning. Moreover, one can observe that the subsequent acceler-
atory response, which is a proxy for the activity of the sympathetic nervous system,
is stronger for winning. Thus, while both shapes of the heart waves have a triphasic
pattern (deceleratory, acceleratory, deceleratory), they are clearly distinguishable.
Table 3.3 depicts a set of paired sample t-test results (n = 66) for the mean difference
in phasic changes in HR in response to the auction outcome. We test whether the
event of losing induces a stronger deceleratory response than the event of winning for
different time periods after the auction outcome. The analysis reveals that the HR is
significantly lower in response to losing an auction compared to winning an auction just
1.4 seconds after the auction outcome is revealed. This result is similar to the responses
documented in the psychological literature regarding the phasic changes in HR when
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Figure 3.4.: Phasic Changes in HR in Response to Auction Outcome. The Left Graph
Shows the Typical Triphasic Waveform for Up to Six Seconds. The Bars
in the Right Chart Show the Response Time for 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0 Seconds
Subsequent to the Auction Outcome. The Bars Represent a Confidence
Interval (CI) of 95 Per Cent
viewing unpleasant pictures (Bradley et al., 2008). This is also supported by additional
analyses in the Appendix B.1. It is important to note that external events with both
a negative and a positive valence generally induce a deceleratory response. However,
the initial deceleratory response is usually stronger for events with a negative valence
(Bradley et al., 2008). The stronger deceleratory HR response after an auction has been
lost may indicate that losing an auction is processed similarly to other negative events.
For example, Osumi and Ohira (2009) found a similar drop in HR as an immediate
reaction to receiving subjectively unfair offers in an ultimatum game. Adam and Kroll
(2012) reported a stronger drop in HR as a reaction to losing a high stakes lottery in
comparison to winning a high stakes lottery. Ravaja et al. (2006) found an initial drop in
HR as a reaction to negative events in video games and Hubert and de Jong-Meyer (1990)
reported similar HR patterns as a reaction to watching movies with negative content
(see also Palomba et al. (2000) for similar results). In summary, our interpretation of
the HR pattern observed in our study is that losing a FPSB auction induces a negative
emotion, which we refer to as the frustration of losing.
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1.4 -.41 .034 ∗
1.5 -.48 .014 ∗
1.6 -.59 .004 ∗∗
1.7 -.79 .002 ∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
3.5. Discussion
3.5.1. Limitations and Future Research
When classifying our results into the previously presented auction literature, we have
to state that concepts such as “joy of winning” or “frustration of losing” are typically
modeled for utility functions which aim at explaining subjects’ bidding behavior and
their decision processes in anticipation of the submitted bid. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to note that our experimental setup is only capable to assess subjects’ responses
after the result revelation—which we call an experienced emotion. Hence, while we find
strong evidence for such an emotion in response to the auction outcome, we can neither
conclude that this reaction was or was not already anticipated before submitting a bid,
nor that it was already reflected in a subject’s bidding process. We must also acknowl-
edge that our FPSB auction design differs from the experiment of Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok (2008) due to our objective to assess physiological parameters. In particular,
we restricted human-computer interaction to mouse inputs, the subjects had to submit
individual bids in each auction, and we introduced constant time lags between the rev-
elation of successive information on the valuation, the bidding process, and the auction
outcome.10 Therefore, our economic results are consistent but not perfectly compara-
ble with Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008). As outlined in the results section,
10Also the experimental instructions were slightly different (see Appendix A.1).
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examining subjects’ sympathetic activation shows that winning an auction elicits sig-
nificantly stronger physiological responses than losing an auction. This is remarkable
since both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli are usually reflected in similar SCR.amps.
Bradley et al. (2008), for example, did not observe statistically significant differences
in average SCR.amp of subjects in response to negative (e.g., hospitals tombstones in
a cemetery or) and positive stimuli (e.g., pictures of families or flowers). Dawson et al.
(2011) concluded that SCRs occur in the anticipation of particularly aversive significant
outcomes that are related to decision making. In this light, the stronger physiological
response to a positive auction outcome compared to a negative auction outcome is even
more surprising. But also from an economic perspective, one would expect more intense
physiological reactions to negative economic events. For example, it is well known that
subjects reveal loss aversion decision patterns in many circumstances. Goeree and Of-
ferman (2003) found support for loss aversion, which explains their auction data. This
leads to the conclusion that subjects are more sensitive to negative feedback informa-
tion and therefore exhibit higher emotional arousal when losing an auction. However,
our results do not support this notion. To the contrary, our data suggests that the
physiological reactions generated by the joyous event of winning an auction are more
dominant than when losing an auction. A first simple explanation for why losing an
auction is not as arousing as winning could be that in our setting a bidder never ac-
tually loses money when he or she loses a FPSB auction. Rather, he or she only loses
the opportunity to make a profit.11 Therefore, it is possible that the forgone gain does
not affect subjects as intensely as a real loss of money. Still, the drop in HR indicates
that participants are not emotionally indifferent to losing a FPSB auction. A second
explanation might be that subjects are well aware of being one of three participants in
the auction. Potentially, they falsely expect to be the winner in only one third of the
auctions, which is not the case since they have higher valuations than the computerized
bidders. Being exposed as the “winner” is therefore more unexpected and more arousing
because of this. Even though the electrodermal response to losing is weaker compared
to winning an auction, the response is still remarkable and the decelerated HR is an
indicator of the negative emotional valance that is associated with losing an auction. A
third explanation could be that subjects attempt to regulate their negative emotions in
11The subject could actually make a negative payoff when placing a bid that exceeds a bidder’s own
valuation. This behavior, however, is clearly irrational and almost never occurred in our experiment.
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our experimental context-and therefore do not express or reappraise them. The Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross and John, 2003) and measuring subjects’ heart
rate variability (cf. Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012) serve as measures for conscious and
sub-conscious emotion regulation (ER). These measures could be used in future research
to investigate the moderating role of ER on subjects’ physiological responses to winning
and losing. While ER, is beyond the scope of this study, it will be further examined in
the following chapters. Even though we have evidence that the experience of winning
an auction results in a significant physiological response, one cannot completely rule
out the alternative explanation that subjects primarily react to the amount of money
won instead of experiencing a “joy of winning” as an emotion completely independent of
the monetary payoff. Below, in the future research section, we propose an experimental
design that is suitable to systematically investigate this particular question. Bidders’ in-
creasing physiological reaction to higher valuations and higher nominal payoffs is another
interesting result. We observed that higher induced valuations go along with stronger
emotional responses, regardless of whether the subject wins or loses the auction. How-
ever, we also observed that higher nominal payoffs also resulted in increased physiological
reactions. The outcome of an auction induces higher emotional arousal when valuations
or the nominal payoffs are higher. This pattern may have two explanations: First, bid-
ders may be more aroused when the probability of winning and the expected payoff is
higher; and second, bidders may be more aroused in response to realizing higher payoffs
or higher foregone payoffs. Finally, a combination of both effects also seems plausible. In
summary, with the current experimental design it is not possible to distinguish whether
the bidders’ SCR.amps are higher for higher value classes (1) because the expected pay-
off is higher, or (2) because the nominal payoff is higher, or (3) both. In terms of future
research, it may be interesting to clarify this effect further by systematically varying the
amount of the nominal payoff and the probability of winning. In any case, the results
of our experiment show that higher payoffs—expected or realized—induce stronger in-
tensities of joy when winning an auction. This result contradicts the theory that there
is a joy in winning regardless of the monetary payoff (van den Bos et al., 2008). In fact,
higher nominal payoffs also induce stronger SCR.amps when a subject loses an auction.
This pattern could be explained by taking loser regret into account (cf. Chapter 2).
The SCR.amps are more likely to increase with the amount of the valuation even in the
case of losing because the subject feels that he or she has just lost the opportunity to
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receive a considerable payoff. Therefore, we contradict the notion that the emotion in
response to winning or losing the auction is independent of the monetary consequences
of an auction (van den Bos et al., 2008). On the contrary, it seems that the size of the
nominal payoff significantly influences the intensity of the emotional response. This ex-
planation corresponds with the regret theory, which suggests that decision makers react
emotionally to missed opportunities by comparing actual outcomes with other possible
outcomes (Humphrey, 2004). An alternative explanation according to Delgado et al.
(2008) assumes that the frustration of losing the social competition increases with the
amount of the valuation. This explanation is in line with previous research that was
done on competitive arousal and auction fever. For instance, Ku (2008) showed that
bidding behavior in a dollar auction is more aggressive if the stakes are high. Even
though the causes of the emotional reactions documented in this study have not been
fully explained yet, we conclude that applying a psychophysiological methodology in the
area of auction research provides a promising approach for deciphering emotions within
the context of market decision making.
The emotions related to winning and losing are what distinguish auctions from that
of fixed price offers on retail sites. According to Stafford and Stern (2002, p. 139), these
emotions provide the basis for the “game-like action and bidding frenzy characteristic”
of auctions (cf. Adam, 2010). To this extent, we presented an experiment that uses
physiological measures to directly assess correlates of the bidders’ emotional process-
ing in FPSB auctions. Our results show that the bidders, in fact, have distinguishable
physiological reactions in response to the auction outcome, namely that the event of
winning an auction is processed much more intensely than the event of losing. More-
over, we provide physiological data which suggests that bidders indeed experience an
aversive emotion in response to losing an auction. The event of losing an auction in-
duces a deceleratory cardiovascular response, i.e., a phasic decrease in HR. While the
deceleration is stronger for the event of losing an auction, the subsequent acceleration
is stronger for the event of winning an auction. The frustration of losing the auction
competition or experiences of regret are potential explanations for the aversive emotion
triggered. In summary, we conclude that auctions either convey an aversive (frustration
of losing) or a rewarding (joy of winning) emotion. In this regard, our data shows that
the joy of winning in FPSB auctions results in stronger reactions than the frustration of
losing. It is notable that this result is even robust for all five distinct value classes. This
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characteristic is presumably an important contributing factor in making online auctions
“one of the greatest success stories of web-based services” (Ariely and Simonson, 2003).
In an auction, a bidder can experience the “uniqueness of being first” (Ku et al., 2005;
Adam, 2010). Pronouncing the joy of winning on auction platforms could be one way
of generating an intense positive shopping experience, which could potentially lead to
the temptation of trying to “win” another auction. Conversely, pronouncing the event
of losing an auction on a platform may also increase the excitement of bidders. Our
physiological data indicates that losing an auction is in fact associated with a negative
valence of significant intensity. Therefore, the bidders will try to avoid this “aversive”
emotion (Frijda, 1986) and might even place higher bids the next time they participate
in an auction. The findings of our experiment also result in a number of questions for
further research. It is important to point out that in our experiment the human par-
ticipants compete with computerized bidders. Thus, there is no interaction with other
human subjects. However, Bosman and Riedl (2004, p. 3) argue that interacting with
other human bidders can cause “emotional spillover effects between subjects,” such as
feelings of anger and envy (see Adam, 2010). For instance, Bault et al. (2008) showed
the subjects’ physiological processing during lottery decisions is already affected by the
mere presence of another human agent, even though there is no strategic interaction
from a game theoretical perspective. With regard to feelings of joy and frustration in
auctions, it would therefore be interesting to analyze the extent to which the intensities
change when the bidders face human competitors. For instance, it may well be that the
frustration of losing is even stronger than the joy of winning when human competitors
are involved. Another approach for investigating the boost of the frustration of losing
would be to introduce bidding fees to the auction. With this approach, a real monetary
loss occurs when the participant is not the highest bidder, which could lead to more
intense physiological reactions when losing an auction. Moreover, the experiment fo-
cuses on FPSB auctions, i.e., static auctions in which only a single bid can be submitted
by each bidder. However, the phenomenon of auction fever, a prominent example of
the impact that emotions can have on bidding behavior, has mainly been observed in
dynamic auctions (Ockenfels et al., 2006; Adam et al., 2011). With auction fever, Adam
(2010) notes that the bidders’ “adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions block their
ability to think clearly, and they end up bidding much more than they ever envisioned”
(Murnighan, 2002, p. 63). According to Haruvy and Leszczyc (2010) this is “induced
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by the dynamic interaction among bidders in an ascending bid auction” (Adam, 2010).
Accordingly, future research in the field of auctions should also focus on how the joy of
winning and the frustration of losing are experienced in dynamic auctions. This way,
the physiological responses of bidders in static auctions can be directly compared with
those in dynamic auctions.
Contrary to these integral emotions that evolve within the auction, the next chapter
will examine the influence of emotions which are completely incidental. These affective
states are not related to the auction task whatsoever, and can be triggered for instance





Regulation and Market Behavior
Chapter 3 and 4 dealt with the influence of integral emotions i.e. emotions elicited due
to the auction mechanism. However, auction platforms also employ methods to trigger
emotions which are not originated by the mechanism itself. Electronic marketplaces,
such as Internet auction platforms, frequently employ images as design elements on
their websites. This might be done in order to either induce a sense of community or
competition among the market participants. In this chapter, we investigate the impact
of such affective images on bidding behavior in a controlled psychophysiological labo-
ratory experiment during which participants’ affective processes are assessed through
psychophysiological measurements. Immediately before placing a bid in a FPSB auc-
tion, bidders are presented: a) competitive sports scenes, b) families or children, or c)
a blank screen. Although participants report not to be affected by the images, we find
that the images significantly shape their bidding behavior. This relationship is mediated
by the bidders’ emotional state and it is moderated by the bidders’ emotion regulation
strategy. Our results entail valuable insights about the coherence of emotional stimuli
on marketplaces and users’ decisions. They also question recent strategies by market
players.
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4.1. Introduction
“It’s better when you win it!” advertised eBay in its commercial campaign “Shop Victo-
riously” (eBay.com, 2007). In the campaign, bidding in an eBay auction was compared
to sports events such as football matches and dog races. Thereby, the world’s largest
consumer online auction site directly addressed the emotions the bidders experience on
their platform by the use of exciting images (Adam, 2010). Other online market plat-
forms, such as DubLi.com, use images of smiling couples or children-like avatars in order
to increase the warmth and social presence during users’ shopping experience. These
examples hint at a strategy of auction and fixed-price retail platforms, which embed
affective images in their websites in an effort to maximize revenues. While there is ev-
idence that the display of affective images in fact alters subjects’ emotional processing
and perception (Hassanein and Head, 2007; Zahedi and Bansal, 2011), little is known
about how the users’ actual decision making process in such information systems is
directly or indirectly affected.
In this chapter, we conduct a psychophysiological experiment to investigate whether
displaying affective images to the participants of electronic auctions has an influence on
the bidders’ emotions and decision making. As the underlying market institution we
consider a FPSB auction, in which each bidder submits a single bid. The bidder who
has placed the highest bid obtains the item and has to pay the amount of his or her
bid (Vickrey, 1961). Before every auction, the subjects are shown affective images that
induce either a sense of competition (through images depicting sportsmen) or a sense
of community (through images depicting families or children), or, as a control, a blank
screen is shown. Bidders’ affective reactions to the images are assessed through SC
and HR measurements, which are well-known psychophysiological correlates of human
emotions (Bradley et al., 2008; Dawson et al., 2011; Riedl et al., 2010). In this vein,
we are able to continuously assess bidders’ affective processes, which would not have
been feasible by the usage of questionnaires alone. These measures enable us not only to
assess the bidders’ emotional processing when seeing the affective images, but also how
the bidders regulate these emotions on an individual level. According to the concept
of emotion regulation, subjects deal with emotional stimuli in various ways and follow
specific strategies, e.g., reappraisal or suppression (Gross and John, 2003). Previous
research has shown that subjects’ emotion regulation strategy impacts their response
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to affective cues and also their decision making. In the following, we investigate these
processes in the context of electronic markets.
In a nutshell, our results reveal that affective images, although they are unrelated to
the task, systematically influence the users’ emotional processing and behavior. Even
in the context of electronic auctions, where real money is at stake, community and
competition images induce emotions of considerable intensity with different degrees of
pleasantness (referred to as valence). This in turn also impacts behavior. Bidders facing
images of competitive sport events place lower bids, whereas bidders seeing community
images place higher bids on average. Moreover, subjects’ individual strategies for regu-
lating their emotions mitigate or amplify their affectedness to the images. In fact, the
more subjects suppress their emotions to the depicted images (i.e., try to inhibit their
responsive reactions) the stronger they are biased in bidding behavior.
4.2. Theoretical Background
4.2.1. Affective Images, Social Presence and Human Computer
Interaction
A central element of user interface design is the use of images (Hassanein and Head,
2006; Zahedi and Bansal, 2011). In the context of shopping websites, images are an im-
portant medium for users when they are forming attitudes and expectations about the
platform as a whole or a specific product they consider buying (Song et al., 2012). Im-
ages trigger affective responses, resulting in approach or avoidance tendencies (Bradley,
2000). Thus, affect inevitably also plays a vital role in human-computer interaction. In
this context, Deng and colleagues argued that affect “influences and mediates specific
aspects of interaction with a user interface” (Deng and Poole, 2010, p. 711). The visual
complexity and arrangement of a webpage triggers affective processes in the user, which
in turn influence emotional and behavioral responses. For example, affective processes
have an influence on intention to use, perceived ease of use, usability, and trust (Cyr,
2008; Qiu and Benbasat, 2009; Riedl and Javor, 2012; Zahedi and Bansal, 2011). With
respect to trust and privacy, Li and colleagues found that a user’s willingness to disclose
personal information to an e-vendor is subject to the emotions elicited by the overall
webpage impression (Li et al., 2011). Deng and colleagues showed that order design
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features and the visual complexity of a webpage induce affective processes that have an
influence on a user’s approach tendency, i.e., the willingness to further explore a website
(Deng and Poole, 2010).
Marketers also have to carefully consider the influence of emotions when designing
a platform. Menon and Kahn (2002) found that the pleasure induced by the initial
exposure to the website of an online retailer affects a user’s shopping behavior. Images
are also frequently used as design elements in electronic auctions. When comparing the
different platforms, the emotional states triggered on these platforms seem to fall into
the following two main categories of human relationships. The first category encom-
passes images that induce a sense of competition or excitement. An example is eBay’s
advertisement campaign “Shop Victoriously,” which compared successful bidding to win-
ning a football match or dog race (eBay.com, 2007). Similarly, other auction platforms
show images of customers on their website who celebrate winning an auction or cheerful
avatars raising their hands in the air. The other category addresses especially images
address primarily feelings of a cozy, safe familiar atmosphere. An example is the auction
website DubLi.com which shows photos of couples and uses a smiling avatar to guide
users. Similarly, eBay has also launched advertisement campaigns that fall into this cat-
egory. For example, in a commercial that aired in December 2011, a family was shown
next to their Christmas tree while doing some last minute shopping on eBay. Menon and
Kahn concluded that “marketers should carefully consider the emotional impact of the
initial encounter with a website since it can affect their subsequent behavior” (Menon
and Kahn, 2002, p. 38). Therefore, it is important to understand if and how such social
images actually affect the users’ emotions and behavior.
Presumably, one reason for the use of social images is that platform operators aim at
boosting their users’ sense of human sociability. This stems from the observation that
electronic markets are often regarded impersonal and anonymous (Hassanein and Head,
2007). The usage of social factors is usually explained by the psychological construct
of social presence, which models the users’ longing for physical presence of other hu-
mans (Fulk et al., 1987). Previous research specifically connected social presence with
“warmth” in a sense that it reveals human warmth and sociability (Hassanein and Head,
2006). Rafaeli and Noy showed that especially images of competitors’ faces increased
virtual presence (Rafaeli and Noy, 2005). Also Hassanein and Head examined which fea-
tures of the web interface can systematically increase the perception of social presence on
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websites and found human-centric images in emotional contexts to be useful (Hassanein
and Head, 2007). In another study, Cyr and colleagues supported this finding: the au-
thors implemented website conditions with varying levels of human and facial factors
and found that human images with facial features can make a website more appealing
(Cyr et al., 2009). In particular, users perceived the website as more appealing and more
trustworthy when human images were displayed. Nunamaker and colleagues found that
smiling computer avatars are perceived as more likeable than agents with a neutral de-
meanor (Nunamaker et al., 2011). Qiu and Benbasat showed that product recommender
agents which employ humanoid embodiment can enhance social presence, which in turn
positively affects the customers’ perceptions and intentions (Qiu and Benbasat, 2009).
Taken together, it can be stated that socially-rich images are a useful tool to induce
social presence.
Research so far has primarily focused on the positive connection of social presence on
the user’s perceived usefulness, trust and enjoyment (Hassanein and Head, 2006). In
this context, Cyr and colleagues stated that “the effect of ads depicting images of people
has yet to be studied extensively, but early research on this topic suggests that images
of humans do influence people’s behaviors in online environments” (Cyr et al., 2009, p.
543). In summary, human images on websites can trigger affective processes that shift
users’ social perception. However, research on how and to what extent these images can
also systematically shape the users’ decision making is scant. In this study, it is our
goal to examine to what degree affective images can shift decision making in electronic
auctions.
4.2.2. Measuring Affective Responses
An affective process is usually triggered by an emotionally-competent stimulus, i.e., a
particular object or event associated with a subjective significance (Bechara and Dama-
sio, 2005). The emotional response then unfolds subsequently to the stimulus along
the timeline. Depending on the nature of the stimulus, the emotion triggered along
the affective process can be categorized as integral or incidental (Rick and Loewenstein,
2008). Images on websites can, for instance, convey essential product information and
are thus an integral part of a user’s cognitive and affective product assessment process.
In this sense, a product image can be regarded as a stimulus that triggers an integral
emotion: in addition to conveying useful product information, a product image may
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trigger emotions like desire or disgust. However, images can even then be inducers of
affective processes, when they are seemingly unrelated to the current task. An image
which is seemingly unrelated to the product can be regarded as a stimulus that triggers
an incidental emotion. For instance, images used as additional design elements may trig-
ger emotions like joy or anger. In our study, we focus specifically on incidental emotions
and therefore use images that do not convey any relevant information about the auction
or the good being auctioned.
The advances in cognitive neuroscience and psychophysiology have contributed to
deeper insights into the cognitive and affective processes underlying human decision
making. In recent years, the methods, theories, and tools from cognitive neuroscience
have also gained increasing interest from IS researchers. This emerging field of IS research
is commonly referred to as NeuroIS (Dimoka et al., 2012; Riedl et al., 2010; Vom Brocke
et al., 2013). In this study, we use psychophysiological measures to unobtrusively assess
the influence of images on the affective responses of users participating in electronic
auctions. In particular, we measure subjects’ SC and HR. Both measures reflect activity
of the ANS and therefore cannot be directly influenced by free will. These measures are
frequently used as proxies for emotional correlates in psychophysiology (Bradley et al.,
2008; Dawson et al., 2011) and can help IS researchers to shed more light on the affective
processes of users interacting with information systems (Cyr, 2008; Riedl et al., 2010).
Research in psychophysiology has shown that changes in SC predominantly reflect
sympathetic activation in response to arousing events (cf. Lang et al., 1993). In our
context, bursts of sympathetic activity, commonly referred to as SCR, are induced by
the arousal inherent in affective images. Thereby, images with emotional content (irre-
spective of their valence, i.e. whether they are pleasant or unpleasant) typically induce a
similar SCR, which is distinct from the SCR that is induced by images without emotional
content. HR responses, on the other hand, reveal insight into how an image stimulus
is ultimately perceived by the subject. Recent studies have confirmed that the initial
cardiac deceleration, i.e., a temporary drop in HR after experiencing an external stimu-
lus, is a proxy for subjects’ experienced emotional valence, where the amplitude of the
drop is negatively correlated with the valence (pleasantness) of the event (Astor et al.,
2013; Bradley, 2000). The orienting parasympathetic response results in a small drop
in HR for pleasant images, whereas threatening or rather unpleasant images result in a
pronounced drop in HR. In order to systematically categorize affective responses which
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occur subsequent to appetitive or aversive stimuli, Lang developed the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, 1995). IAPS is a database with a large set of
emotionally evocative images, which are rated and standardized in terms of valence and
arousal. Valence and arousal are frequently used dimensions for judgments about emo-
tional stimuli (Russell, 1980). Previous research has shown that the IAPS images can
elicit psychophysiological responses, e.g., HR response, SCR, and startle reflex (Bradley,
2000; Bradley et al., 2008). Moreover these images can easily be edited, distributed, and
catalogued. Due to these characteristics, IAPS is highly validated and widely used in
experimental studies.
In neurophysiological studies building on IAPS, the images are usually integral to the
task, because the images and the neurophysiological responses are the actual focus of
the investigation. In our study, we investigate the impact of these affective images in
the context of electronic auctions. Thus, the images are unrelated to the task in our
study. As outlined above, affective images with social connotations have been shown to
elicit affective processes in humans (Cyr et al., 2009; Hassanein and Head, 2006, 2007).
However, it is an open question whether such unrelated images can trigger (incidental)
affective processes that eventually have an influence on economic decision making, i.e.,
influence bidding behavior in an auction task where real money at stake. Consequently,
as the first building block of this theory, we hypothesize that seemingly unrelated affec-
tive images (which induce either a sense of community or a sense of competition), that
are displayed before an electronic auction, can trigger (incidental) emotional processes
in the bidders. The images used in this study were selected to have comparable levels of
arousal. Therefore, we do not expect significant differences in SCR between the display
of community and competition images. We do expect, however, that the images induce
SCRs which are stronger than when no images are displayed. Moreover, according to
the IAPS repository, the selected images differ in the perceived valence with community
images being perceived as more pleasant than competition images. Therefore, we expect
systematic differences in the bidders’ HR responses when being exposed to these two
categories of images. Our first research hypothesis thus states:
Hypothesis 3a: Bidders exposed to competition images experience stronger
deceleratory HR responses than bidders exposed to community images.
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4.2.3. Emotional Bidding
Previous research has provided evidence that emotions can have an impact on economic
decision making (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Riedl et al., 2010; Slovic et al., 2007).
With respect to images and incidental emotions, Winkielman and colleagues showed
that the presentation of images with frowning or happy faces changes subjects’ behavior
on pouring and consumption of drinks (Winkielman et al., 2005). Similarly, Trujillo
and colleagues found that subjects took riskier financial decisions when seeing images
with happy faces, while they took less risky decisions when looking at angry or fearful
faces. Interestingly, in both studies positive and negative expressions altered subjects’
decision behavior independently of whether they stated that the images influenced them.
Decision behavior was not moderated by subjects’ perception of the image influence.
These studies show that images seems to be capable to influence subjects’ decision
behavior in simple tasks, and that this influence happens unconsciously. Emotions have
also been found to play a role in auction decision making (Ariely and Simonson, 2003;
Ding et al., 2005; Ku et al., 2005). Ariely and Simonson found that the dynamics of
auction participation require consumers to be highly involved (Ariely and Simonson,
2003, p. 116). Ding and colleagues concluded that “emotions are an integral component
of a bidder’s decision state and bidding strategy” (Ding et al., 2005, p.363). Based on
a literature review, Adam and colleagues derived a conceptual framework for emotional
bidding (Adam et al., 2011). The authors argued that a bidder’s emotional state is
affected by specific emotions that are integral to the task and triggered by the auction
environment and the bidding process. The induced emotional state can in turn have an
influence on bidding behavior. As examples for the influence of integral emotions, i.e.,
elicited by the auction mechanism, Ku and colleagues found that time pressure, social
facilitation, and rivalry can induce a highly competitive atmosphere and high levels of
arousal in the bidders (Ku et al., 2005). This “competitive arousal” can ultimately
even cause bidders to place higher bids than they actually intended to. For instance,
Heyman and colleagues reported that bidders place higher bids if the degree of rivalry
is comparatively high (Heyman et al., 2004). With respect to time pressure, Adam and
colleagues conducted a psychophysiological experiment and showed that in descending
clock (Dutch) auctions the bidders’ arousal levels are affected by the clock speed (Adam
et al., 2012). Moreover, the authors found that the level of arousal as measured by HR
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mediates the influence of clock speed on bidding behavior. Evidently the mediating role
of competitive arousal on decision making seems to be driven also by the auction format.
Only few experimental studies so far have examined the effects of emotions on bidding
behavior. Bosman and Riedl exposed bidders to positive and negative economic shocks
in FPSB auctions, in order to induce positive and negative moods (Bosman and Riedl,
2004). While the mood induction was effective, only subjects in the negative mood
condition placed significantly higher bids. Subjects in the positive mood condition did
not alter their decision making. However, a potential limitation of this study is that the
economic shock itself can change the subjects’ bidding strategy, since also the subjects’
wealth is changed by the shock (see Ding et al., 2005). Thus, the emotions induced in
this study are integral and not incidental as is the case for our experiment. In a more
recent experiment, Capra and colleagues examined the influence of induced incidental
positive and negative emotional states on bidding behavior in nth-price auctions (Capra
et al., 2010).1 It was found that subjects in the positive mood treatment generated an
upward bidding bias and overbid more often than subjects in a no- or negative-mood
treatment. The authors hypothesized that the positive mood might enhance subjects’
competitiveness or that it lets them become less detail oriented. This result is supported
by a recent study which builds on data from auction houses in London, where prices of
low-priced paintings were positively correlated with good mood (Silva et al., 2012).
As will be described in more detail in the method section, for our study we employ a
FPSB auction, in order to analyze the influence of social images with different emotional
connotations on bidding behavior under controlled conditions. For our hypotheses de-
velopment it is important to note that a bidder has to face the following trade-off when
placing a bid in a FPSB auction: submitting a higher bid increases the probability of
winning-however at the drawback of a smaller payoff. In contrast, submitting a lower
bid decreases the probability of winning-but then again at the advantage of a greater
payoff (Vickrey, 1961; Ding et al., 2005). As outlined above, we have identified two
predominant strategies frequently applied by e-auctioneers to elicit (incidental) affective
processes in the users. One strategy aims at increasing social presence by displaying
community images. The second strategy calls on increasing the users’ sense of compe-
tition. We hypothesize that bidders exposed to community images will place less risky
1Similar to the FPSB auction, this auction format is static in the sense that bidders submit one single
bid and that higher bids increase the probability of winning. In this auction format, however, the
weakly dominant strategy is to bid one’s own valuation.
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and therefore higher bids, while bidders exposed to competition images will place more
risky and therefore lower bids. This translates into our second research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Bidders exposed to competition images place lower bids
than bidders exposed to community images.
Notice that H3a conjectures an influence of the competition and community images
on affective emotional process, whereas H3b conjecture a direct influence of the images
on bidding behavior. In order to provide comprehensive insight into how the images
possibly affect bidding behavior, we are also interested in whether there is an indirect
effect of the images on bidding behavior that is mediated by the induced emotional
processes. This possible mediation is addressed in H3c:
Hypothesis 3c: The impact of affective images on bidding behavior is me-
diated by bidders’ deceleratory HR responses.
4.2.4. Emotion Regulation
Research has provided empirical evidence that subjects, depending on interpersonal
differences, continuously regulate their emotions—and that this regulation process influ-
ences how they experience and respond to emotional stimuli. The psychological concept
of emotion regulation (ER) (Gross, 1998b) stems from the assumption that humans
constantly, consciously or unconsciously, regulate the emotions they have, and therefore
differ in how they experience or express their emotions (Gross, 1998a; Lerner et al.,
2004).
In particular, individuals differ in their ER capabilities and the applied ER strategies
are determined by personality traits and psychological capacity (Gross, 1998b). Gross
developed an ER process model in which emotions unfold over time and are generated in
an evolving process (Gross, 1998b). The author distinguished between antecedent and
response-focused ER strategies.2 Antecedent ER strategies apply while the emotion is
2Previous to the ER definition by Gross, similar concepts have been introduced, e.g. on coping, mood
regulation, and traditional ego-defenses. Emotion regulation, however, has been clearly distinguished
from them (Gross, 1998b). Other approaches from clinical psychology also cover additional ER
techniques such as acceptance, avoidance, problem-solving, and rumination (Aldao et al., 2010).
Moreover, there are approaches that also focus on the non-conscious mechanisms of ER (Williams
et al., 2009). However, in the field of ER and decision making Gross’s model is the most prominent.
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still unfolding and has not reached its peak. The major representative for antecedent-
focused ER strategy is reappraisal. Consider for instance the user of an online auction
platform, who is interested in a second-hand car. In one of the advertised auctions the
user finds an appealing image of a suitable car, next to relevant technical information.
When applying reappraisal, the user would try to avoid becoming overly excited when
looking at the image about the prospective new car; for example, by focusing on technical
details of the image or by making himself aware that the seller overstated the condition of
the car by choosing a non-representative image. By contrast, response-focused ER aims
at altering and controlling the experiential, behavioral, and psychophysiological response
when the emotion has already unfolded. The major representative for a response-focused
ER strategy is suppression. In the auctioned-off-car example, the image-stimulus could
unfold in a positive imagination of already driving this car, which the user then tries
to inhibit or suppress subsequently. While this is an example of how emotions may be
generated and regulated when seeing an image that provides additional information, our
study focuses specifically on the impact of images that are not directly related to the
auction.
In our study, it is reasonable to assume that ER capabilities have a moderating influ-
ence on the bidders’ disposition to affective images. While both ER strategies outlined
above were found to be effective in regulating positive emotions, previous research in-
dicated that suppression can perform poorly in its effectiveness to mitigate negatively
arousing emotions (Gross, 1998a). While this is considered the “emotional side,” sup-
pression is also presumed to have an “unemotional side.” Suppression demands more
cognitive load than reappraisal, since the emotion interference occurs at a later stage
of the emotion generative process and therefore requires constant self-corrective action
and self-monitoring (Gross, 2002; Heilman et al., 2010). Hence, reappraisal is often con-
sidered as the preferable ER strategy associated with better physical health, well-being,
and even trading-skills (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012; Gross and John, 2003).
4.2.5. Emotion Regulation and Decision Making
When it comes to behavior, only few studies so far have directly compared the effects
of reappraisal and suppression on decision making. In previous studies—contrary to
the belief that decision makers should suppress or at best, avoid strong emotions in
order to take “unbiased” decisions (Seo and Barrett, 2007)—suppression was found to
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fail at mitigating effects of negative affective responses (Gross, 2002; Heilman et al.,
2010). Reappraisal, by contrast, was associated with successful mitigation of stimuli
and enhanced decision performance (Heilman et al., 2010) [33]. Reappraisal was found
to both increase and decrease risk aversion in decision making, depending on the decision
context (Heilman et al., 2010; Martin and Delgado, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2008).
With respect to behavior, the results are therefore not fully conclusive and context
depending.
In recent years, the impact of ER has been investigated in a number of psychophysio-
logical studies, mostly using images or short films (e.g. Gross, 1998a; Urry, 2009). This
research provided insight into the coherence of neural structures and ER. It was shown
that reappraisal either does not influence or even decreases sympathetic activation, re-
sulting in average or weaker affective responses (Gross, 1998a, 2002). Therefore, we do
not expect a systematic effect on psychophysiological responses with respect to reap-
praisal. To the contrary, emotion suppression—even though as defined as the inhibiting
expressive reactions—was shown to increase sympathetic activation in response to emo-
tive stimuli, resulting in stronger affective responses (Gross, 1998a, 2002). For instance,
previous research found that subjects who apply suppression strategies are physiolog-
ically more susceptible to watching visual stimuli than other subjects (Gross, 1998a).
Correspondingly, we hypothesize that subjects with a comparatively high level of using
suppression exhibit stronger SCRs:
Hypothesis 3d: The use of suppression strategies is positively correlated
with the SCR amplitudes in response to seeing affective images.
This influence has frequently been explained in the sense that the process of suppress-
ing emotions is (cognitively) more demanding (Gross, 1998a, 2002). Following these
insights, we hypothesize that displaying affective images does not only trigger more pro-
nounced psychophysiological responses in suppressors, but that this is also reflected in
their bids. This translates into our fifth research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3e: The effect of competitive and community images on bids is
moderated by the use of suppression strategies.
The research hypotheses of our study are summarized in the research model depicted
in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1.: Research Model.
4.3. Design and Method
In order to investigate the impact of (incidental) community and competition images
on emotions and bidding behavior, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment with
psychophysiological measurements. In the experiment, each subject participates in 15
auctions and thereby accumulates so-called MU, which are later individually paid out
in cash. Thus, in line with the induced value theory (Smith, 1976), decision making in
this experiment is directly related to real monetary payoffs. In this experiment, 1 MU
is equivalent to e 0.04.
4.3.1. Treatment Structure
Our experiment constitutes a between-subjects design with three treatments. In the
competition treatment (CMP), the bidders are shown images of sports events (e.g., run-
ners passing the finishing line, boxers hitting each other, tumult on a rugby field) before
the bid mask appears.3 By contrast, in the community treatment (COM), the bidders
are shown images that illustrate cozy family scenes (e.g., grandmother and grandchil-
dren laughing, children playing with each other, father with his daughter on the beach).4
3In particular for CMP the images #1505, #5623, #8118, #8001, #8050, #8060, #8230, #8065,
#8116, #8467, #8232,#8130, #8117, #8220 and #8231 of the IAPS database were used.
4In particular for COM the images #2341, #2345, #2598, #2080, #2091, #2154, #2156, #2158,
#2216, #2274, #2303, #2332, #2340, #5830 and #5831 of the IAPS database were used.
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The images were retrieved from the IAPS repository (Lang, 1995), in which all images
are annotated with arousal and valence levels based on a large data sample. In our
experiment, the images were selected to have comparable levels of arousal across the
two treatments COM and CMP (M = 4.695 vs. M = 5.330). With respect to valence,
COM images are inherently perceived as more pleasant in comparison to CMP images
(M = 7.559 vs. M = 5.666). In the third, control treatment (NO), the bidders are
shown no images at all. Instead of the images, a black screen is presented to the bidders
in this treatment.
To assure that the single emotional cues resulting from the images are not distorted
by the integral arousal induced by the dynamic market environment, we control for the
emotional factors that might interfere:
• The auction result is not revealed at the end of a single auction round, but only
at the very end of all auctions. This ensures the elimination of immediate emo-
tions, such as joy of winning or frustration of losing (cf. Astor et al., 2013; Goeree
and Offerman, 2003) which might also influence bidding behavior. This also re-
stricts the set of possible auction formats to static (sealed-bid) auctions, since the
Dutch or the English auction cannot be conducted without announcing the winner
instantly, which again might trigger integral emotions (Bosman and Riedl, 2004).
• The current profit is not displayed to the bidders and hence potential cash-balance
effects are mitigated. These design decisions also control for potential learning
effects or belief updates that might otherwise occur during the course of auctions.
In order to exclude final stage effects, subjects do not know exactly in how many
auctions they will actually participate in. They were informed that the main part
of the experiment would last about 45 minutes.
• To further assure a high level of control, subjects compete with computerized
agents. This eliminates further auction dynamics such as rivalry. Also, subjects
know that the computers follow an earlier determined bidding strategy which is
not influenced by the human participants’ bidding decisions. This design decision
restricts subjects’ anticipation of how their opponents might be affected in the
respective treatment sessions.
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4.3.2. Auction Process
In order to concentrate on the impact of incidental emotions on bidding behavior, we
mitigate the level of integral arousal induced by the auction and deliberately choose a
static (sealed-bid) auction format without interpersonal interaction. More specifically,
each bidder participates in 15 FPSB auctions with 2 computerized opponents and in-
dependent private values (IPV). In an IPV auction each bidder knows his or her value
for the good with certainty. In case the bidder placed the highest bid on the auctioned
off good, the bidder wins the auction and earns his or her value minus the placed bid.
Otherwise the profit is zero.
Figure 4.2.: Auction Process with Image Being Displayed at Event ’Image’.
The auction process of a single auction is illustrated in Figure 4.2. At the beginning
of each auction, the bidder is informed about the round number. Then, a black waiting
screen follows for 33 seconds. After that, depending on the treatment condition, a
community image, a competition image, or a black screen is displayed for 10 seconds
to the bidder. Then, the bidder is informed about his or her value for the commodity
in this auction. Three seconds later the bidding screen appears. Now, the bidder has
up to 10 seconds to place a bid. This ensures that the bids are made shortly after the
bidder has seen the images. The bids are restricted to integers from 1 to 80, indicated
by 80 buttons on the screen. Each button also contains a small bar which indicates
the winning probability related to the bid. As subjects get no result information after
each auction round and the bar assures that the bidder gets an intuitive sense of how
risky his or her bid actually is (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) for a similar
approach). After the bidder placed a bid, the next auction starts with the display of
the round information. Finally, after all 15 auctions ended, each bidder is individually
informed about his or her cumulated final profits.
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Each subject received 3 times private values drawn from the set {60, 65, 70, 75, 80}
MU in random order. In line with the extant experimental literature (e.g. Cox et al.,
1988; Astor et al., 2013; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008), this set of private values
was chosen in order to avoid extreme values close to the lower or upper bound, would
only increase the dispersion of bids. The computerized agents bid according to risk-
neutral Nash equilibrium strategy and their value is drawn from a uniform distribution
[0,100]. The subjects are told that the computerized agents place bids that maximize
their expected profit if they participate against two identically programmed agents (see
Astor et al. (2013); Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) for a similar procedure). In
an auction with three risk neutral bidders the equilibrium bidding strategy b(vi)∗ for
bidder i with value vi and is given by: b(vi)∗ = 2/3vi (Vickrey, 1961).
4.3.3. Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the KIT, and in accordance with the university’s
ethics guidelines. At the beginning of each session, the instructions were read to the
participants, providing them with general information and details about the auction
mechanism used. In order to ensure that the participants understood the procedure,
they then had to successfully complete an online questionnaire consisting of 8 questions.
After the experiment was over, subjects were asked to complete additional question-
naires. One complete experimental session took about one hour. In total 108 subjects
participated in the experiment (mean age=22.80; 75 male; 33 female).5 The participants
were recruited from a pool of students using the ORSEE software environment (Greiner,
2004). Almost all subjects were of central European origin. The experiment consisted of
18 sessions with six participants each. Subjects received a show-up fee of e 4 and earned
on average e 19.94. The z-Tree software environment was used to implement the exper-
iment (Fischbacher, 2007). Each session started with an initial five minute rest period,
which is needed for a proper calibration of the psychophysiological signals. The average
room temperature in the laboratory was 25.1°C (77.2°F), which is within the method-
ological recommendations of the Society for Psychophysiological Research (Fowles et al.,
1981). Seven subjects had to be excluded from the analysis because no adequate physi-
5We identified four economic outliers in the overall sample. A closer look reveals that those subjects
also had comprehension problems, risk preferences that did not at all comply with their bidding
behavior or, for example, did not even manage to place a bid within the time limit. These outliers
were removed from the dataset.
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ological measures could be assessed, resulting from measurement appliances that failed
to operate (two subjects) or subjects being non-responders (five subjects). Additionally,
we had to exclude seven single responses to the image induction, since due to motion
artifacts the electrocardiogram signal could not be properly assessed. These problems
are common when assessing physiological parameters. Also for the more fine-grained
subsequent regression analysis two cases in which subjects did not manage to place a
bid within the time limit were excluded. The reported results on bidding behavior are
invariably robust against inclusion or exclusion of the above subjects or cases (cf. Table
B.6).
4.3.4. Measures
Next to the subjects’ bids, measured in MU, there are a number of further measures
used in this study. Questionnaires were used at the end of the experiment in order to
assess participants’ perceptions during the auction phase and during the image induc-
tion phase. Therein, bidders were first asked to assess their individual emotional state
during the auctions by means of the Affect Grid (Russell et al., 1989), that is, a two
dimensional 9x9 matrix (pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness). Second, subjects
were asked whether they thought that the images influenced their bidding behavior on
a 7-point interval scale (1=not at all, 7=very much). Third, demographic factors such
as age and sex were assessed. Fourth, in order to identify subjects’ individually applied
ER strategies, the ER questionnaire (ERQ) by Gross and John (2003) was used. The
ERQ can be completed within five to ten minutes and consists of ten questions (6 for
reappraisal and 4 for suppression). Each question is encoded on a 7-point interval scale.
It is characterized by high reliability, high discriminate validity, and only little correla-
tion with the dimensions of other commonly used personality questionnaires (Scheibe,
2011). Finally, we used the risk aversion questionnaire by Holt and Laury (2002) to
assess subjects’ individual risk preference. In this questionnaire, subjects have to make
10 choices between two lotteries with different levels of risk and expected payoffs. Based
on the number of safe choices a subject chooses, the experimenter can approximate the
subject’s individual risk attitude.
With respect to psychophysiology, we focus specifically on phasic changes in SC and
HR in response to seeing the affective images. In the analysis, we compute the amplitudes
of SCRs (SCR.amp) as a measure for the intensity of immediate sympathetic reactions
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(Dawson et al., 2011). Data treatment with respect to SCR.amp was done analogously
to Section 2.3.4. Additionally, in order to reduce the between-subjects variability in the,
data was normalized according to Section 3.3.4 in the subsequent regression analysis
(i.e. all SCR.amp values were referenced to a subjects’ average response to the value
information).
Moreover, we investigate deceleratory responses in HR as a measure of parasympa-
thetic activity. This allows for an evaluation of the perceived valence of external stimuli
in response to images (Bradley et al., 2008; Ravaja et al., 2006) and other events such
as winning an auction or a lottery, as described in the previous section. More specif-
ically, external stimuli with a negative valence usually elicit stronger deceleratory HR
responses than stimuli with a positive valence. The assessment was done identically as
described in Section 3.3.4. Evidently, some participants did not react instantly to the
image induction, as they concentrated their attention only after a view seconds to the
displayed images. Prior research has especially focused on the cardiac phasic response
upon 6 seconds past the visual stimulus (Lang et al., 1993). Analogously, we focus on
the electrocardiogram signal within that particular time frame. In particular, we assess
the magnitude of the deceleratory HR response by identifying first the maximum HR
that occurred within the first 4 seconds after the stimulus, and subsequently the min-
imum HR that occurred up to 2.5 to 6 seconds after the stimulus. The deceleratory
HR response is then calculated as the difference between the identified maximum and
minimum HR within the relevant time frame. This parameter is a proxy for the valence
dimension of emotions induced by the images (see Palomba et al. (1997) for a similar
approach), and will be denoted by ∆HR in the following.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. The Influence of Images on Affective Processes in
Electronic Auctions
In our research model we hypothesized that affective images can trigger emotions in the
users, even though the images are unrelated to the task and displayed in the context of
electronic auctions where there is real money at stake for the bidders.
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As discussed above, emotions can be categorized in two dimensions: arousal and
valence. Thereby arousal can be assessed through SCR.amp and valence through ∆HR.
Before we can test our first research hypothesis (H3a), which relates to ∆HR only, we
must first provide evidence that the induction of emotions in the treatment conditions
(COM and CMP) was successful in the sense that it has resulted in significantly stronger
emotions than in the control treatment (NO) in which no images were shown. To
this end, we first compare SCR.amp between the treatment conditions and the control
treatment condition. Figure 4.3 depicts the bidders’ average change in Skin Conductance
Level (∆SCL) up to six seconds after the image induction and SCR.amp, indicating that
the community and competition images in fact induce emotions of significant intensity in
comparison to the control treatment where no images were shown. An ANOVA confirms
that the treatment condition had a significant influence on the SCR.amp (F (2, 96) =
4.768, p = .011). Moreover, a post-hoc Tukey HSD test shows that the differences in
SCR.amp between NO and COM (.069 vs. .117, SE = .019, p = .030), and NO and
CMP (.068 vs. .120, SE = .019, p = .020) are significant, respectively. By contrast,
the SCR.amp values in COM and CMP are comparable (.117 vs. .120, SE = .019,
p = .986), which is in line with previous studies (Codispoti et al., 2001).
Figure 4.3.: Skin Conductance Level (SCL) and SCR.amp in Microsiemens (µS) to the
Images Display versus a simple Flare Up on the Screen. (Error Bars: 95 Per
Cent Confidence Intervals).
Having confirmed that the images induced an emotion of significant intensity, we can
now examine the potential difference in subjects’ experienced valence in response to the
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two image conditions.6 Figure 4.4 depicts the mean HR drop relative to image display
(∆HR) for the COM and the CMP treatment. In line with H3a, subjects’ cardiac de-
celeration is more pronounced in the CMP treatment than in the COM treatment. A
t-test confirms that the difference in ∆HR between the CMP and the COM treatment
is significant (3.572 vs. 2.680, t(62) = 2.124, p = .038). This is also confirmed by the
results of regression I in Table 4.1 (b = .205, SE = .100, t = 2.050, p = .045).7 Note that
the regressions in Table 4.1 control for several additional factors, such as each subject’s
individual risk preference (safe_choices) and sex (dummy_female) as well as learning
effects (auction_round) and the implied private value in a specific auction. Taken to-
gether, the analysis of the HR data provides support for our research hypothesis H3a.
We can conclude that the community and competition images not only induced emotions
of significant intensity in the bidders, but that these images also differ significantly in
the valence dimension.
4.4.2. The Influence of Images on Bidding Behavior
Next, we focus on the impact of competition and community images on bids. Figure
4.5 shows the bidders’ average bids for the three different treatments. In line with
previous research, the bidders persistently place higher bids than the RNNE (b∗ = 46.66)
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008; Kagel and Roth, 1995).
In a first step, an ANOVA reveals that the treatment manipulation had a significant
impact on the bids (F (2, 101) = 4.069, p = .020). Moreover, and in line with our
research hypothesis H3b, a post-hoc Tukey HSD test shows that the bids in the COM
treatment are significantly higher than the bids in the CMP treatment (54.537 vs. 51.730,
SE = 1.026, p = .020). On average, the bids in the COM treatment are 2.703 MU higher
than those in the CMP treatment. This difference is remarkable considering that the
only difference between the treatments was that images with different social connotations
were shown prior to the auction. As expected, average bids in the benchmark treatment
(NO) are in between the two treatment conditions. However, the differences between
6Note that subjects’ ∆HR cannot be properly assessed in the NO treatment, as there was no affective
stimulus.
7The regressions summarized in Table 4.1 account for the fact of repeated measures for each subjects
by using robust standard errors clustered by subject. Since only the participants in the COM and
CMP treatments were exposed to affective images, the regressions in Table 4.1 are only based on














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 4. Affective Images, Emotion Regulation and Market Behavior
Figure 4.4.: HR Drop (∆HR) in beats per minute (bpm) subsequent to the image in-
duction between CMP and COM. (Error bars: 95 Per Cent Confidence
Intervals).
NO and COM (53.814 vs. 54.537, SE = 1.040, p = .767), and NO and CMP (53.814 vs.
51.730, SE = 1.026, p = .110) are not statistically significant, respectively. Regression II
in Table 4.1 provides further evidence that there is a significant difference in bids between
the COM and the CMP treatments (B = −2.809, SE = 1.034, t = −2.720, p = .008).
Expectedly, subjects’ value and risk attitude (i.e., the number of safe choices) enter the
regression with high significance for all models with bid as dependent variable. Higher
values and higher risk aversion increases average bids. This is in line with previous
research on FPSB auctions (cf. Kagel and Roth, 1995). We cannot observe a significant
impact of a bidder’s sex on bids.
Interestingly, subjects reported that they did not think that the images had an influ-
ence on their bidding behavior (M = 2.290, SD = 1.287). Regarding their emotional
state (on the Affect Grid), subjects reported on average a valence score of M = 6.114
(SD = 1.602) and an arousal score of M = 3.300 (SD = 1.680), indicating that they




























Figure 4.5.: Subjects’ mean average bids in the different treatments. (Error bars: 95 Per
Cent Confidence Intervals)
reveals that there are no significant differences in perception between the three treat-
ments on subjects’ self-perceived valence (F (2, 101) = .335, p = .716) and arousal
(F (2, 101) = .765, p = .468). In other words, the images evidently did not alter the con-
scious emotional state significantly, while the psychophysiological data provides evidence
that the images in fact had an influence on the bidders’ affective processes. Therefore, it
seems plausible that the effect of the affective images on bidding behavior is unconscious
in nature. Taken together, we can reject the null hypotheses in favor of our research hy-
pothesis H3b. The bidders exposed to competition images place lower bids than bidders
exposed to community images.
4.4.3. Mediation Analysis
Next, we examine H3c, i.e., to what extent subjects’ bids are mediated by their affective
processes, as measured by ∆HR. In our research model in Figure 4.1, this indirect effect
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is captured by the conjoint path of Affective Images through Affective Response to User
Behavior.
We test H3c by employing a mediation analysis (cf. Preacher et al., 2007). Regressions
I to III in Table 4.1 provide the results of the corresponding regression analysis on the
mediator (Regression I), and on the bids. The latter regressions either do not take ∆HR
as covariate into account (Regression II) in order to determine the total effect, or include
∆HR as covariate (Regression III) in order to determine the size of the direct and indirect
effect. According to the suggestion of Hayes, we evaluate the significance of the indirect
effect in a bootstrapping procedure based on 5,000 samples (Hayes, 2009). We find a
significant total effect (TE = −2.809, SE = 1.034, LL = −4.875, UL = −.743), as well
as a significant direct effect (DE = −2.597, SE = 1.034, LL = −4.729, UL = −.464),
and a significant indirect effect (IE = −.207, SE = .115, LL = −.465, UL = −.008)8
where LL and UL refer to the upper and lower limits of the 95 per cent confidence
interval. In summary, we can conclude that, in line with our research hypothesis H3c, a
bidder’s affective processes, as measured here by ∆HR, partially mediate the impact of
images on bids. We will return to the implications and limitations of this result in the
discussion.
4.4.4. The Moderating Influence of Suppression
Finally, we examine the moderating influence of suppression. The scores for suppres-
sion and reappraisal were obtained by computing the means of both item scales. In
our research model, we hypothesized that applying suppression increases the users’ psy-
chophysiological response to seeing affective images (H3d) as well as their impact on
bidding behavior (H3e).
In line with our research hypothesis H3d and with previous results from the literature,
regression IV in Table 4.1 indicates that subjects who apply suppression strategies exhibit
stronger SCR.amp (B = .048, SE = .027, t = 1.830, p = .072). However, this effect
is only marginally significant and we thus find only weak support for H3d. On the
other hand, we find that reappraisal significantly decreases average SCR.amp in the
COM treatment (B = −.112, SE = .041, t = −2.720, p = .009), while this effect
is mitigated in the CMP treatment (B = .119, SE = .064, t = 1.870, p = .066).
8The indirect effect (IE) can be calculated by multiplying its constituent paths. In this case IE =
−.205 = −1.006 ∗ .206 (discrepancy is due to rounding errors).
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This provides evidence that—depending on the context—reappraisal can be reflected in
smaller SCR.amps. We will return to this result in the discussion. Finally, we find that
SCR.amps mitigate over the sequence of the 15 auction rounds.
Next, we examine whether the use of suppression amplifies or mitigates users’ affect-
edness to affective images in electronic auctions. In order to control for this moderating
influence (cf. H3e), we included the corresponding interaction term in the regressions of
the mediation (CMP x suppression). For completeness, we also controlled for a moder-
ating influence of reappraisal (CMP x reappraisal) in these regressions. As can be seen
in regression III in Table 4.1, the direct effect of affective images on bids is conditional
on the extent to which a subject applies suppression. Figure 4.6 provides a graphical
illustration of this relationship.
Figure 4.6.: Illustration of the moderating influence of suppression.
In the COM treatment, using suppression strategies has a significant positive influence
on bids (b = 1.322, SE = .528, t = 2.500, p = .015). Moreover, the interaction term
CMP x suppression reveals that the influence of suppression on bids is reversed in the
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Table 4.2.: Conditional direct effect of treatment on bids at values of suppression. Note:
The regressions are based on robust standard errors clustered by subject.
Dependent Variable Bid
Suppression Score B SE t-Stat p-value Sig. LLCI ULCI
-1.000 -.174 1.429 -.121 .904 -3.029 2.682
.000 -2.597 1.067 -2.433 .018 ∗ -4.729 -.464
1.000 -5.020 1.327 -3.784 <.001 ∗∗∗ -7.671 -2.369
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
CMP treatment (b = −2.403, SE = .864, t = −2.780, p = .007), i.e., there is a
significant negative influence of suppression on bids. The corresponding moderation
analysis provides further evidence for a conditional direct effect of affective images on
bids (see Table 4.2). Subjects with a low score of suppression seem to be unaffected by
the affective images (ME = −.174, p = .904), while subjects with a medium (ME =
−2.597, p = .018) or high (ME = −5.020, p < .001) suppression score are affected
significantly. In summary, we can therefore reject the null hypothesis in favor of our
research hypothesis H3e. The effect of competitive and community images on bids is
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Figure 4.7.: Results of mediation analysis using unstandardized coefficients.
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4.5. Discussion and Conclusions
4.5.1. Managerial Implications
From the perspective of Internet auction platforms, our study shows that even seemingly
unrelated design elements can cause affective processes in the users which eventually
influence their behavior. Images are widely used in platform design of electronic markets.
In particular, platforms seem to either use community images, which are meant to induce
a sense of social intimacy and warmth, or competition images, which are meant to induce
a competitive spirit in the bidders. Our study shows that bidders place higher bids
when community images are displayed than when competition images are displayed.
Evidently, the designers of such electronic market platforms need to be aware of how
such images impact market outcome. Our results suggest that in order to maximize
revenues, the user interface should rather induce a sense of social warmth than a sense
of competition. In reverse, this questions the marketing strategy of the market leader
ebay.com, for example, which suggested to its customers in advertisement campaigns as
well as through images on its website that “it’s better when you win it.”
Our results also show that the designers of electronic markets should be well aware
of the ER strategies employed by their users. In our study, those users who employ
suppression are found to bid significantly higher in the presence of community images,
but also significantly less in the presence of competition images. Taken as a whole, users
who apply suppression are more affected in their behavior. Auctions inherently pick
those bidders as winners who have a systematic tendency to place higher bids than the
other bidders (Lee and Malmendier, 2011). Profit-maximizing sellers should thus account
for individual behavioral aspects of their consumers, e.g., the influence of interpersonal
differences in ER. Consequently, it is important for marketers to identify the ER strategy
of their users (e.g., through a questionnaire during registration) in order to individually
adapt the interface for each user accordingly. In addition to maximizing profit in single
auctions, adjusting the interface according to the ER strategies of the users may also
improve user experience and thus the success of the platform in the long run. For
instance, our results show that the behavior of bidders with a low suppression score, but
a high reappraisal score is unaffected by the images. However, these bidders experience
weaker emotions in response to community images than in response to competition
images (see moderating influence of reappraisal on SCR.amp).
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Finally, from the perspective of market participants, it is important to highlight that—
subject to interpersonal differences in ER—affective images can have an impact on their
behavior. However, applying suppression is not disadvantageous per se. While the bid-
ders place higher bids in response to seeing community images, their bids are lower
and thus their profits higher when seeing competition images. Furthermore, the use
of psychophysiological measurements during market participation may also be to the
benefit of customers. In this context, Menon and Kahn (2002, p.39) concluded: “rather
than designing static websites, a retailer could design a website to interact with the
consumer and adjust to his or her emotional state”. Building on psychophysiological
measurements, providing users with biofeedback could ultimately protect market partic-
ipants and the organizations they represent from taking disadvantageous decisions (Cyr,
2008). Customers might find biofeedback helpful for detecting a state of poor ER, which
may then be utilized to turn a previously unconscious influence of affective processes on
economic behavior into a conscious, deliberate choice.
4.5.2. Theoretical Implications
Previous studies focused particularly on the impact of using facial features in product
images (Cyr et al., 2009; Hassanein and Head, 2006). As a product image is an im-
portant medium for forming attitudes and expectations about the product for sale, it
can be regarded as a stimulus that triggers an integral emotion. By contrast, our study
focused on images which are unrelated to the task and we can show that also inciden-
tal emotions can have an impact on economic decision making in electronic markets.
This insight bears implications for the design of “exciting” marketplaces, as excitement
that is derived outside actual market participation, e.g., through graphic and acoustic
elements on the website such as videos, sounds and images, can have a systematic in-
fluence on market outcome. Changes in the bidders’ emotional states, whether derived
from participation in an electronic market (auction) or induced by an outside event, are
thus relevant for the market outcome. It would be interesting to investigate the influ-
ence of further sources of incidental emotions on the behavior of market participants.
In this context, Riedl (2013) provided a comprehensive literature review on how inter-
acting with information systems per se can induce considerable levels of arousal and
“technostress.” For instance, experiencing a system breakdown can induce high levels
of the stress hormone cortisol in the users (Riedl et al., 2012). Such incidental affective
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processes might in turn increase or decrease the users’ willingness to take risk in elec-
tronic markets. Interestingly, by combining self-report data with psychophysiological
measurements we can conclude that the influence of incidental emotions on behavior is
unconscious. In the questionnaire, participants indicated that they were not affected
by the images shown, neither emotionally nor economically. By taking into account the
psychophysiological data, however, we found a mediating relationship of bidders’ affec-
tive processes on bids. This highlights how research on psychophysiology can provide
additional insights that complement more traditional research approaches, such as psy-
chometric scales. Clearly, with the use of self-report measures alone, this relationship
could not have been confirmed. It is important to highlight though that (i) taking into
account the users’ self-perception is important for assessing characteristics which are
not reflected in psychophysiology, e.g., whether the effect is conscious or unconscious in
nature, and (ii) that of course also psychophysiological measurements bear limitations
(see next subsection).
Finally, our results indicate that ER strategies, particularly emotion suppression, can
act as moderators of the impact of the emotional state on bidding behavior. Even though
previous literature provided evidence that suppression has emotional and non-emotional
costs, which are reflected in psychophysiology (Gross, 2002; Heilman et al., 2010), subse-
quent economic behavior in electronic auctions has not been considered under controlled
laboratory conditions so far. Our results show that suppression not only struggles at
mitigating the psychophysiological but also the behavioral response. Consequently, this
insight suggests that the users’ ER capabilities should be taken into account when in-
vestigating the impact of emotions on the behavior of market participants. For instance,
the emotional bidding framework of Adam et al. (2011) neither accounts for the influence
of incidental emotions nor for a moderating effect of ER.
4.5.3. Limitations and Future Research
Evidently, there are several limitations that exist in this study. First, as it is often the
case with observational studies, it is difficult to disentangle causality from correlation.
Therefore we cannot definitely answer whether suppression is the reason for subjects’
strong reactions to the images shown or whether it is another trait that drives the
pattern—which then would be correlated with suppression. For instance, we only found
marginal evidence for our research hypothesis H3d (p = .072), i.e., that suppressors
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experience stronger emotions in response to seeing affective images. However, taking into
account that our subjects belong to a relatively homogeneous group (i.e., all students
with similar age) the interplay of the economic and psychophysiological results provides
coherent results, such that suppression can be suspected to play a moderating role in
users’ behavior. In general, more IS research is needed to examine the role of ER on the
users’ affective processing and behavior. Although our findings are consistent with recent
research results that poor regulation can be detrimental to trading performance (Fenton-
O’Creevy et al., 2012), the relationship between ER and economic behavior deserves
more attention. For instance, it might be interesting for future studies to actually
manipulate subjects’ usage of suppression strategies via certain tasks that stimulate
suppression (Heilman et al., 2010). However, researchers should be aware that subjects
who generally apply reappraisal techniques might struggle to use suppression and vice
versa (Volokhov and Demaree, 2010).
Second, we considered a FPSB auction with computer opponents in order to attain
a high level of control over the environmental conditions and to exclude alternative
explanations for the observed effects. However, this may have limited the generalizability
of our results as most electronic auction platforms, such as eBay, employ a dynamic
auction mechanism. Moreover, contrary to our experimental design, bidders usually
have some uncertainty about their private value of the good. However, these aspects are
likely to rather increase bidders’ emotionality during auction participation (Ariely and
Simonson, 2003; Ku et al., 2005), which may also lead to more pronounced results.
Third, while HR and SC provide interesting insights into the affective processes of
auction participants, it is important to highlight that these measures also bear limita-
tions. The advantages are that psychophysiological measures can be assessed in the very
moment of decision making without the necessity to interrupt users and cause distrac-
tion. On the other side, psychophysiological measures (i) have a high degree of variance
and (ii) cannot assess the users’ individual perceptions about the quality of the emotions
(Dimoka et al., 2012; Riedl et al., 2010). For instance, with respect to the mediating role
of affective processes, our analysis only reveals a partial mediation while the direct effect
of affective images on bids might actually be fully mediated. Due to the high variance
of psychophysiological data, it might be interesting for future research to compute mul-
timodal arousal and valence parameters based on multiple parameters—including both
psychophysiological as well as self-perception data. It should be highlighted that self-
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report measures will continue to be a valuable source of information, also or especially
in the presence of complementary psychophysiological data. For example, without the
use of self-report questionnaires it would not have been possible in our study to state
whether the effect of images on behavior is conscious or unconscious.
In general, we believe that using tools from cognitive neuroscience and psychophysi-
ology will be able to provide more insight into the unconscious processes shaping users’
expectations, attitudes and behavior. More research is needed here to investigate how
internal and external affective influences are processed and how these processes are
shaped by personality traits and cultural background (Cyr, 2008; Zahedi and Bansal,
2011). For instance, how does technostress shape the users’ beliefs and attitudes towards
a platform? What other elements of the user interface can induce affective processes in
market participants and change their behavior? To what extent do personality traits and
cultural background moderate the users’ conscious and unconscious affective processes?
We believe that answering these questions can contribute to building better information
systems.
4.5.4. Conclusions
In conclusion, affective images can have an influence on market participants’ affective
states and subsequently on their economic behavior—even when the images are unrelated
to the task. Moreover, those bidders who try to suppress their emotions are even more
strongly affected by them. While the self-report measures indicate that this process
is unconscious in nature, the use of psychophysiological methods shows that bidders’
affective processes partially mediate the relationship between the display of affective
images and market behavior. Taken as a whole, the results of this chapter suggest that
market design should carefully consider which images are displayed to the users and that
the user interface should be individually adapted according to the users’ ER capabilities.
Furthermore, we conclude that combining self-report measures with psychophysiological
measures is a promising approach for the evaluation of user interfaces (Vom Brocke
et al., 2013), because the impact of affective processes on behavior can be unconscious.
As unobtrusive biosignal technology is becoming available to a broader community, it
seems promising for the users and designers of electronic markets and other IT artifacts
to apply such measures even in the field (Nunamaker et al., 2011). Eventually the use
of biosignals may help to better understand the coherence of incidental emotions and
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decision making and ultimately even support users in their goal to adequately respond




and Rewarding Emotion Regulation
As known from literature, but also as indicated by the previous chapters, emotional pro-
cesses can have material consequences on individuals’ financial decision performance.
Also traders and private investors are well aware of this circumstance. However, typical
learning approaches for de-biasing fail to overcome emotionally driven financial dispo-
sitions; mostly because of subjects’ unability for self-monitoring. The tool introduced
in this chapter aims at improving users’ decision making performance by (i) boosting
their awareness to their emotional state and (ii) punishing skills of poor ER. To that
end we design, implement and evaluate a serious game based NeuroIS tool that con-
tinuously displays the player’s individual emotional state, via biofeedback, and adapts
the difficulty of the decision environment to this emotional state. The design artifact is
then evaluated in two laboratory experiments. Taken together, our study demonstrates
how IS design science research can contribute to improving financial decision making by
integrating tools from cognitive neuroscience in IT artifacts.
5.1. Introduction
Indeed, the human nervous system is fascinating. While in one moment it enables us to
achieve high performances—independent whether in sports or in natural sciences—the
next moment it allows us to calm down and enjoy the beauty of a quiet sunny afternoon.
No matter if consciously or subconsciously, the human nervous system thereby continu-
ously adjusts bodily functions in order to match the entire system to ongoing changes in
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environmental demands. Central in this process are emotions. Emotions facilitate our
interactions with the socioeconomic environment; they foster meaningful interpersonal
interactions, prepare behavioral responses, and enable us to take beneficial decisions
(Gross, 2007). Unfortunately, however, emotions are sometimes inaccurately processed.
Emotions can get “out of control” (Loewenstein, 1996). In the heat of the moment,
human decision makers can be overwhelmed by their emotions and—under the influence
of high levels of arousal—lose control over their actions. In business, such processes can
have material consequences for the organizations the decision makers represent. As it
turns out, there is a strong misbalance between emotions and their consequences. While
the emotions are passing, the consequences of the actions which they caused are not; they
can very well be long-lasting. This applies even more for important decisions, because
“important decisions induce powerful emotions in decision makers” (Loewenstein, 2000,
p. 429). To frame it differently, it is highly important for decision makers to correctly
process emotions, because emotions particularly affect important decisions. Financial
decisions fall into this category (Lucey and Dowling, 2005). There are, however, strong
interpersonal differences in the capabilities of adequate emotional processing (Lo and
Repin, 2002; Lo et al., 2005). There is evidence that traders’ and investors’ ER capabil-
ities correlate with their skills in trading (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011, 2012). This also
means that decision makers with low ER capabilities are more likely to take maladaptive
decisions, leading to undesired outcomes. Hence, improving the ER capabilities of deci-
sion makers might also be an important step for their organizations. One approach to
boost this improvement process is to employ sophisticated IS tools that provide decision
guidance and facilitate the skill development process.
In this chapter, it is our objective to help decision makers with improving their ER
capabilities in the context of financial decision making. Therefore, a NeuroIS tool is
designed, implemented, and evaluated (Vom Brocke et al., 2013). More precisely, we
provide a dynamic learning environment which is based on a serious game with real-
time biofeedback. In the game, the player is continuously confronted with financial
decisions. The difficulty of these decisions is directly linked to his or her individual
emotional state which is also indicated via biofeedback. Based on HR measurements,
the game incorporates the player’s arousal level into the game task. The player wears an
electrocardiogram sensor that transfers the data via Bluetooth to the game. Depending
on the player’s ability to regulate his or her emotions, the financial decision scenario of
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the game adjusts in real-time and thereby becomes more (or less) difficult. The design
artifact is thus also a use case for how information systems can incorporate tools from
cognitive neuroscience.
This chapter is organized as follows. The conceptual foundations of our approach are
outlined. We then introduce the concept of ER and summarize previous results regarding
the impact of ER on financial decision making. Based on this theoretical background,
requirements, design decisions, and implementation of our design artifact are presented.
The design artifact is then evaluated in two laboratory experiments (Evaluation Study
I and II). In the conclusion the implications of the approach and challenges for future
research in the field of NeuroIS design science research are outlined.
5.2. Theoretical Background
5.2.1. Emotion and Cognition in Financial Decision Making
In classical economic theory the decision maker is typically described as “as a perfectly
rational cognitive machine” (Sanfey et al., 2003, p. 1755). This assumption certainly
has advantages in economists’ strive to formalize and model human decision making;
and then to squeeze it into the boundaries of expected utility theory. However, this
“consequentialist perspective” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 267) does not leave much
room for the incorporation of emotions on cognition and decision making and therefore
struggles with a broad body of literature which provides sufficient evidence that the
assumption of a perfectly rational homo economicus does not hold for most human
decision makers (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Shiv et al., 2005).
From a purely economic standpoint, emotions were originally considered as a violation
of expected utility theory and their influence as disturbing and even counterproductive
for the quality of financial decision making (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). And with
respect to financial decisions, emotions are suspected to be the underlying driving force
for a whole group of biases, such as the disposition effect (Weber and Camerer, 1998),
loss aversion (Novemsky and Kahnemann, 2005; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2008), and the
phenomenon of auction fever (Adam et al., 2012; Ku et al., 2005). These biases have
been shown in a broad range of field studies (Ku et al., 2005; Shefrin and Statman, 1985)
and laboratory experiments (Novemsky and Kahnemann, 2005; Weber and Camerer,
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1998). They can result in significant financial losses and therefore have highly adverse
consequences for the decision makers.
Despite these biasing effects emotions can have, insights from economic psychology
widened the picture in several aspects. The majority of psychologists meanwhile view
decision making in a dual process framework, stating that depending on the context,
humans process reality in two fundamentally different ways: the slow and analytical ra-
tional system and the fast and intuitive experiential system (Kahneman and Frederick,
2002). Especially in environments where fast processing is required, subjects tend to rely
on their emotions and follow an so-called “affect heuristic” (Slovic et al., 2007). Essen-
tially, the affect heuristic states that human decision makers integrate context specific
affective feelings into perception and their decision making process. Somewhat related,
Isen argued that “positive affect” can even be of positive influence for creative problem
solving, cognitive processing and decision making under complex and stressful situations
(Isen, 2001). Research from the field of cognitive neuroscience provided evidence that
activation in distinct neural circuits, correlating with positive as well as negative affec-
tive states, can increase but also decrease the likelihood for certain financial mistakes
(Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Peterson, 2007). In this regard, Kuhnen and Knutson
concluded that “financial decision making may require a delicate balance” and that “ex-
cessive activation of one mechanism or the other may lead to mistakes” (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005, p. 767).
Emotions’ impact on financial decision making became evident in a multitude of stud-
ies (e.g. Adam et al., 2012; Loewenstein, 1996; Riedl et al., 2010). It is important to
note, however, that most of these studies refer to contextualized situations and “the
context can influence how we process stimuli that may have affective properties” (Rolls
and Grabenhorst, 2008, p. 230). Put in different words, affective processes are highly
context dependent and up to today it is not clear what in general the emotional triggers
are that guide optimal financial decision making. A series of experiments specifically
accounted for the interplay of emotions and information processing—and found that
emotions in fact can contain relevant information (Bechara, 2004). In their somatic
marker hypothesis, Bechara and Damasio concluded that emotions seem to be both a
source of biases as well as an important mechanism for advantageous decision making
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005). The authors showed that the experience of emotions
itself is a mandatory prerequisite for advantageous decision making. More specifically,
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the authors found that those subjects with brain lesions, that are critical for the pro-
cessing of emotions, performed worse in a card game under ambiguity than healthy
subjects (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 1997). Bechara and Damasio con-
cluded that so called “somatic markers”—in essence emotional responses to information
events—can affirmatively guide our focus of attention. The somatic marker hypothe-
sis therefore states that “decisions are aided by emotions, in the form of bodily states,
that are elicited during the deliberation of future consequences and that mark different
options for behavior as being advantageous or disadvantageous” (Naqvi et al., 2006, p.
260). Depending on the context, it was however also been shown that such emotional
processes can also have disruptive effects (Adam and Kroll, 2012). It is hence important
to note that emotions cannot always “be trusted as leading to good or bad decisions”
(Shiv et al., 2005, p. 438). But it can be retained that a well-functioning recognition
of these emotional bodily states is a necessary prerequisite for the decision whether it
is better to follow an emotional response or to inhibit it. It can also be stated that the
strict separation of emotions and cognition drawn in the past is rather outdated (Phelps,
2006).
While economic theory for a long time neglected the influence of emotions on financial
decision making, professional trades and investors at banks are well aware that emotions
can have significant influence on their decision performance. Therefore they are highly
interested in eradicating such emotional dispositions (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011).
Fenton-O’Creevy and colleagues found in an interview based study with professional
traders that major losses often resulted in periods of high risk aversion and overcautious
behavior (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011). Furthermore, a period of major gains could
result in excessive self-confidence and risk prone behavior. Experimental findings point
towards similar results (Novemsky and Kahnemann, 2005; Weber and Camerer, 1998).
Traders and private investors have already understood that they cannot simply ignore
their emotional states, and that certain decision making biases, such as for instance
illusion of control (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003), are even beyond conscious awareness.
Lo and Repin conducted a study with day-traders, which were connected to physio-
logical measures (Lo and Repin, 2002). The authors found that traders do in fact have
high states of arousal during the trading day, with strongest activation during periods
of high market volatility. In a subsequent study, Lo and colleagues found that “extreme
emotional responses are apparently counterproductive from the perspective of trading
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and performance” (Lo et al., 2005, p. 357). This provides further support for the notion
that arousal can adversely affect rational cognition and decision making (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005).
Weak impulse control strategies, high emotional reactivity and the exposure of high
levels of arousal, which might threaten rational processing, are often associated with poor
investment performance (Peterson, 2007). It has also been shown that trading success is
correlated with certain personality traits. In particular, introversion, emotional stability,
and openness to new experiences have been found to be associated with good trading
performance (Peterson, 2007). Peterson found that it is important for traders to be
aware of their own “fallibility” and to avoid to be overpowered by their emotions. The
author recommended to “use awareness of your emotional state to generate a personal
warning signal” (Peterson, 2007, p. 76). Similarly, Biasis and colleagues found that
“self-monitoring enhances trading performance” (Biasis et al., 2005, p. 308). As these
findings indicate, an increased awareness to one’s own emotional state might help traders
to identify a state fueled with high arousal, which could eventually threaten decision
performance (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012, 2011). In addition to the mere awareness
of arousal, however, it is also important to develop strategies in order to “interpret
and manage affective states” (Peterson, 2007, p. 75). In this context, Seo and Barret
found that effective regulation of emotional states is positively correlated with trading
performance in a trading simulation environment (Seo and Barrett, 2007).
5.2.2. Emotion Regulation
The concept of ER has gained wide attention in psychological research in recent years
(Gross, 2007) and will be explained here in more detail. According to the concept of
ER, emotions can determine and change the way how we perceive certain situations and
thereby influence the way we react to them. Thus, emotions act as response tendencies:
they suggest distinctive responses to a certain situation, which an individual may or may
not follow (Gross, 1998b). In this sense, emotions “reflect the status of one’s ongoing
adjustment to constantly changing environmental demands” (Thayer and Lane, 2009,
p. 85). The process model of Gross (Gross, 1998a) is widely known and acknowledged
in the field of ER research. It stems from the assumption that emotions are generated
in an emotion generative process. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, re-
search distinguishes primarily between antecedent- and response-focused ER strategies.
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Antecedent ER strategies apply while the emotion is still unfolding and has not reached
its top. The most prominent representative is cognitive reappraisal. These strategies
will be explained on the basis of a short example. Consider for instance, an impatient IT
manager waiting for a developer to fix a potential security hazard in the system. Cogni-
tive reappraisal could now manifest in becoming aware that the manager could usefully
utilize the waiting time, for instance, by reassuring that recently a backup copy was
made. Contrarily, response-focused ER aims at suppressing the experiential, behavioral,
and physiological response when the emotion has already completely unfolded. The most
prominent strategy for response-focused ER is suppression. In the IT manager example,
suppression could enfold in the way that the manager gets really frustrated, but then
decides to not express this experienced emotion in order to not alarm his colleagues.
In fact, emotions and their regulation can be both conscious- and subconsciously pro-
cessed and also positive as well as negative emotions can be regulated to a certain extent
(Gross, 2007; Williams et al., 2009). Therefore, an increased emotional awareness is crit-
ical for enhanced ER. Up to now it is assumed that the applied ER strategies are also
determined by personality traits and individual psychological capacity (Gross, 1998a).
5.2.3. Improved Financial Decision Making through Enhanced
Emotion Regulation
A few studies from previous research have already shown that effective ER can improve
financial decision making. Heilman et al. (2010) for instance, showed that ER can reduce
loss aversion and thereby contribute to advantageous decision making. Sokol-Hessner
et al. (2008) induced an intentional cognitive regulation strategy which emphasized co-
called “perspective taking.” The authors showed that this ER strategy, which can be
understood as a form of cognitive reappraisal, mitigated physiological responses to losses
relative to gains and also reduced subjects’ loss aversion. Sütterlin and colleagues mea-
sured subjects’ individual degree of inhibitory control, which is a physiological measure
for ER capabilities. The authors found it to be negatively correlated with susceptibility
to framing effects in a risky-choice task (Sütterlin et al., 2011). Similarly, Fenton-
O’Creevy and colleagues measured the heart rate variability of professional traders in
their daily environment. The authors found a significant relationship between effective
ER and trader experience and argued that improved ER results from active trading
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experience (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012). Further, in a study based on interviews,
Fenton-O’Creevy and colleagues found that high performing traders (i) have a bet-
ter awareness of their current emotional state and (ii) are also more sophisticated in
down-regulating highly arousing states (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011). Also the authors
reported that new traders simply tend to avoid negative emotions, while experienced
traders do not evade those negative arising emotions.
In conclusion, research so far has shown that the awareness of the own emotional
state and the capacity to employ ER in states of high arousal overall is a considerable
feature for financial decision making. ER can help to reduce emotions which might
adversely affect decision biases and therefore even improve decision performance. How-
ever, how can a decision maker actually learn to improve his or her ER capabilities?
Unfortunately, traditional learning approaches seem to fail when it comes to improving
ER capabilities (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012). In the context of ER, common problems
of traditional learning approaches are (1) that learning ER and actually experiencing
high levels of arousal are separated in time, and (2) that the subjects can get practically
no feedback on their own capacity to regulate their emotions. In the following, we will
address these problems by designing, implementing, and evaluating an IS artifact that
aims at rewarding strong ER capabilities. In particular, we build on insights from cog-
nitive neuroscience and provide users with a direct feedback of their current emotional
state. Advances in cognitive neuroscience highlighted the influence of ER on emotional
experience and the underlying visceral processes. For instance, Martin and Delgado
(2011) supported the notion that effective ER reduces neural responses under risk, and
henceforth results in more goal-directed decision making.
5.2.4. NeuroIS and Design Science Research
In the near past, the progress in cognitive neuroscience has also gained increasing inter-
est from IS researchers (Dimoka et al., 2012, 2011; Riedl et al., 2010; Vom Brocke et al.,
2013). As outlined by Dimoka and colleagues, the nascent field of NeuroIS is “drawing
upon the theories, methods, and tools offered by cognitive neuroscience” (Dimoka et al.,
2011, p. 687). This also includes psychophysiological tools such as electrocardiography
and skin conductance measurement (Riedl et al., 2010). It is further argued that research
in the field of NeuroIS has the potential to provide long overdue insight into the decision
making processes of users interacting with IT. Certain insights were already gained by
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the application of NeuroIS experiments: For instance, Riedl and colleagues showed that
deciding whether to trust an avatar induces less intense neurobiological processes than
deciding whether to trust an actual person (Riedl et al., 2011). In another experiment,
Riedl and colleagues reported that there are gender differences with respect to the ac-
tivity of specific brain areas when deciding on the trustworthiness of eBay offers (Riedl
et al., 2010). In a further experiment, Adam and colleagues showed that in electronic
Dutch auctions the impact of time pressure on final prices is mediated by arousal, based
on HR measurements (Adam et al., 2012). Also in the present study we will employ a
derivative of the heart as a measure for arousal, which will be explained in more detail
later.
While the number of empirical NeuroIS papers is constantly growing, the incorporation
of cognitive neuroscience “is still in its infancy in IS design science research” (Vom Brocke
et al., 2013, p. 2). In order to provide a framework for how tools and theories from
neuroscience can be applied in IS design science research, vom Brocke and colleagues
derived three specific application strategies (Vom Brocke et al., 2013). In this chapter,
we focus specifically on Strategy 3 in the framework by Vom Brocke et al. (2013), i.e.
on how neuroscience tools can be used as built-in functions of IT artifacts. In more
detail, vom Brocke and colleagues argued that “IT artifacts with built-in neuroscience
tools may even adjust to the affective state of the user” (Vom Brocke et al., 2013, p.
9). Thereby, IS design science research can build on progress in the fields of affective
computing (Nacke et al., 2011; Picard, 1997, 2003) and neuroergonomics (Di Stasi et al.,
2011; Parasuraman, 2003).
Picard (1997, p. 3) defines affective computing as “computing that relates to, arises
from, or deliberately influences emotions.” Picard et al. (2001) also highlights the impor-
tance of software which has the ability to sense and respond to the users’ affective states
based on physiological measures. Neuroergonomics is typically defined as “the study
of brain and behavior at work” (Parasuraman, 2003, p. 5). In an interesting study, Di
Stasi and colleagues showed in this context how eye-tracking devices can help to monitor
operators’ mental workload when interacting with hypermedia (Di Stasi et al., 2011).
Additionally, previous research has employed physiological measures in order to find out
how interacting with IT can induce strong levels of stress in the users (Riedl et al.,
2012; Zhai and Barreto, 2006). One prominent concept in affective computing and also
in neuroergonomics is biofeedback. Typically, for this form of feedback physiological
95
Chapter 5. Enhancing Emotional Awareness and Rewarding Emotion Regulation
parameters such as HR or SC are acoustically or visually displayed (Lehrer et al., 2000;
Nacke et al., 2011; Ouwerkerk, 2011). Thereby, subjects get direct feedback on their own
physiological reactions and processes; processes which are typically for subjects even be-
low awareness (Dawson et al., 2011). It has been shown that biofeedback can increase
the user’s attention to the emotional state, which in turn can improve interoception,
i.e. the conscious awareness of one’s own physiological processes (Vaitl, 1996). Also,
there is evidence that biofeedback can contribute to an alleviation of sufferings such as
heart diseases and depression (Lehrer et al., 2000). In clinical studies, serious games
with biofeedback are brought into use to train beginning doctors at reducing their level
of stress (Wang et al., 2010). With respect to financial decision making, the electrics
company Philips together with the Dutch bank ABN AMRO developed a biofeedback
device for retail investors. The so-called “Rationalizer” is a device that “acts as a kind
of emotion mirror in which the user sees reflected the intensity of his feelings in form of
dynamic lighting patterns” (Djajadiningrat et al., 2009, p. 39).
5.3. Design and Method
In order to reward efficient ER strategies of decision makers, a NeuroIS tool is de-
signed, implemented, and evaluated. Thus, this study serves as an example of how
IS design science research can employ biofeedback as built-in functions of IT artifacts
(Vom Brocke et al., 2013). The goal which is pursued with this tool is to put the de-
cision maker in an interactive learning environment in which effective ER, assessed via
biofeedback, is rewarded. The tool was developed by an international consortium with
scientific backgrounds in information systems, computer science, finance, and psychology
(www.xDelia.org).
5.3.1. Requirements
Importantly for IS design science research, the design decisions have to be well justified
and based on existing research (Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2008; Vom Brocke
et al., 2013). Correspondingly, a set of specific requirements is defined (R1-R3). These
requirements are based on the literature and serve as guidelines for the design process
and are later used as criteria for the evaluation of the design artifact.
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Requirement1 (R1): The design artifact has to provide an engaging learn-
ing environment which can elicit arousal and is embedded in the context of
financial decision making.
Requirement 1 (R1) refers to the general nature of the created learning environment.
From a learning perspective, it is important to highlight that “learning is maximized”
when the learners are provided with an engaging environment (Dror, 2008). In contrast,
“when the learning material is simply presented to the learners, they are passive and so
learning is minimal” (Dror, 2008, p. 219). Moreover, down regulation of high levels of
arousal—such as they occur for traders and private investors in real life—can only be
actively practiced, when the user actually has to face a similarly arousing environment.
According to Grandey, “the experience of both emotions and stress are known to be
accompanied by a physiological state of arousal” (Grandey, 2000, p. 99). Therefore,
the goal to create a design artifact based upon which ER can be actively practiced, can
only be achieved when the users actually have to face an engaging learning environment
which can elicit highly arousing states. Lastly, the general focus of our tool lies on
rewarding ER in the context of financial decision making; therefore it was decided to
embed the learning environment in a financial context. The reason behind this is that
such a scenario may support the users in their strive to apply the learned skills in the
game to a real trading context.
Requirement2 (R2): The design artifact has to provide an environment
in which effective ER is rewarded.
The second requirement (R2) refers to our overall goal of rewarding the users with
effective capabilities. In addition to merely providing the users with an arousing envi-
ronment in which ER can be practiced, a core requirement for our design artifact is that
effective ER is actually rewarded. By rewarding effective ER and punishing poor ER,
the design artifact should help users to actively learn ER (Rolls, 2000). Both ER strate-
gies reappraisal and suppression, when instructed, have been shown to be successful in
down-regulating positive emotional states. There is also evidence that depending on
specific traits, some subjects favor suppression to reappraisal and conversely (Volokhov
and Demaree, 2010). Therefore it is left open to participants which strategy they want
to use in order to regulate their arousal. Thereby we assume both ER strategies to be
successful.
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Requirement3 (R3): The design artifact has to provide the user with live
biofeedback in an unobtrusive and meaningful way.
The third requirement (R3) refers to the biofeedback the user is given during playing
the game. As mentioned before, a major problem with rewarding of effective ER is
that users practically get no feedback on how successful they are at regulating their
emotions (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012). Our approach is to provide the users with real-
time biofeedback on their emotional state by the usage of physiological measurements.
This way, we intend to increase users’ awareness to their own physiological state and
thus improve their interoception. Certain requirements with regards to life biofeedback
have to be met: First, from a technical perspective, life biofeedback systems should
be designed as “unobtrusive and as unnoticeable as possible” (Ouwerkerk, 2011, p. 24).
This assures that a user may also use them in daily life, such as in our case traders in day-
trading centers or for private investors at home. In order to meet these requirements
the system has to be easy and unnoticeable to wear. Second, from a user-interface
perspective, the biofeedback has to be provided in a meaningful way i.e. the users
should be able to actually draw useful information from the displayed biofeedback. Taken
together, by providing the user with live biofeedback in an unobtrusive and meaningful
way, the users can get direct feedback on their individual capacity to regulate their
emotions during their interaction with the game.
5.3.2. Conceptual Idea
When turning to requirement R1, previous research has shown that learning through
serious games can be engaging and can have a positive influence on the development
of knowledge and skills (Anderson and Lawton, 2009). Generally, serious games aim
at purposes apart from sheer entertainment (Corti, 2006; Legér et al., 2011). Serious
games, which are repeatable, highly engaging, and also motivating can result in enhanced
training activities and therefore in enhanced skill development (Corti, 2006). A major
reason for the effectiveness of serious games as learning instruments is that “participants
in a serious game must try something, even though they may not have complete or clear
information about the best course of action” (Legér et al., 2011, p. 45). Following
this argumentation, we decided to design and implement the design artifact as a serious
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game. The game is named Auction Game and, in line with requirement R1, is embedded
in a financial context.
The Auction Game sets the player into the role of a trader who’s goal is to earn
money by repeated buying and selling a single stock in consecutive trading rounds. Each
trading round gives the player information about the stock’s real value in this round by
displaying three sequential price estimates. These estimates correspond to the ratings
of three independent analysts whereas the mean of the three price estimate represents
the true value of the stock. Thereby, we follow the economic concept of common value
signals (e.g. Oh, 2002). In each round the player has to calculate the mean of the three
price estimates and to decide whether he or she wants to buy or sell the stock at a offered
price. If the offered price is below (above) the true value of the stock, the player can
realize a profit by buying (selling) the stock.1 If the player opts for the wrong option,
the payoff of this round is negative.
Step II: Display price estimates 
Step III: Decision 
Sell 
95.42€ No Trade 
Buy 
95.42€ 
The Player has to decide for one  
of the three following options. 
Step IV: Payoff 
Based on the player‘s decision,  
the round payoff is calculated. 
Step I: Calculation 
 Current arousal level 
 Price estimates 





Figure 5.1.: Process of One Trading Round
1Short selling here means that the player can sell the stock without actually having it. This is a
common procedure in financial markets.
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A representative trading round is illustrated in Figure 5.1 . Each trading round com-
prises four steps (Step I-IV). Step I calculates the user’s current level of arousal, the three
price estimates for the stock, the true value of the stock, and an offer price. Later the
player decides to buy or sell the stock for that offer price. Step II displays consecutively
the three price estimates. In the example in Figure 5.1, the price estimates are e 92.48,
e 93.31, and e 87.80. Thus, the true value of the stock is e 92.48+e 93.31+e 87.80/3 =
e 91.20 in this round. Step III sets the user into the position to decide for one of three
options. In the example of Figure 5.1, the user can buy e 95.42, sell for e 95.42, or press
the no-trade button. By pressing the so called no-trade button, the user can jump to the
next round without having to suffer from a negative payoff. Conceptually, the no-trade
button enables the user to escape an immediate decision and take a step back to calm
down before returning to the active trade. If the user does not manage to choose one of
the three options within a time limit of two seconds, he or she loses e 5.00. By design
this is the worst payoff a player can realize in a single round. Therefore, action should
always be preferred to no action, as the user should never lose control over his or her
actions. In Step IV, the gain or loss of the current round is displayed. In the example of
Figure 5.1, the player decided to sell for e 95.42. Since the mean of the price estimates
(e 91.20) is lower than the offered price (e 95.42), the player makes a profit of e 4.22.
Afterwards the game returns to Step I with the next trading round.
5.3.3. Arousal Eliciting Game Elements
The Auction Game incorporates specific design elements with the aim to induce arousal
into the users. First, the users get feedback subsequent to their decisions. Previous
research has shown that being confronted with the positive and negative outcomes of
one’s own financial decisions can induce rewarding and aversive emotions (Astor et al.,
2013; Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Therefore, with every decision a user has made, the
Auction Game immediately provides a visually and acoustically highlighted feedback
on whether she or he gained or lost money. Second, the Auction Game is designed to
increase the general level of arousal by constantly putting the users under time pressure.
Time pressure is generally known for increasing the decision makers’ arousal and their
willingness to take risk (Adam et al., 2012; Ku et al., 2005). In particular, in each trading
round the user only has two seconds for submitting a decision. Similarly, each estimation
cloud is displayed for only one second and this display time reduces to fractions of a
100
5.3. Design and Method
second as the user progresses in the game. Taken together, the maximum duration of
one round is five seconds. As it is essential to keep the user at constant levels of high
arousal and to make the Auction game highly engaging (Kelly et al., 2007), the tool is
structured into seven levels. The user’s goal in the game is successfully complete the
highest level and earn as much money as possible.
To earn money in the game the player has to make profitable decisions, allowing him
to jump from one level to the next when he or she has achieved the current game level’s
profit goal. The profit goal increases by e 30 in every new level. In case the user falls
e 10 below the current level’s starting point, the game is finished. Conceptually, the
user either accomplishes the final seventh level or an earlier game over results due to
time or money constraints. Ideally the game runs for approximately 25 minutes and the
user earns around e 200 during the progression through the game.
Only four minutes are given the user to progress from one level to another, inducing
an additional level of time pressure. Additionally, the background music in the game
automatically adjusts to the user’s current profit within each game level. The original
beat of the background music is 120 bpm. It has been shown at several instances that
background music is capable to impact subjects’ level of arousal (Critchley et al., 2004).
Due to this, we decided to increase the tempo of the background music, once the player
has achieved 50 per cent and again when the user has achieved 75 per cent of the current
level’s profit goal.
Table 5.1.: Overview of Game Levels
Level Element varying cloud estimates
1/7 Player’s arousal is displayed but it has no effect on the game at all.
2/7 Player’s arousal level affects the variance of estimates.
3/7 Estimation clouds move.
4/7 Estimation clouds become bigger and smaller in size.
5/7 Estimation clouds are same sized, but fake clouds with text start to appear.
6/7 Fake clouds with numbers start to appear. Distracting background images.
7/7 Estimation clouds become bigger and smaller in sizes again.
Table 5.1 summarizes the seven different levels of the game. With each game level
game difficulty increases, making it more difficult for the player to make profitable deci-
sions. With each level also new distracting feature are included in the game environment.
Those comprise additional irrelevant clouds carrying false information, reduced display
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time of the clouds, as well as auditory and visual distracting elements. For instance,
starting in level 6, the background of the game interface shows arousing photos of the
IAPS database (Lang, 1995) (see section Section 4.2.2 for a closer description). Also,
the speed of cloud movement is correlated to arousal in higher levels.
5.3.4. Rewarding the Use of Emotion Regulation
The Auction Game employs physiological measurements in order to reward effective ER,
as stated in requirement R2. It is focused in particular on down-regulation of high levels
of arousal as those levels should be overcome and are often found to be correlated with
maladaptive financial decision making (Adam et al., 2012; Ku et al., 2005; Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005). However, the here followed approach is not normative in a sense that
we assume specific actions or strategies are always preferable to others. Our approach
rather aims at extending the decision maker’s toolbox (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002)
by improving his or her capabilities to down-regulate high levels of arousal when this
is actually required for beneficial decision making. The player’s goal in the game is to
constantly keep her or his level of arousal low. As down-regulation of arousal shall be
rewarded by the Auction Game, it is designed in the fashion that the player’s current
level of arousal (normalized on a scale from 1 to 5) influences the variance of the price
signals. As by construction the variance of the price signals is connected to the player’s
current level of arousal. For instance, for an arousal level of 1, the price estimates
would be e 92.48, e 93.31, and e 87.80. For an arousal of 5, however, the variance of
price estimates is much larger, which results in price estimates of e 68.22, e 79.21, and
e 126.17. Following, the game increases the difficulty for the player to calculate the mean
of the pricing signals. By this setup, the player’s level of arousal is directly connected
to the game’s difficulty. Therefore, in the game not only emotional awareness to the
emotional state is boosted, even directly the down-regulation of arousal is rewarded.
In following levels in the game additional elements are affected by arousal, such as the
movement of the clouds on the screen. Summarizing, the better a subject is able to keep
his or her arousal down, the easier the financial decision scenario in the game becomes.
Therefore, the Auction Game is designed to directly reward effective ER in the context
of financial decision making.
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5.3.5. Employing Biofeedback
A central concept in the Auction Game is biofeedback, providing the user with a direct
feedback on his or her current level of arousal. Cognitive neuroscience has shown that
“the experience of both emotions and stress are known to be accompanied by a physio-
logical state of arousal” (Grandey, 2000, p. 99), which in turn manifests in changes in
physiology. In the context of IS, Riedl and colleagues have shown that the stress hor-
mone cortisol is released when users experience “technostress” in response to a system
breakdown (Riedl et al., 2012). While measuring cortisol levels is undoubtedly highly
reliable for assessing arousal, the use of saliva samples is not suited for providing users
with a continuously adjusting live biofeedback.2 In order to meet requirement R3, we
thus specifically focus on real-time measures. Skin conductance corresponds to the elec-
trical conductivity of the human skin and reflects activity of the sympathetic nervous
system, which activates the organism for fight or flight. While this signal is suitable
for assessing the intensity of single (phasic) emotions, changes in the overall (tonic)
level are rather inert (Dawson et al., 2011). The Auction Game, however, is by design
characterized by a fast-paced decision environment and skin conductance measurements
are thus not optimal in this context. Moreover, skin conductance is not innervated by
the parasympathetic nervous system, which promotes recreation (Berntson et al., 2007).
In contrast, the HR is a measure that reflects activity of both the sympathetic and
parasympathetic branch of the ANS (Berntson et al., 2007). Moreover, sympathetic and
parasympathetic activation is almost instantly reflected in changes in HR. The degree
of interplay between the parasympathetic and the sympathetic nervous system provides
an indication for a subject’s ER capabilities (Sütterlin et al., 2011). Practically, the HR
can be measured in an unobtrusive way by use of dry electrodes in a chest strap or a
shirt. In contrast to sensors attached to the hand as for example for skin conductance
or pulse measurement the chest strap allows a movement of the hand and will neither
cause artifacts nor lose electrodes. Due to these characteristics, it was decided to use
HR as the underlying parameter for biofeedback in the Auction Game.
2In this context, Ouwerkerk noted that “due to the large time lag of saliva sampling and obtaining
the lab result, real-time monitoring of the hormone levels is currently not feasible in a daily life
situation” (Ouwerkerk, 2011, p. 25).
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5.4. Implementation
Based on the requirements and design decisions outlined in the last section, we now
present how the Auction Game was implemented and demonstrated in practice. The
implementation followed an iterative process (Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2008)
which involved demonstration to real practitioners at trader and investor shows, as well
as play-testing calibration with student testers. Insights from the demonstration directly
fed back into the implementation.
5.4.1. Architecture of the Game
The Auction Game is based on a modular and dynamic architecture, which can be
adjusted to include further game elements by modifying an XML configuration file. In
particular, the Auction Game can be used with measurement devices from different
manufacturers. A screenshot of the game and further details on the game mechanics are
provided in the following.
Biosignal Analysis Framework 
 Real-Time Biosignal Processing 






 Adjustment of Game Difficulty 
 Calculation of Price Estimates 
Player 
Sensor 
Figure 5.2.: Schematic Overview Over the Game Architecture
The Auction Game architecture is schematically depicted in Figure 5.2. The ECG
device was chosen in consideration of R3 to be as unobtrusive as possible. More specif-
ically, the player wears a dry electrode chest-belt and a sensor that transmits the user’s
ECG wirelessly to a Bluetooth receiver. A biosignal analysis framework then processes
the ECG data, computes the arousal values and feeds them into the game in real-time.
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The game constantly adjusts the level of game difficulty, calculates the price estimates,
and updates the user interface.
5.4.2. Arousal Value Computation
As outlined in the design section, the computation of arousal values is based on HR. To
connect the physiological sensors to the game, the xAffect framework was used. This
software environment provides a modular open source framework for offline and online
analysis of biosignals. It can be used as a middleware between physiological sensors and
3rd party software such as the Auction Game. After receiving the ECG signal, QRS
detection is performed using the OSEA algorithm (Hamilton, 2002). The ECG is then
decomposed into characteristic deflections referred to as P, Q, R, S, and T waves. The
R peak is the most characteristic peak in the ECG signal and corresponds to the bulk of
ventricular myocardium activity, i.e. the activity of the heart chamber muscle (Berntson
et al., 2007). The QRS algorithm is used to detect these R peaks, based on which HR
is computed. Irregular beats are excluded from further analysis using the algorithm
proposed by Clifford and colleagues (Clifford et al., 2002).
Before the actual trading task starts, there is a five minute rest period in order to
assess an individual baseline level of arousal (cf. Sütterlin et al., 2011). The arousal
values in the game are then derived from the HR in relation to this baseline period.
Sympathetic activity tends to increase HR, while parasympathetic activity decreases
HR. In the game, an increase in HR compared to the initial baseline period, results
in an increase in the computed arousal. To avoid that respiratory sinus-arrhythmia is
reflected in the arousal value, the mean value over the last 5 heart beats is used for
arousal computation (Berntson et al., 2007). Humans have limited information pro-
cessing capabilities-particularly in fast-paced environments. Reducing the amount of
information to a limited number of categories is thus essential to facilitate effective
information processing (Miller, 1956). Previous research has shown particularly that
reductions to five or seven categories are effective (e.g. Lozano et al., 2008). In order to
provide the users with biofeedback in a meaningful way (cf. R3), the arousal parameter
in the Auction Game can thus only take on five different integer values (1 to 5). A
value of 5 corresponds to the highest level and is reached if the current HR is more
than 15.00 per cent higher than in the initial rest period. A value of 4 corresponds to
the second-highest level and is reached if the increase in HR is between 11.25 per cent
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and 15.00 per cent. Finally, a value of 1 corresponds to an increase of 0.00 per cent
or lower. The threshold values were calibrated based on an iterative implementation
process with student and real investor trial sessions. Moreover, the range of values is in
accordance with the levels reported in previous research (Adam et al., 2012; Smith and
Dickhaut, 2005). Figure 5.3 depicts the generated unisens.xml with information about
a participants’ ECG, triggers for each heart beat and the calculated heart rate.
Figure 5.3.: Unisens.xml with ECG, Triggers for Heart Beats and Calculated Heart Rate
5.4.3. Display of Arousal Values
In the Auction Game, the arousal parameter is displayed to the user by means of an
arousal meter that visualizes the user’s current emotional state (see Appendix). Meters
are frequently used in user interface design to display important indicators in an intuitive
and meaningful way (cf. R3, see (Ariely and Loewenstein, 2006; Caria et al., 2007) for
a similar approach). The arousal meter visualizes the five different levels of arousal
with colors ranging from green (1) to red (5). This approach is similar to the light
patterns used in the Philips Rationalizer which were designed to make the arousal levels
“intuitively clear” (Djajadiningrat et al., 2009, p. 44).
In order to objectively determine which game elements the users are paying attention
to during the game, a Tobii T60 eye tracking device was used when demonstrating
a prototype of the game to six students. The results revealed that users in general
paid attention to the arousal meter. However, when the decision scenario became more
complicated, the users hardly paid attention to the arousal meter. The users stated that
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this was due to lack of time during fast-paced decision making. Based on these results,
the visualization of arousal values was extended to also include the cloud estimations
so that the important information is presented at the attention focus point. More
specifically, the cloud estimates were implemented to change their color according to
the current level of arousal. This feature was found to be very useful by student testers
as well as real traders and investors in subsequent demonstration sessions.
5.5. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the Auction Game, we conducted two laboratory experiments (Eval-
uation Study I and II). The evaluation measures as well as the design and procedure of
the experiments are outlined in the following. As argued by Hevner and colleagues, “a
design artifact is complete and effective when it satisfies the requirements and constraints
of the problem it was meant to solve” (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 85). Correspondingly,
the requirements (R1-R3) derived in the design section are now used as criteria for the
evaluation and thus for the design of the experiments.
5.5.1. Experimental Design
The general aim of Evaluation Study I and II is to evaluate whether the Auction Game
can in fact induce high levels of arousal (R1) and whether effective ER is rewarded (R2).
Moreover, by activating and deactivating biofeedback and its impact on game difficulty,
it was evaluated whether the display of biofeedback was meaningful in the sense that it
helped the users to achieve a higher decision performance (R3).














Study I 36 BF: 19 YES YES YES
23.39
[20-28] 12
NBF: 17 YES NO YES
Evaluation
Study II 68 BF: 44 YES YES YES
23.39
[20-28] 16
NI: 24 YES NO NO
107
Chapter 5. Enhancing Emotional Awareness and Rewarding Emotion Regulation
The core parameters of the two experiments are summarized in Table 5.2. Both
studies are based on between-subjects designs with a total number of 36 and 68 subjects,
respectively.4 In the biofeedback treatment (BF), the subjects are provided with a direct
feedback on their emotional state. In the no-biofeedback treatment (NBF), subjects do
not gain any direct information on their emotional state. In both treatments, however,
the arousal level has a direct impact on game performance (see design section). Thus,
in both treatments the level of arousal is positively correlated with the game difficulty.
Participants in NBF and BF receive the same instructions on how emotional arousal
influences game difficulty, except that the NBF version does not get any information
on the arousal meter and the adjusting color of the clouds, since these elements do
not occur in their game version. Figure 5.4 in the Appendix depicts screenshots of the
different treatments. Finally, in the no influence (NI) treatment, subjects play the game
in a mode where neither the emotional state is indicated nor does it influence the game
whatsoever. For this group also the instruction material differs slightly: Participants of
the NI treatment only received the information that “paying attention is an important
task to regulate your emotions”, without referring to arousal. It is important to highlight
in this context, that the arousal influencing the game can only increase game difficulty.
This means that subjects in the NI treatment played a game in which the trading task
is never more difficult than it is in the BF treatment. Therefore, it is interesting to
analyze, whether biofeedback and thus an increased sensitivity for ER in fact has a
positive impact on decision performance in the Auction Game.
5.5.2. Game Mechanics
The Auction Game was developed using the Unity 3D Pro game engine5. The game is
played in a 2D environment, where price estimates are presented inside colored cloud
drawings. To depict a sense of progress through the game, every level has a different
background picture of the sky.
3An ANOVA indicates no significant difference in decision performance between male and female
subjects (F (1, 102) = 1.181, p = .280).
4Originally, 46 subjects participated in Evaluation Study I and 80 subjects participated in Evaluation
Study II. Due to difficulties with the wireless data transmission we had to exclude 10 subjects from
Study I and 12 subjects from Evaluation Study II. This was necessary, because for these subjects no
ECG was recorded—and hence no arousal values could be calculated—or the signal was inverted.
5The Unity 3D Pro software environment provides one of the world’s leading game engines for profes-
sional video games. For further information, please refer to http://www.unity3d.com.
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Appendix 
This appendix provides further details on the implementation and game mechanics of the Auction 
Game as well as the measurement devices used in the evaluation studies.  
Game Mechanics 
The Auction Game was developed using the Unity 3D Pro game engine.
1
 The game is played in a 
2D environment, where price estimates are presented inside colored cloud drawings. To depict a 
sense of progress through the game, every level has a different background picture of the sky. 
  
Figure A.1. Game screen of the Auction Game. 
Figure A.1 displays a screenshot of the Auction Game. On the top-left side of the screen, the 
remaining time for the current level is displayed. The player can see his or her individual arousal 
level indicated on the meter in the right top corner, as well as by the color of the clouds (green, 
yellow, and red). The profit goal and total money earned are presented on the meter at the 
bottom-right side of the screen. Decisions can be made by clicking on the buy, the sell, or the no-
                                                 
1
 The Unity 3D Pro software environment provides one of the world’s leading game engines for professional video 
games. For further information, please refer to http://www.unity3d.com. 
Figure 5.4.: Game Screen of the Auction Game
Fig re 5.4 displays a screenshot of the Auction Game. On the op-left side of the
screen, the remaining time for the current level is displayed. The player can see his or
her individual arousal level indicated on the meter in the right top corner, as well as by
the color of the clouds (green, yellow, and red). The profit goal and total money earned
are presented on the meter at the bottom-right side of the screen. Decisions can be made
by clicking on the buy, the sell, or the no-trade button at the bottom of the screen. Note
that, in contrast to the illustration in Figure 5.4, the clouds appear sequentially in the
game and that the location of their appearance on the screen is random. The decision
terminal does not get activated before the last cloud got indicated. Every profitable
decision will reward the player with a certain amount of money, while a non-profitable
decision will reduce the player’s earning and take him or her further away from the
current level’s profit goal. Figure 5.5 displays screenshots of the two treatment groups
of Evaluation Study I.
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trade button at the bottom of the screen. Note that, in contrast to the illustration in Figure A.1, the 
clouds appear sequentially in the game and that the location of their appearance on the screen is 
random. The decision terminal does not get activated before the last cloud got indicated. Every 
profitable decision will reward the player with a certain amount of money, while a non-profitable 
decision will reduce the player’s earning and take him or her further away from the current 
level’s profit goal. Figure A.2 displays screenshots of the two treatment groups of Evaluation 
Study I. Note again that, in contrast to the illustration in Figure A.1, the clouds appear 
sequentially in the game and that the location of their appearance on the screen is random. 
 
Figure A.2. Game screens of the two treatment groups of Evaluation Study I; with and without 
biofeedback (cloud colors and arousal meter). 
Before the game starts, the instructions on how to play the game are displayed. Moreover, the 
player can choose to go through a tutorial. The tutorial explains the principle of the game and 
introduces its different elements step by step. The tutorial should be played the first time the 
player gets in contact with the game, but it can be skipped if the player already knows the game. 
Starting from level 6, affective pictures from the IAPS database are randomly displayed to 
Figure 5.5.: Game Screens of the two treatment groups of Evaluation Study I; with and
without biofeedback (cloud colors and arousal meter).
Before the game starts, the instructions on how to play the game are displayed. More-
over, the player can choose to go through a tutorial. The tutorial explains the principle
of the game and introduces its different elements step by step. The tutorial should be
played the first time the player gets in contac with t e game, but it can be skipp d if
the player already knows the game. Starting from level 6, affective pictures from the
IAPS database are randomly displayed to distract the user and further induce arousal.
Thereby, we selected particularly pictures with high arousal scores while excluding dis-
gusting pictures6.
5.5.3. Measurement Devices
Due to the flexible software architecture of the biosignal analysis framework, the Auction
Game can be connected to a variety of measurement devices. In the evaluation studies
described in this chapter, we used two different types of measurement devices. The first
device is called ekgMove and is produced by the company Movisens. It is a sensor on
a chest strap with dry electrodes. The strap is attached directly on the subject’s chest
(comparable to the ones used during sport exercises). The assessment is performed
using Bluetooth and therefore the chest strap and sensor are very comfortable to wear
6In particular, pictures #1505, #2080, #2091, #2154, #2156, #2158, #2216, #2274, #2303, #2332,
#2340, #2341, #2345, #2598, #5623, #5830, #5831, #8001, #8050, #8060, #8065, #8116,
#8117, #8118, #8130, #8220, #8230, #8231, #8232, and #8467 of the IAPS database were used.
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as there are no wires required.7 The second device is called Varioport-e and is produced
by the company Becker Meditec. In contrast to the ekgMove, it requires a constant cable
connection of the electrodes to the PC. The Varioport-e system was used for measuring
the ECG of eight subjects in Evaluation Study I. This demonstrates that the Auction
Game can be used with measurement devices of different producers.
5.5.4. Measures
The evaluation is based on a set of specific measures. First, the users’ current level of
arousal is assessed on a scale from 1 to 5 by means of ECG measurements as outlined in
the implementation section. Second, we measure each user’s decision performance in the
Auction Game. More precisely, a user’s individual decision performance is defined as the
percentage of decisions taken correctly out of all decisions. Pressing the no-trade button
is defined here as a correct decision, since it always prevents against losing e 5.00 when
not choosing one of the other options. Third, we assess to which extent ER strategies are
consciously applied by individual users. Therefore, we use the ER questionnaire by Gross
and John (Gross and John, 2003; Abler and Kessler, 2009), which focuses specifically on
the strategies cognitive reappraisal and suppression. The ERQ is characterized by high
reliability, high discriminate validity, and only little correlation with the dimensions of
other psychological questionnaires (Scheibe, 2011). Both strategies assessed with the
ERQ could been shown to be beneficial for regulating positive emotional states and
negative emotional states to a certain extent. Therefore, we use a single measure that
equally reflects both strategies as an indicator for consciously applying ER strategies;
in the following denoted as ER score. Due to experimental constraints the ERQ was
carried out in a different chronology in the two studies and subjects’ average scores vary.
Nevertheless, the results are invariably robust against controlling for this issue. See
Appendix B for a more detailed description, an analysis with independently normalized
ER scores and also a factor analysis carried out with the ERQ data set of the present
experiment. Fourth, in addition to using the ERQ, we also directly asked the subjects
of Evaluation Study I which strategies they applied in order to down-regulate their
emotional arousal and analyzed the effectiveness of these strategies.
7In fact, one student left the laboratory after the experiment without noticing that she was still wearing
the chest belt and the sensor.
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5.5.5. Experimental Procedure
Both experiments were conducted at KIT. Evaluation Study I was conducted in late 2011
and Evaluation Study II in early 2012. The ORSEE software environment was used to
recruit participants from a pool of university students (Greiner, 2004). In the first study
a constant conversion of game Euros earned into real cash was used, which was paid
directly after subjects had finished the game, according to their performance. In the
second study the game was played within a set of games (which will not be described
here in detail) and the payment was randomly chosen according to the performance in
one of the games. Thus, in both studies subjects had a high incentive to perform to
their best in order to earn money.
Subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory and the use of the sensors was ex-
plained during the registration. Furthermore subjects received an envelope which con-
tained the number of their work station and their anonymous identification number.
In order to reduce distractions, each participant sat in his or her own cubicle with
noise-cancelling headphones and was therefore completely separated from the other par-
ticipants. After the instructions were read via headphones to the subjects they started
playing a tutorial which walked them slowly through the game mechanisms. Subjects
had to complete the training mode successfully before a five minute rest period started
and they could proceed with the game session.
5.6. Evaluation Results
In this section we present the results of the two evaluation studies along with the three
requirements introduced in the design section. Altogether, subjects took around 79
decisions on average before the game stopped, with 21 decisions being the fewest and
177 being the most. The no-trade button was used in around 10 per cent of the decisions
and subjects needed on average 1.15 seconds to take a decision once they had received
the three price estimates. Of all the 104 subjects who participated in the two studies 18
managed to complete the game.
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5.6.1. Evaluation Results for Requirement R1
In order to examine the engaging impact of the Auction Game, the subjects’ arousal level
and HR during the game were constantly assessed. The arousal parameter reveals that
the game in fact induces arousal: the average arousal level, which can take on values
from 1 to 5, is M = 3.272, (SD = 1.285). For almost all subjects (97 per cent) the
highest arousal level of 5 was reached at some point of the game, and for the majority
of subjects (65 per cent) all possible values from 1 to 5 were encountered during the
course of the game. Subjects’ HRs during the game are on average 11 per cent higher
compared to the baseline period (ΘHR) and for the large majority of subjects (88 per
cent) the average HR is higher during the game period compared to the baseline period.
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 illustrate subjects’ average arousal and HR during the game
relative to the baseline period.
Figure 5.6.: Subjects’ Average HR and Arousal
Note: The correlation between HR and arousal does not map perfectly, since
ΘHR values smaller than 1.00 result in arousal values of 1 and ΘHR values
exceeding 1.15 result in arousal values of 5.
These increases in HR are remarkable with respect to the fact that the subjects did
not engage in any physical exercise, but simply played an engaging serious game. This
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Figure 5.7.: Correlation of Subjects’ Average HR and Arousal
is also supported when comparing our results to other studies. Adam and colleagues
also employed ΘHR as a measure for physiological arousal in fast dynamic auctions, but
report slightly lower values (Adam et al., 2012). Smith and Dickhaut list typical HR
responses to induced idiosyncratic emotions (Smith and Dickhaut, 2005). The reported
scores average for the strongest emotions around 4 to 7 beats per minute above baseline.
This is lower than the average HR during the Auction Game, which results on average
in 8 beats per minute above baseline.
In Evaluation Study I, we additionally asked the subjects to fill out a questionnaire
and report the affective states they had experienced during the experiment. The highest
reported emotional states were tension (M = 4.78; SD = 1.290), joy (M = 4.08;
SD = 1.592), and anger (M = 3.97; SD = 1.828). Additionally, subjects were asked
to express their overall impression of the game in a free text field. The majority of the
subjects reported that they liked the game and also felt highly aroused whil playing
it. They liked to pick up the concept to regulate their emotions in order to ease game
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difficulty. These self-assessments are in line with our findings from physiology that the
game is capable of inducing arousal. Based on the physiology and questionnaire results,
we conclude that in line with R1 the Auction Game provides an engaging learning
environment which can elicit arousal and, by design, is embedded in the context of
financial decision making.
5.6.2. Evaluation Results for Requirement R2
In order to test whether the game rewards effective ER, we analyze whether those sub-
jects who managed to down-regulate their arousal are in fact more successful in the
game. As depicted in the left part of Figure 5.8 subjects’ average decision performance
decreases with increasing levels of arousal. Correspondingly, the right part of Figure
5.8 shows that the average arousal level is lower for those subjects, who manage to
successfully reach the final game level (n = 18) compared to the other subjects.
Figure 5.8.: The left bar chart illustrates subjects’ average decision performance depend-
ing on their state of arousal. The bar chart on the right indicates subjects’
average arousal during the game levels (Error bars: 95 per cent confidence
interval).
In order to test this relationship, we conduct an OLS regression with arousal and the
ER score, which is summarized in Table 5.3. In this regression we also take into account
whether subjects participated in Evaluation Study I or II (dummy study II), in order
to control for potential slight differences in game and treatment design, and whether
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subjects were assigned to the NBF treatment, which only existed in Evaluation Study I
(dummy NBF). The regression confirms that arousal has a significant negative influence
on decision performance (B = −.032, SE = .009, t = −3.370, p < .01).
Table 5.3.: Regression results for subjects’ decision performance on arousal and ER (n =
80) (Employing the ER score).
Decision Performance
Independent variables B SE t-Stat p-value Sig.
arousal -.032 .009 -3.370 .001 ∗∗
ER score .041 .019 2.132 .036 ∗
dummy NBF -.091 .034 -2.640 .010 ∗
dummy study II -.034 .034 -0.982 .329
c (constant) .858 .068 12.561 <.001 ∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Another opportunity to assess whether effective ER strategies are rewarded while
playing the game is to analyze the results of the ERQ, which is used to determine sub-
jects’ consciously employed tendency to regulate their emotions. As can be seen in Table
5.3, the regression reveals a positive impact of the ER score on decision performance
(B = .041, SE = .019, t = 2.132, p < .05). Further robustness checks of the results can
be found in the Appendix B.2. Interestingly, subjects scoring high on ER tend more of-
ten to hit the so called “no-trade button” and thereby escape the e 5.00 penalty (n = 80,
Pearson’s r = .213, p = .058). However, this effect is only marginally significant.
Moreover, in Evaluation Study I we used a free text questionnaire in order to ask the
users what kind of strategies they used to actively down-regulate their arousal. Out of the
36 participants, 21 stated that they tried to regulate their breathing in order to regulate
their arousal. Common answers were: “I tried to breathe calmly” and “I concentrated on
breathing.” Two subjects tried to close their eyes for a moment when they realized that
they were too aroused, in order to take a step back from active trading and relax before
returning to it. Six subjects tried to “think of something different.” These strategies are
very similar to professional meditation techniques as, for instance, applied in mindfulness
interventions which is often linked to ER (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). Active-breathing and
closing-eyes lead to increased average decision performance in the game. As additional
result, we find that subjects experience of subjective “frustration, when taking a wrong
decision”, positively correlates with arousal (n = 36, Pearson’s r = .374, p < .05). With
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respect to R2, we conclude that the Auction Game rewards effective ER with a high
decision performance in the game and is thus suitable for helping users to actively train
ER.
5.6.3. Evaluation Results for Requirement R3
By design, biofeedback in the Auction Game is based on unobtrusive measurements (cf.
design section). In order to test, whether biofeedback is also provided in a meaningful
way, i.e. whether the users can actually draw useful information from it, we analyze
subjects’ decision performance with and without biofeedback. In Evaluation Study I,
one treatment group played the Auction Game with biofeedback (BF) and one treatment
group played the Auction Game without biofeedback (NBF). In other words, subjects in
the NBF treatment did not see the arousal meter and color adjustments of the clouds.
It is important to note, however, that the positive correlation of arousal and game
difficulty remains unchanged, only the feature of biofeedback is controlled for. As a first
descriptive result it is interesting to note that subjects in the BF treatment stated that
they do not think that the biofeedback helps them either to “become aware of their
current emotional state” (M = 2.65; SD = 1.656), nor to “help them with making
better decisions” (M = 1.82; SD = 1.074). However, a t-test confirms that subjects of
the BF treatment achieved a better decision performance than the subjects of the NBF
treatment (.749 vs. .658, n = 36, t(34) = 2.530, p < .05). This is also confirmed by the
regression (B = −.091, SE = .034, t = −2.640, p < .05). Taken together, these results
demonstrate that biofeedback helped subjects to increase their decision performance in
the game. In Evaluation Study II, we introduced a no-influence treatment (NI) in which
the biofeedback was neither displayed, nor did it influence game difficulty. In other
words, the two core features of the game “live bio feedback” and “arousal influencing
game difficulty” were deactivated in the NI treatment. In this context, it is important
to note that the correlation of arousal and game difficulty can only make the game
harder to play. Therefore, in absolute terms, subjects in the NI treatment played a
game in which the trading task is never more difficult than it is in the BF treatment.
However, if subjects can employ the biofeedback profitably this might mitigate or even
offset this effect. The results of Evaluation Study II show that subjects in the BF
treatment performed better in the Auction Game than those subjects who were in the
NI treatment (.688 vs. .629, n = 68, t(66) = 1.985, p = .051); however, this effect is only
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marginally significant. In other words, those subjects who knew that their arousal level
influences game difficulty achieve a higher decision performance—even though playing a
more difficult game. It therefore seems plausible that the positive effect of biofeedback
offsets or even exceeds the negative effect of the correlation between arousal and game
difficulty. It is important to note, however, that we cannot control for game difficulty
here, as it is by design endogenously connected to arousal. Based on our study, we thus
cannot draw general conclusions on how biofeedback impacts decision performance in
general. We will return to this point in the discussion.
In summary, we conclude that the users were provided with biofeedback in a meaning-
ful way in the sense that it helped them to perform better in the Auction Game. This
is also supported when comparing the overall arousal level in the two treatments. The
overall arousal level was significantly lower in the BF treatment than it was in the NI
treatment (2.871 vs. 4.030, n = 68, t(66) = −3.820, p < .001). Thus, the subjects were
able to draw information from the biofeedback and down regulate their current level of
arousal. Based on the results of Evaluation Studies I and II, we conclude that in line
with R3 the Auction Game provides the users with live biofeedback in a meaningful way
which is, by design, based on unobtrusive physiological measurements.
5.7. Discussion and Conclusions
5.7.1. Managerial Implications
The Auction Game was designed and implemented in close correspondence with practi-
tioners from the banking and finance industry. Therefore, it is particularly relevant for
professional traders and private investors who want to improve their ER capabilities.
In this regard, the Auction Game has already drawn attention at several international
trading and investment conferences. Especially during stressful periods traders and in-
vestors are highly motivated to remain level-headed and improve their ER capabilities
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011). The Auction Game provides market participants with
a tool that can help them to train stressful periods and actively practice ER. Banks
like ABN AMRO, Barclays, and Saxo Bank have recently become aware of their cus-
tomers’ interest in de-biasing and ER training. In this context, a growing number of
banks strive to offer their customers specific training services for skill development. The
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Auction Game and similar biofeedback approaches can thus be included as intervention
elements. The Philips Rationalizer was an important first step in this direction (Djaja-
diningrat et al., 2009). Similar to the Auction Game, future trading systems will also
directly incorporate biofeedback into their trading interfaces. But also beyond the scope
of skill development and training, biofeedback will play a more and more important role
for the designers of trading interfaces.
In the near future, shirts with built-in dry electrodes will come into the market and
technical progress already allows wireless recording and real-time processing of ECG
data. A prominent example for unobtrusive skin conductance measurement is the Af-
fectiva Q Sensor, which is a wearable sensor for long-term assessment in the field (Poh
et al., 2010). Soon it will be possible to constantly measure and process a wide range of
physiological parameters in real-world decision scenarios instantaneously and integrate
them into the trading interfaces; e.g., at day-trading centers and also for private in-
vestors at home. Thus, it will be possible to provide the decision makers with a highly
sophisticated live biofeedback on their current emotional state, to immediately warn
them in critical situations, and support them with improving their ER capabilities. In
this context, it will also be very interesting for traders, investors, and consumers, to
match arousal to their decision performance on a longer time base. The continuous as-
sessment of the emotional state during periods of strong and poor decision performance
could help subjects to understand how their own arousal and decision performance are
interlinked. Moreover, biofeedback games like the Auction Game can then be used to
help the subjects to regulate their arousal to an individually optimal level-also beyond
the scope of financial decision making.
While there is a growing number of related studies in the fields of Neuroergonomics
and affective computing, the use of tools from cognitive neuroscience in design science
research has only just begun (Vom Brocke et al., 2013, p. 2). By applying methodologies
from neuropsychology and psychophysiology to information systems research, the new
field of NeuroIS provides long overdue insight into the decision making process of hu-
man individuals when interacting with modern IT (Dimoka et al., 2012, 2011). Thereby,
one major goal is to support human decision makers. In this sense, the Auction Game
is a use case for how information systems can incorporate physiological and neurolog-
ical biofeedback in order to improve human decision making. Applying ER strategies
in the context of information systems research is not only limited to decision making
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alone. It can also be helpful for well-being, learning, and health. Riedl and colleagues
showed that IT users are exposed to “Technostress” (Riedl et al., 2012). Down-regulating
arousal can help subjects to reduce the impact of stress and, thus, to maintain and im-
prove health (Gross, 2009). Therefore, ER training and the integration of biofeedback
into information systems are also highly relevant from a management perspective as it
may help managers to reduce their employees overall stress levels and thereby increase
productivity.
5.7.2. Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations that exist in this study. First, the presented Auction Game
was designed to reward down-regulation of arousal. While it was shown that in many
scenarios arousal can impair decision making (Ku et al., 2005; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005; Peterson, 2007), there are also scenarios where it might be beneficial to up-regulate
arousal to an optimal level and maintain that level (cf. Flow Theory (e.g. Nacke and
Lindley, 2008), Yerkes Dodson Law (Hebb, 1955)). In this respect it is important to
note that we do not pursue a normative approach in the sense that low arousal is always
preferable. We rather aim at improving the user’s capacity to reduce high levels of
arousal when he or she aims at doing so. For future research the design artifact could
easily be adjusted with the goal to train up-regulating arousal or even target an optimal
level of arousal. Subjects’ trading data from the field could then be assessed in order to
detect an individual optimal arousal level, where performance is highest. Then, similar
to how athletes warm up before sport events, traders could warm up before they start
with their actual task, in order to reach their optimal arousal level.
A second limitation is that, due the fast-paced decision environment and further rea-
sons outlined in the design section, the current calculation of arousal is based on HR
measurements solely. Dependent of the particular context and focus, future research
should employ further physiological parameters, e.g., skin conductance or electroen-
cephalogram (EEG). Both of these measures are well known physiological proxies for
emotional processing. Also noncontact monitoring of arousal has been successfully em-
ployed in recent studies (Nunamaker et al., 2011). A combination of several parameters
will produce a more accurate and robust computation of arousal.
A third limitation arises from the fact that we varied two features between the treat-
ment groups in Evaluation Study II, the connection of game difficulty to arousal, but
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also the display of biofeedback. In both studies we found biofeedback to be meaningful
in the sense that it helped users to achieve a higher decision performance. It is impor-
tant to highlight though that we cannot directly draw inferences with respect to whether
immediate biofeedback also generally increases decision performance. By design, arousal
and game difficulty are combined in our approach. The question, whether biofeedback
is beneficial for users beyond the use case of ER training is, however, highly relevant for
IS design science research.
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, decision performance was assessed by the percentage
of decisions which users have taken correctly out of all decisions, including the user’s
conscious decision to hit the so called no-trade button. While this measure is highly
correlated with other measures for game performance, such as maximum money earned
(r = .734, p < .001, n = 104) or total number of decisions taken (r = .631, p < .001,
n = 104), it cannot be inferred that the presented results are invariably robust against
these other measures. However, decision performance as it was defined is in this context
is the most suitable measure as it positively appreciates the user’s conscious decision to
actively turn away from trading in order to calm down.
Fifth, as the Auction Game was designed within a research project and as a study
tool, it should not be considered as a fully fledged game from a rather gaming-oriented
perspective. For instance, game difficulty in the first level should be refined, as a signifi-
cant proportion of the participants already failed in the first couple of minutes. Further,
possibly due to the lack of diversion in the game the Auction Game’s capabilities to-
wards a long term skill development of ER must be questioned. While we found in this
study the ER score to increase decision performance, it remains unclear to what extent
the tool can be used to improve the two ER strategies reappraisal and suppression over
an extended period of time. In that respect a longitudinal study (not described here
in detail) within the project xDelia lead to mixed findings concerning how and whether
the trait variables cognitive reappraisal and suppression can be improved over a longer
period of time. While the tool accomplishes its requirement to punish poor ER skills in
a one term period, it lacks the necessary complexity in order to maintain its functions of
punishing poor ER and high arousal when often repeated. Nevertheless, an adaption of
the game to couple arousal also on other, potentially more sophisticated and alternating
mechanisms of game difficulty, could potentially mitigate these drawbacks.
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For future IS design science research it will be interesting to investigate to what
extent biofeedback environments can (1) be of valuable decision support for the users
and (2) contribute to a long term skill development of effective emotion. Also, other
ER approaches, known to increase interoception—such as different forms of relaxation
exercises, yoga, breathing patterns, or mindfulness courses—could then be evaluated
with respect to their beneficial influence. It also has to be mentioned that in general,
more biofeedback studies need to be conducted to help unravel its influence on decision
making. Are traders less susceptible to decision biases when they are provided with
live biofeedback? Can live biofeedback help managers to maintain control of highly
emotional situations? Do consumers behave less impulsive during online shopping when
they are provided with live biofeedback? We believe that answering these questions
can contribute to more sophisticated NeuroIS tools that support users in taking more
advantageous decisions.
5.7.3. Conclusions
Taken as a whole, this study demonstrates the potential of biofeedback-based NeuroIS
tools and the relevance of ER for information systems. Generally speaking, emotions are
an integral part of our lives that guide many facets of human experience. Who would
want to live without emotions? However, although emotions are essential for taking
advantageous decisions, they can also get out of control. NeuroIS tools can help us to
increase emotional awareness, to improve our ER capabilities, and, in consequence, to
avoid disadvantageous decisions with undesired consequences. In this sense, this chapter
can also be understood as a motivation for IS researchers to incorporate the concept of
emotion regulation in information systems research. Affective processes have been found
to play a vital role in human-computer interaction (Deng and Poole, 2010; Riedl et al.,
2010, 2011). Therefore, we believe that it is important to also take into account the
users’ individual emotion regulation processes and capabilities.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Emotional processing lies at the heart of economic decision making. In this thesis we
employed psychophysiological measures in order to assess subjects’ emotional processing
during decision making. We find evidence for the influence of emotions and ER on
decision making. Furthermore, a NeuroIS live biofeedback tool was invented in order to
improve subjects’ emotional awareness.
This chapter is tripartite: First, the main contributions of the work at hand are
highlighted. Second, limitations of the work as a whole and specifically with respect to
the fields psychophysiology and ER are discussed. Finally, implications are drawn and
relevant and interesting fields for future work are pointed out.
6.1. Contributions
In this section the contributions of the work at hand are listed. It is therefore ranged
back to the introductory research questions. The results are especially relevant for
researchers from IS and economics, who deal with the influence of emotions and ER on
decision behavior.
Research Question 1: Do bidders in FPSB auctions experience regret, and
if so, does regret influence bidders’ decision making?
Indeed, in Chapter 2 we provide evidence for physiological responses to informational
feedback information, which can arguably be attributed to the emotion regret. This so
called WR and LR feedback information is also reflected in subjects’ average bids. More-
over, psychophysiological data indicates that the original assumption about the degree
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to which the bidders incorporate regret into their bids needs to be reviewed and possibly
renewed. Three major findings can be taken away concerning an individual’s emotion
of regret in a FPSB auction: First, LR is more intense than WR, as it results in overall
stronger skin conductance responses. Second, LR as measured by skin conductance is
especially strong for high monetary levels of “missed opportunity.” Third, there is no
such pattern for WR. Instead the results point towards the finding that relief or rejoice
are experienced for bids, which are close to an optimal bid. Summing up, these results
support the notion that emotional decision processes can be deliberately manipulated
by IS design.
Research Question 2: Do “joy of winning” and “frustration of losing” in
FPSB auctions occur, and if so, which one is more prevalent?
In Chapter 3 we find physiological evidence for both joy of winning and frustration of
losing. As expected, losing is reflected in a more pronounced drop in HR than winning
an auction—indicating that losing is afflicted with a lower valence (i.e. negative va-
lence). Independent of the drawn valuation, winning induces stronger skin conductance
responses, i.e. is experienced with a greater intensity than losing, (partly) contradicting
the assumption that the aversion to losses is prevalent in FPSB auctions (cf. Goeree and
Offerman, 2003). Interestingly, the more money is at stake the stronger the resulting
emotional intensity. To some extent, this contradicts the notion that the experience of
winning or losing an auction is largely independent of the money at stake (cf. van den
Bos et al., 2008).
Research Question 3: What is the impact of incidental social images in
FPSB auctions on emotions, emotion regulation and decision making?
Internet shopping platforms often use affective images as design elements of their web-
sites. Chapter 4 explores the effect of such images on the users’ affective processes and
behavior, again, in the context of FPSB auctions. In this laboratory experiment partici-
pants are either shown community images, competition images, or no images before they
can place a bid. At first, we can confirm that the treatment manipulation is successful:
Even though the images are completely unrelated to the task, participants’ skin conduc-
tance responses in the treatment groups are significantly stronger compared to those in
the control group. Moreover, competition images induce a stronger drop in participants’
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HR than community images, indicating that competition images are perceived as less
pleasant. However, the image influence seems to be unconscious in nature, as the par-
ticipants state that the images neither affected their emotional state nor their bidding
behavior. With respect to behavior, our first main result is that bidders systematically
place lower bids in response to seeing competition images than they do in response to
seeing community images. Furthermore, the effect on bidding behavior is partially me-
diated by subjects’ affective processes in response to the images, as measured by HR.
Moreover, results from skin conductance reveal that participants who use suppression
as an ER strategy experience stronger emotional reactions in response to the images.
Furthermore, the more participants aim at suppressing their emotions, the more they
struggle to mitigate the influence of images on their bidding behavior. Whereas bids of
participants with a low suppression score seem to be unaffected by the affective images,
participants with a medium or high suppression score are found to be affected signifi-
cantly. To the contrary, applying reappraisal as an ER strategy does not moderate the
influence of affective images on bids and has only a marginal influence on bids overall.
It does, however, has a mitigating influence on the intensity of the experienced emotions
in response to seeing community images. Summing up, it becomes clear that even inci-
dental images on electronic platforms are capable of unconsciously influencing emotional
processing and shifting decision behavior systematically. The magnitude of this shift is
moderated by subjects’ suppression tendencies.
Design Objective: Development of a NeuroIS tool which increases sub-
jects’ awareness for their emotional state and rewards emotion regulation
capablities.
From the assumption that high awareness to the own emotional state and improved
ER capabilities can contribute to improved financial decision making, in Chapter 5 a
biofeedback based NeuroIS tool is designed, implemented, and evaluated which aims to
support decision makers by rewarding successful ER—the Auction Game. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first serious game in which online biofeedback is directly
applied to a financial decision making context. In addition to the Rationalizer by Philips
and ABN AMRO, which displays biofeedback by means of a light bowl next to the
monitor, this design artifact integrates biofeedback into the decision scenario and thereby
aims at rewarding the users’ ER capabilities. A core feature of this approach is that
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game difficulty is directly linked to the user’s current emotional state. The emotional
state is assessed by means of unobtrusive ECG measurements. Depending on the player’s
ability to down-regulate levels of high emotional arousal, the financial decision scenario
of the game continuously adjusts itself and thereby becomes more (or less) difficult.
The results of two conducted evaluation studies show that the game, as an one-time
intervention in fact induces arousal and rewards down-regulation of arousal. Moreover,
it provides an environment in which poor ER strategies are punished. In addition to
that, it is found that biofeedback displayed in the Auction Game is meaningful for the
users in the sense that it helps them to down regulate arousal and perform better in the
game, as measured by decision performance.
6.2. Limitations of the Present Work
This work is self-evidently limited as it only investigates individuals’ emotional and
behavioral responses to previous affective or informative stimuli in an artificial setting
such as the FPSB auction or the developed game. The generalizability of the presented
findings with respect to other economic contexts or even to other auction formats is not
necessarily given (cf. Adam et al., 2012). Hypotheses were derived by extensive inves-
tigation of previous literature and application of the emotional bidding framework by
Adam et al. (2011). While the thesis as a whole certainly provides strong arguments
for the influence of integral and incidental emotions and ER on human individuals’ de-
cision making, it does not provide an overall integrating framework which incorporates
all findings generally. One reason for this is the novelty of both the topics psychophysi-
ology and ER in economics and IS. Hence, further research is needed to synergize those
promising fields. Additionally, this work solely employs the methodology of experimen-
tal economics enriched by psychophysiology in the aim to understand the influence of
emotional constructs on decision making. See Falk and Heckman (2009) for a discussion
of the methodology of experimental economics. The previous chapters have already dis-
cussed the limitations of the respective studies, see Sections 2.5.2, 3.5.1, 4.5.3 and 5.7.2.
In the following paragraphs the discussion will be particularly set on the two domains
psychophysiology and ER, as they are only little established so far in the domain of
economics and IS.
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6.2.1. Psychophysiology
The incorporation of psychophysiological measures into the field of experimental
economics and IS has been subject to criticism and is widely debated (cf. Camerer
et al., 2005). The following sections will tackle some occuring issues.
Assessability of Emotions Neurophysiology has been criticized for “providing
little more than a picture of where things happen in the brain or, more cynically, as
simply showing that behavior is caused in the nervous system (which never was in
doubt)” (Camerer et al., 2005, p. 14). While this criticism is aimed at neuroimaging
procedures especially the second part of this statement can equally be referred to
psychophysiological indicators. In fact, skin conductance and cardiovascular activity
are innervated by the autonomic nervous system (ANS), consisting of the systems
parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous system; electrodermal activity can be
employed for the measurement of a number of sympathetically innervated processes
such as: activation, attention, significance or affective intensity of a stimulus (Dawson
et al., 2007). Indeed, for psychophysiology multiple emotions can result in similar
responses, when only one indicator is examined. For instance the anticipation of an
oral exam and the anticipation of a reunion with an old friend after a couple of years
may result in very similar emotional responses with respect to fear, when approximated
with skin conductance.
However, whether the activity of the ANS is emotion-specific has been debated for
more than a century (Ekman et al., 1983) and by now, evidence yields the notion
that varying emotional states are reflected in associated psychophysiological indicators
(Ekman et al., 1983; Collet et al., 1997; Kreibig, 2010). Without entering the discussion
about the existence of basic emotions (Ekman, 1992), psychophysiology with its
indicators (phasic) heart rate and skin conductance response (as measures for (para-
)sympathetic activity) appears capable to adequately reflect an individual’s positive and
negative emotional response. Both measures are well established for stimulus intensity
and valence, which are according to many psychologists the two major dimensions
regarding emotional processing (Bradley, 2000). It is essential though, to accompany
these measures by questionnaires or self-reports and a rigorous restricting experimental
design which allows to isolate the emotional response (Adam et al., 2011).
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Unifying Measures Many measures whirr around when it comes to studies em-
ploying electrodermal or cardiovascular activity, and there is extensive literature on
psychophysiology in the social and physical sciences (cf. Bradley, 2000). It is highly
important to determine ex ante, which measures should be assessed in order to limit the
experimental effort and also to be capable to answer the respective research questions.
For instance, the drop in heart rate as well as the phasic bursts in skin conductance
activity are sufficient indicators for the measurement of the intensity and valence of
a discrete stimulus (e.g. Adam and Kroll, 2012; Astor et al., 2013). However, these
measures do not aid our understanding of an individual’s overall arousal state. Typical
measures concerning the arousal level are overall heart rate, relative to the individual’s
baseline, as employed in Chapter 5 or the (tonic) skin conductance level. This work
employed the assessment of phasic responses for skin conductance (SCR.amp) in Chapter
2, 3 and 4 and heart rate drop (i.e. ∆HR) in Chapter 3 and 4 subsequent to affective
stimuli. In Chapter 5 we employed overall heart rate (i.e. ΘHR) as a proxy for (tonic)
arousal. Also, one could have taken into account the heart rate variability (HRV) as a
measure, which is also known to be a reliable index for parasympathetic processing and
ER (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012).
Particularly skin conductance is vulnerable to measurement artifacts or errors (e.g.
because of room temperature, body movement, previous usage of soap by participants
or simply subjects being non-responders), which leads to a high measurement variability
within and between the participants. While the measurement devices continuously
improve, allowing to transmit psychophysiological indicators wirelessly, orderly ex-
perimental conditions are indispensable. If possible, a prescreening of participants
can help to exclude non-responders, before starting the experiment. With respect
to data treatment, normalization procedures of the signal against an appropriate
baseline (such as an omnipresent external stimulus) are helpful as well as taking into
account the sequence of the stimuli (as done in Chapter 3 and 4), as it can also
reduce confounding factors such as stimulus novelty. Adam et al. (2011) provide a
good methodological paper for assessing psychophysiological parameters in NeuroIS
experiments. However, for future work it might be desirable to carry out a method paper
which provides the experimenter with a toolbox in respect to the indicators of electro-
dermal and cardiovascular activity, depending on the research focus in economics and IS.
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Neuroimaging versus Psychophysiology It is often mentioned that brain
imaging techniques such as fMRI or PET, in contrast to psychophysiology are more
detailed and precise as they can locate certain areas in the brain when emotions are
processed (Camerer et al., 2005). In fact, neuroimaging studies provide a clear picture
of which areas in the brain are activated during emotional processing. However, also the
visualization of brain activation does not completely dissolve our understanding of its
functioning due to its highly complex anatomical nature. In this context Taleb (2010)
mentions that neuroscience often employs the size of the brain cortex as a proxy for
intelligence. For instance, humans are succeeded by dolphins, these by apes. However,
some birds—for instance parrots—are equally intelligent as dolphins, even though they
have a much smaller cortex. In fact, for parrots the mentioned rule does not apply
as for them intelligence correlates with different brain parts. This example shows
that—also when working with neuroimaging tools—one has to be careful with too
distant inferences. Apart from these comments, psychophysiological measures also offer
certain advantages such as comparably low acquisition and operation costs (Dimoka
et al., 2011), easy and unobtrusive assessment (allowing their usage in field studies),
but also the acquisition of much larger data samples (Adam et al., 2011).
To sum it up, with respect to psychophysiological indicators, it is important to not
make unrealistic demands in one’s strive to add further insight into experimental eco-
nomics. In line with Adam et al. (2011), it is important to mention that psychophysiology
is no panacea. It always has to be accompanied by complementary questionnaires and a
rigorous experimental design, assuring a high level of control. Also, researchers should
always reconsider, whether the psychophysiological indicators can add significant value
to the research question (Dimoka et al., 2012). Psychophysiological measures are no self
purpose. The beauty of the discipline as such accrues from a clever treatment design
with a dazzling idea, embedded in profound theory. By asking the right questions, psy-
chophysiology should be considered the role of a judge, which helps the researcher to
confirm or discard our theoretical assumptions.
6.2.2. Emotion Regulation
Hypothesis Building The concept of ER originally stems from developmental psychol-
ogy and then flourished psychology, thereby cutting many traditional subdisciplinary
boundaries within its domain (Gross, 1998b). Psychological literature often refers to
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emotion response tendencies, when subjects aim at modulating or regulating emotions
(cf. Gross, 1998b). However, how these tendencies translate into decision behavior is
to a large part not yet resolved. With respect to ER, hypothesis building in Chap-
ter 4 and 5 varies to a certain extent. In Chapter 5 subjects are instructed to inhibit
their emotions in order to decrease their arousal and therefore game difficulty. Both
strategies, reappraisal and suppression, have been shown to successfully down-regulate
positive emotional states and thereby lead to a decreased average heart rate (Gross
and Levenson, 1997; Giuliani et al., 2008). As the game aims at being motivating and
entertaining—eliciting positive emotional states—it particularly rewards the successful
down-regulation of arousal and therefore the two ER strategies.
To the contrary, the study conducted in Chapter 4 makes use of spontaneous ER, i.e.
subjects are not instructed in any respect about ER (cf. Volokhov and Demaree, 2010).
Therefore their interaction with ER occurs rather habitually or even unconsciously.
Previous studies have shown that suppression can have certain drawbacks in the respect
that it fails to mitigate (aversive) emotions and can even result in increased sympathetic
responses, such as strong skin conductance responses (Gross, 1998a).1 Consequently we
hypothesized that suppression may also result in more unpremedidated bids. We will
refer to the general influence of ER on decision behavior in the next section.
We measured ER by German and English versions of the ERQ (Gross and John,
2003; Abler and Kessler, 2009), a validated measure for the two prevalent strategies of
ER. Nevertheless, subjects’ tendency to regulate emotions is also correlated with age,
cultural background, gender, health related and other personality traits. It is always
hard to draw causality from correlation. Potentially, future studies should also take into
account further questionnaires, which also control for other constructs, related to ER,
such as the Positive Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (cf. Watson et al., 1988) or the Big
Five (cf. McCrae and John, 1992).
1For down-regulation of positive emotions, the physiological indicator HR reacts similar in response
to reappraisal and suppression (i.e. heart rate decelerates) (Gross and Levenson, 1997) while skin
conductance differs for the two regulation strategies (i.e. skin conductance increases for suppression,
while there are no overall consistent findings for reappraisal) (Gross, 1998a).
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6.3. Implications and Future Work
This thesis provides evidence for an influence of emotions and ER on economic decision
making in simplified electronic markets. Implications of the individual chapters can be
found in the Sections 2.5.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 5.7.1. Here the consideration is limited to
general implications of this thesis and possible directions for future work.
Using NeuroIS to Enhance Theory in Economics and IS The experiments
carried out in this thesis provide physiological evidence for the integral emotions regret,
joy and frustration in subjects’ decision processes in electronic auctions; but also
for constructs such as social presence or competition. In line with previous research
we confirm that psychophysiological indicators such as cardiovascular activity and
skin conductance can reliably measure emotional bursts during economic decision
making (cf. Smith and Dickhaut, 2005; van’t Wout et al., 2006). Psychophysiology
contributes significantly to economists’ and information scientists’ strive to step from
previously more or less arbitrary assumptions, with respect to subjects’ emotionality
during decision making, towards a clear testability of hypotheses. It also enhances
our understanding and conception of theoretical constructs regarding how different
facets of IS are emotionally processed by the recipient and how they ultimately
stimulate behavior on electronic platforms. Future research on IS constructs such
as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) or facets of Human Computer Inter-
action (HCI), with its usability metrics such as perceived usefulness or affective
information processing, should also be supplemented by psychophysiology (cf. Koller
and Walla, 2012). This could for instance inform research on website design about
how these constructs are emotionally (i.e. in terms of valence and intensity) experienced.
Employment of Unconscious Processes As shown in this thesis psychophysi-
ological measures allow us to assess hidden emotional processes, which would have been
non-assessable otherwise. Taking into account the questionnaire data, it was found that
this process can be beyond conscious awareness. It is also recognized that affective
reactions, measured by subjects’ drop in heart rate, can be employed—to a certain
extent—as a mediator for subjects’ behavior.
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As described by Dimoka et al. (2011, p. 6), tools from neurophysiology can capture
unconscious or automatic processes opposed to self-assessments since “subjects might
not be able or willing to express them verbally or behaviorally.” Due to automated
processing or social desirability subjects sometimes “cannot” or “do not want to” give
correct answers in surveys (Koller and Walla, 2012). These otherwise immeasurable
processes can be captured by neurophysiology to some extent. Thus, in order to study
the impact of concepts from IS or economics it is important to note that an application
of tools from neurophysiology can complementarily assess the users’ hidden affective
processes. The investigation of unconscious aspects of constructs of economics and IS
should gain further consideration, as neurophysiology provides useful and unobtrusive
tools to assess these.
Automated emotional processes may be an important cornerstone for many decision
patterns and biases in economics, which are not completely resolved yet, such as the
disposition effect, loss aversion or the house-money effect2. Also extensively researched
constructs in IS such as TAM with its concepts perceived usefulness or ease-of-use could
be extended by tools from neurophysiology (Dimoka et al., 2011). Arising questions
related to the usability or adoption of electronic markets might profit from further
insights about the influence of unconscious affective information processing (Koller and
Walla, 2012).
Enhancing our Understanding of Emotion Regulation Opposed to emo-
tions, the concept of ER has not gained extensive attention in the field of IS and
economics so far. However, Chapters 4 and 5 provide evidence that controlling for ER
on decision making considerably helps to explain human decision behavior. Chapter
4 provides evidence that using suppression increases one’s affection to the emotional
image stimuli—and also results in a stronger bidding bias. In the game developed in
Chapter 5 arousal is directly connected to game difficulty. With respect to whether ER
strategies—or even which ER strategy—should be applied in order to make profitable
decisions, we cannot conclude that inhibiting ones emotions is generally for the better
or for worse. The effects of ER on decision making may be highly context-dependent.
Further research is needed in order to develop frameworks and models about the
2The house-money effect commonly describes the observation that prior windfall gains lead to increased
risk seeking (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
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coherence of emotions, their regulation, and (market) decision making. Also the
emotional bidding framework by Adam et al. (2011) should be enhanced as it, so far,
does not account for the influencing role of ER. In order to better understand the
connection of ER and decision making, future research should decisively manipulate
subjects’ ER strategies before or during the decision making task (cf. Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2008). Breathing patterns, mindfulness courses or yoga excercises, frequently
linked to improved ER (Arch and Craske, 2006), could also help to disentangle more
rigorously the connection of ER strategies with subjects’ information retrieval.
As mentioned, both the physiological and economic effects of the respective ER
strategies are not yet completely resolved and may depend on a multitude of factors.
Therefore, it is highly interesting for future research. Factors such as whether ER
is incidental or instructed and whether the task at hand deals with ambiguity or
uncertainty may have a significant influence (cf. Heilman et al., 2010). Also whether,
for instance, the economic task itself induces positive or negative emotions, or whether
it is cognitively demanding, may significantly alter the effectiveness of whether ER
strategies can be successfully employed or not. Finally, field study examinations with
decision makers under high levels of stress, such as stock market traders or investors,
may complement experimental findings, since ER in the real world adds the necessary
external validity (cf. Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011).
Adaptive NeuroIS in Electronic Markets Applying sophisticated algorithms
and multi-modal arousal parameters will allow one to unobtrusively gain information
about the user’s emotional state in realtime. These multi-modal parameters could
also include unobtrusive measures such as pupil dilation (Bradley et al., 2008) or even
indicators apart from psychophysiology, for instance tools assessing mouse pressure
(e.g. Schaaff et al., 2012). Heart rate, meanwhile can be assessed fast, reliably and also
wirelessly, assuring a high validity through an unobtrusive measurement—allowing to
carry the method for instance into the trading floor, measuring the traders’ emotional
state on site without constraints (cf. Lo and Repin, 2002). Psychophysiology, as opposed
to brain imaging tools, allows a continuous and simultaneous assessment of many human
market participants. Moreover, psychophysiological tools can easily be used in the
field. This might be of interest for (i) the market participant, (ii) the market platform
provider and (iii) even the regulator. First, from a market participant’s perception
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one could think of NeuroIS tools which act for decision support during the user’s
interaction with the platform. Depending on the user’s emotional state the displayed
information complexity could then be increased or narrowed, in order to adapt the
decision scenario to the user. Also the system could then aid the user and prevent him
or her against rash impulsive decisions which might be regretted afterwards. Second,
from a platform provider’s viewpoint, who engineers the market, participants’ sentiment
within a market could be assessed. Measures such as the mean or the volatility of
arousal in the market could provide information about participants’ emotional states
in the market; and whether these converge or diverge. Platform providers could then
analyze which distribution of arousal might be optimal for profit in an auction market;
or for instance for liquidity in two-sided electronic markets. Third, market regulators
could—depending on this arousal distribution—dynamically decide to change certain
market elements, such as increasing or reducing the number of algorithmic traders in
the markets, or change the set of rules in the market (e.g. Zhang et al., 2012). Future
research could, on the one hand, examine how these adaptive systems improve an user’s
actual decision making and, on the other hand, whether such adaptive design helps
to strengthen markets in order to become more robust against market price bubbles,
herding behavior or panic during economic downturns.
Biofeedback and Decision Making Psychophysiological indicators can also be
unobtrusively employed for live biofeedback. Arousal parameters, employing physiologi-
cal derivatives such as heart rate, heart rate variability, eye-tracking or skin conductance
promise fast assessment, processing and are capable to provide instantaneous visual or
auditive feedback (cf. Ouwerkerk, 2011).
The developed NeuroIS application (cf. Chapter 5) provides the insight that the
indication of an arousal bar can provide useful information for the user about his or her
emotional state on an IS platform, potentially even increasing emotional awareness. In
fact, the resulting biofeedback could be usefully employed by participants in the game.
However, to what extent biofeedback can actually support retrieval of information, help
to down-regulate arousal and support decision making in general is still an open question
which deserves more research in future.
The influence of biofeedback on cognition and decision making is still vividly dis-
cussed (cf. Wang et al., 2010; Djajadiningrat et al., 2009). Gimpel et al. (2013) provide
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a good overview in what respect biofeedback might be useful: monitoring/recording,
live feedback, warning/intervention and training. More research is needed to figure out
to what extent biofeedback can actually help to warn the user in dealing with stressful
decision scenarios or when he or she falls prey to decision biases. Significant findings
in the laboratory could then be validated externally with stock market traders or other
professionals, working in exhausting jobs. However, as Vom Brocke et al. (2013, p.2) put
it “the consideration of neuroscience is still in its infancy in IS design science research.”
Ultimately, research on this topic could result in a decision support system which identi-
fies highly emotional states such as auction fever and warns the user, so that a previously
non-conscious decision bias is detected and becomes a conscious deliberate choice—which










Appendix A. Participant Instructions and Comprehension Questions
A.1. Participant Instructions for Study on Regret
Appendix A.1 lists the participants instructions of the studies presented in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3. The material was translated to English from the original German version.
Please note that the instructions are only translations for information; they are not
intended to be used in the lab. The instructions in the original language were carefully
polished in grammar, style, comprehensibility, and avoidance of strategic guidance.
A.1.1. Instructions
You are participating in an experiment in which your decision-making behavior in auc-
tions is examined. During the experiment your skin conductance, your pulse and your
heart rate will be recorded and analyzed in a subsequent analysis. You can earn money
in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions. These instructions
explain how to decide in order to earn money. The amount of money earned during
the experiment will be paid out in cash after the experiment. Please read the following
paragraphs carefully.
Description of the Experiment After having read these instructions you will be
asked some comprehension questions about the auction mechanism. The comprehension
questions are followed by a 5-minute rest period. This rest period is required for the
calibration and analysis of the physiological data. Please keep calm during this rest
period, avoid movements and relax. The auction begins with three practice rounds.
In these practice rounds you have the opportunity to practice the auction without any
consequences for your actual cash balance. The subsequent main part of the experiment
consists of 50 auctions. Structure and course of these auction sequences are described
below. At the end of the main part you will be asked to enter your identification
number in a predefined box on the screen. The data recorded in the questionnaires and
the auctions are processed anonymously using your identification number. Only this
identification number links you to the collected data in the experiment. Each participant
makes his or her decisions in isolation from the other participants at a computer terminal.
Communication between participants is not allowed. We kindly ask you to use the
computer only to enter your decisions and to answer the questions displayed on the
screen. Please do not start or stop any programs or change any settings.
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Description of an Auction Two computerized agents take part in each of the 50
auctions. The agents were programmed so that they maximize their expected profits,
when participating in an auction with two identically programmed computers. In each
auction one single fictive good is auctioned off. At the beginning of each auction round,
each bidder is assigned with a private valuation. This private valuation indicates how
much the fictive good is worth for you. The selling of the goods is carried out by a first-
price auction. In this auction each bidder places one irreversible bid, without knowing
the bids of other bidders. With your bid, you specify how much you are willing to pay for
the fictive good. Once all bids are submitted, the experimental software automatically
determines the highest bid. The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and has
to pay the price of its bid.
If you win an auction, the difference between your valuation and the auction price will
be credited to your account. An example: your valuation is 60 and you win the auction
for the price of 45, then you will be credited 60 - 45 = 15 monetary units. In case you
and one of the computerized bidders place the highest bid with the same amount, you
are automatically identified as the highest bidder. If you win an auction and your bid is
higher than your valuation, you will suffer financial losses. An example: your valuation
is 60 and you win the auction for the price of 70, then you lose 60 - 70 = -10 monetary
units. If you lose an auction, your payment for this auction is equal to 0.
The Auction Process
1. Receiving your valuation At the start of each auction your valuation will appear
on the computer screen. Your valuation will randomly take on values of 50, 60,
70, 80, and 90. You will receive every valuation for 10 times in a row. The
valuations for the two computerized bidding agents are randomly drawn from the
distribution of 0-100 prior to each auction. Note: the valuations of the bidding
agents are drawn independently in each auction, your valuation, however, remains
the same over subsequent 10 rounds. The bidding agents follow a fixed bidding
strategy, which is not affected by your bidding decisions.
2. Placing your bid Next, a keypad will appear on screen to enter your bid. The
keypad is unlocked after 5 seconds. Consider your bid first and then click on the
box which displays your favored bidding amount when the keypad is unlocked. In
141
Appendix A. Participant Instructions and Comprehension Questions
the upper right corner of the screen you will see a box with a reminder of your own
valuation. Once you selected a bidding amount on the keypad with a mouse click,
your bid is accepted and it will appear in the upper right box. The bidding agents
place their bids before you. Just like you do not know their bids, your bidding
amount is not known to them.
3. Determination of the auction price Once all bids have been submitted, the
experimental software automatically determines the winner and the price of the
good. The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the price of his
own bid. The winner earns the difference between his valuation and the highest
value bid. The other two bidders have not won the auction and receive 0. Let’s say
your valuation is 80 and you enter a bid of 65 and your computerized bidders have
placed bids at 47 and 51. In this case your bid is higher than the other two bids.
You win the auction and receive a payoff of 80-65 = 15. The two computerized
agents receive 0. Suppose the bids of the computerized bidder would be 47 and 66.
In this case the bidder with the bid 66 wins the auction. Your profit in this case is
0.
4. Viewing the auction result After completion of the pricing you will receive the
following information:
• Whether you have won or lost the just completed auction.
• Your “money left on the table”: This value is 0 if you do not win the auction.
If you win the auction, it is calculated as the value of your bid minus the
second highest bid (winner regret condition).12
• The second highest bid (winner regret condition).34
5. Start of a new auction
Payoff You have an experimental account. This account accumulates your profits
and losses over a total of 50 auctions. Your account closing balance will be paid out
1In the loser regret condition the following information will be given instead; Your “missed opportunity
to win”: This value is always 0 if you win the auction or if your valuation is lower than the highest
bid. In all other cases it will be calculated by subtracting the highest bid from your valuation.
2None of these information will be given to the participant in the no regret condition.
3None of these information will be given to the participant in the no regret condition.
4In the loser regret condition the following information will be given instead: The highest bid.
142
A.1. Participant Instructions for Study on Regret
in cash after the experiment. In this experiment, monetary units (MU) are used. 1
MU in the experiment corresponds to a payoff of EURO cents 3. At the beginning of
the experiment, you will receive an initial endowment of 100 MU (e 3), which will be
credited to your experimental account.
...a few notes at the end If you have questions about the experiment, please remain
seated quietly and give the experimenter a signal by raising your hand. Please wait until
the experimenter is at your seat and pose your question as quietly as possible.
To interact with the experimental system, please use your free hand. The hand that is
connected to the measuring technique must be kept quiet during the entire experiment.
Try to avoid any movement, as this may distort the results of the measurements. At
the end of the experiment stay at your seat and wait until the experiment has removed
the measuring electrodes from your skin. These instructions should be left on your seat.
Important note: Please make sure that you use your mouse during the experi-
ment as quietly as possible, try to apply very little power when clicking on the mouse.
You will now receive ear muffs to reduce the influence of noise on the measures.
In the remainder we attach a set of questions which the participants had to an-
swer correctly before the actual experiment proceeded. Each time the participant picked
an incorrect answer option the following message occurred: “This answer is not correct!
Please have a look at the instruction material for further information”. Subsequently
the participant could answer the question again. The correct answers are italicized.
After the participant had answered all questions correctly, the following message was
displayed on the screen: “Now a 5-minute calibration period starts, which is necessary,
to calibrate the physiological measuring instruments. Please try to relax and focus on
the cross in the middle of the screen.”
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A.2. Participant Instructions for the Emotion
Induction Study
Appendix A.2 lists the participants instructions of the studies presented in Chapter 4.
The material was translated to English from the original German version. Please note
that the instructions are only translations for information; they are not intended to be
used in the lab. The instructions in the original language were carefully polished in
grammar, style, comprehensibility, and avoidance of strategic guidance. The bidding
screen and also the bidding fields in detail were also depicted in the instructions (in
illustrated in Figure A.2 and Figure A.1.
A.2.1. Instructions
You are participating in an experiment in which your decision-making behavior in auc-
tions is examined. During the experiment your skin conductance, your pulse and your
heart rate will be recorded and analyzed in a subsequent analysis. You can earn money
in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions. These instructions
explain how to decide in order to earn money. The amount of money earned during the
experiment will be paid out in cash after the experiment. Therefore it is necessary to
read the following paragraphs carefully.
Course of the Experiment Subsequently to this instruction phase some compre-
hension questions regarding the procedure of the auction will be asked. A 5-minute
rest period will follow. The rest period is required for the calibration and analysis of the
physiological data. Please keep calm during this rest period, avoid movements and relax.
The main part of the experiment will last altogether about 45 minutes. Structure and
course of these auction sequences are described below. Subsequent to the experiment it is
asked to fill out a participant questionnaire. The data recorded in the questionnaires and
the auctions are processed anonymously using your identification number. A mapping
between you and the experimental data collected during the experiment is only possible
via your personal participant code, which is only in your possession. Each participant
makes his or her decisions isolated from the other participants at a computer terminal.
Communication between participants is not allowed. We ask you to use the computer
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only to enter your decisions and to answer the questions displayed on the screen. Please
do not start or stop any programs or change any settings.
Description of an Auction In each auction you and two computerized agents
take part. The agents were programmed to maximize their expected profits, when
participating in an auction with two identically programmed computers. In each
auction one single fictive good is auctioned off. At the beginning of each auction, each
bidder is assigned with a private valuation for the good. This valuation indicates how
much the fictive good is worth to you. The auction of the goods is carried out by a
first-price auction. This means the bidder who places the highest bid receives the good
and has to pay precisely the price of his or her placed bid. Hence, each bidder places
one irreversible bid, without knowing any of the opponent bids. With your bid, you
specify how much you are willing to pay for the good. Once all bids are submitted, the
experimental software automatically determines the highest bid. The bidder with the
highest bid wins the auction and has to pay the price of his or her bid. This bidder’s
profit is then the received valuation minus the price that the bidder placed with his
or her bid. Only after completion of all played auctions the final results will be displayed.
If you win an auction, the difference between your valuation and the
auction price will be credited to your experimental account. Example: your
valuation is 70 and you win the auction for the price of 45, then you will be credited 70
- 45 = 25 monetary units.
In case you and one of the computerized bidders place the highest bid with the same
amount, you are automatically identified as the highest bidder.
If you win an auction and your bid is higher than your valuation, you will
suffer financial losses. Example: your valuation is 60 and you win the auction for
the price of 70, then you lose 60 - 70 = -10 monetary units
If you lose an auction, your payment for this auction is equal to 0. Example:
your valuation is 65 and you lose the auction with a bid of 33. One of the computerized
bidders has placed a higher bid. In this case your payment is 0 monetary units.
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Course of the auctions
1. Multimedia display At the beginning of each auction round a multimedia overlay
is indicated. Let this overlay appeal to you.5
2. Valuation Information and Bid Placement In the next step your valuation
on the screen will be displayed on the screen. Your valuation will take on values
of 60, 65, 70, 75 and 80 in random order. Additionally, an 80-fields appears on the
bidding screen. Each field is labeled with a number in order, which stands for a
possible bid. With a click on the bidding field you place a bid for the good at the
amount of the respective number. Please note: you have only 10 seconds time to
place a bid.
On the next page you will see an example screen.
In order to simplify the submission of the bid, a black bar appears in each bidding
field. It is a graphical indicator for your winning probability. It indicates the
probability to win the auction with the respective bid. If the black bar does not
cover the field at all, your winning probability is 0%. If the field is completely
covered your winning probablity is 100%.
Example: Consider again the picture above. You see on the top left, that your
valuation is 60. Now, consider the picture on the next page. You see here a
depicted bidding field. By clicking on this bidding field you place a bid in the
amount of 47. Respectively the black bar stands for the winning probability, in this
case a little less than 50%. In case you win the auction, you receive a payment of
60 - 47 = 13 monetary units. In case you lose the auction, you receive 0 monetary
units.
Please note again, that the time for you decision is restricted to 10 seconds. The
countdown for your remaining time is indicated on the top right of the screen. In
case you do not come to a decision within these 10 seconds and do not place a bid,
you cannot realize any profit.
Strategy of Computer Agents As mentioned earlier, you bid against 2 computerized
agents. The valuations for the two bidding agents are drawn previously to each
auction randomly from a unity distribution of 0-100. Imagine an urn with 101
5This first item was omitted in the NO condition, where no images were shown at all.
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Figure A.1.: Bidding Screen for Participants
balls. Each ball is labeled with a number, the first with 0, the second with 1, the
third with 2 and so on. The last ball is labeled with the number 100. Now, you
pull a ball from the urn. Each ball corresponds to a possible valuation which your
computerized opponents receive. Notice: The valuation for each bidding agent is
drawn in each auction independently from this distribution. The bids, which the
computers subsequently place, follow a determined bidding strategy, which is not
influenced by your bidding decisions. The bidding agents place their bids before
you. Same as you do not know the bids of the bidding agents, also the bidding
agents do not know your bid.
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Figure A.2.: Bidding Field
3. Price Determination Once all bids have been submitted, the experimental soft-
ware automatically determines the winner and the price of the good. The bidder
with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the price of the placed bid. The
winner earns the difference between his or her valuation and the highest bid. The
other two bidders, who did not win the auction, receive a payment of 0.
Attached some examples for the price determination:
Example: Let us assume, your valuation is 80 and you place a bid of 65 and your
computerized opponents placed 39 and 22. In this case your bid is higher than
those of your two opponents. You win the auction and receive a payment of 80 -
65 = 15 monetary units. The two computerized agents receive a payment of 0.
Example: Assume the bids of the computerized bidders are 47 and 66. In this case
the bidder placing a bid of 66 wins the auction. Your payment in that case is 0.
4. Auction Result As mentioned before, you do not receive any information regard-
ing your results at the end of the individual auctions. Only after the final end of
all auctions you receive a list of all your played auctions and your amount won.
Thereby your valuations, your bids, the bid of the computerized agents and your
respective gains is presented.
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Payoff You have an experimental account. This account accumulates your gains and
losses over the participated auctions. Your final account balance will be paid out in
cash after the experiment. In this experiment, monetary units (MU) are used. 1 MU
in the experiment corresponds to a payoff of 4 Eurocents (e 0.04). At the beginning of
the experiment, you will receive an initial endowment of 100 MU (e 4.00, which will be
credited to your experimental account.
... a few notes at the end If you have questions about the experiment, please
remain seated quietly and give the experimenter a signal by raising your hand. Please
wait until the experimenter is at your seat and ask your question as quietly as possible.
To interact with the experimental system, please use your free hand. The hand that is
connected to the measuring technique must be kept quiet during the entire experiment.
Try to avoid any movement, as this may distort the results of the measurements. At
the end of the experiment stay at your seat and wait until the experiment has removed
the measuring electrodes from your skin. These instructions should be left on your seat.
Important note: Please make sure that you use your mouse during the experi-
ment as quietly as possible, try to apply very little power when clicking on the mouse.
You will now receive ear muffs to reduce the influence of noise on the measures
In the remainder we attached a set of questions which the participants had to an-
swer correctly before the actual experiment proceeded. Each time the participant picked
an incorrect answer option the following message occurred: “This answer is not correct!
Please have a look at the instruction material for further information”. Subsequently
the participant could answer the question again. The correct answers are italicized.
After the participant had answered all questions correctly, the following message was
displayed on the screen: “Now a 5-minute calibration period starts, which is necessary,
to calibrate the physiological measuring instruments. Please try to relax and focus on
the cross in the middle of the screen.”
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A.3. Participant Instructions for the Auction Game
Appendix A.3 lists the participants instructions of Evaluation Study I presented in Chap-
ter 5. The material was translated to English from the original German version.6 Please
note that the instructions are only translations for information; they are not intended to
be used in the lab. The instructions in the original language were carefully polished in
grammar, style, comprehensibility. The paper instructions for Evaluation Study II were
shorter as more information of the game mechanics was shifted to the subsequent game
tutorial. At entrance, participants received information on how to tighten the chest
belt of the EKG move and how to apply it. Furthermore, subjects received information
regarding anonymity of the retrieved data and the subsequent payment. The starting
screen is depicted in Figure A.3 and the game screen with annotations in Figure A.4.
A.3.1. Instructions
In the following the “Auction Game” will be introduced. Please read through the com-
plete instructions before starting the game.
Goal of the game The “Auction Game” is a trading simulation where you can sell
or buy a virtual good for an offered price. Depending on your decisions you will earn or
lose money. The goal of the game is to earn as much money as possible. As soon as you
reach a certain level of wealth you will be forwarded to the next level.
Start of the game Before beginning to play the game please start the Tutorial to
receive a brief practical introduction to the basics of the game play. Afterwards please
inform the experimenter by raising your hand thus he can enter all necessary information
for you and enable you to start the game.
After entering all necessary parameters a 5-minute resting period starts during
which only a blue screen with a black cross appears on the screen. This resting period
is crucial for the evaluation and calibration of the physiological data. Please stay calm
during the resting period, avoid any movements and relax. Subsequent you will proceed
to the first level of the game automatically. Prior to each level you will receive a short
6I thank Eike Holst for the translation of the material.
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Figure A.3.: Start Screen.
overview of the current level displaying your initial wealth, the wealth to be reached and
the new features of the current level. Finally you will proceed to the game screen.
The game screen The clock in the up left corner and the money pile in the low
right corner display your progress in the current level. The money pile shows you how
much money you already earned in the current level and how far you are away from
reaching the goal of the level. The clock indicates the number of your current level and
how much time is left to complete the level.
Three clouds will appear one after another somewhere on the screen as estimations of
the true market price of the virtual good. Depending on the level additional clouds may
appear which contain further numbers or information. Those clouds are distinguishable
optically of the relevant clouds and contain wrong information.
In the low middle of the screen the decision buttons “buy”, “sell” and “no trade” are
placed. Here also the offered price is displayed to which you can decide to buy or sell
the good. The price is always the same for buying and selling. Alternatively you can
choose “no trade” and skip a decision making round. These buttons only get active
after all clouds appeared. When you made your decision, here the gain or loss that
results from your decision will be displayed.
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In the up right corner you can see the indication of your level of arousal on a
scale between 1 (low) to 5 (high). The higher your level of arousal is, the higher is the
level of difficulty of the game. That means that with a higher level of arousal it becomes
more difficult to calculate the mean of the displayed estimation clouds. Additionally
the color of the clouds represents your level of arousal.7
Figure A.4.: Game Screen
Course of the game You will try to realize gains by making several consecutive
decisions whether to buy or to sell a virtual good and thus you will increase your wealth.
You can make your decisions by clicking on of the buttons “Sell” or “Buy.” Alternatively
you can skip the current decision by using the button “No trade.” First three or more
clouds will appear in the game. Three of these clouds serve as indicators for the market
price, all other clouds are only disturbing elements. The clouds appear on the screen one
after another for a short moment and then disappear. Given a high level of arousal it is
7The above paragraph was omitted in the NBF treatment, as there is no biofeedback display in that
group.
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possible that the clouds are hardly visible so that you cannot recognize them properly.
Subsequently you have to make your decision whether to buy or to sell within maximum
2 seconds. You make your decision basing on the information regarding the market price
of the good that you received by the clouds that appeared. The true market price is
the mean of the three sums which have been displayed in the clouds of identical shape.
Afterwards you receive a short feedback regarding the correctness of your decision (and
the sum you gained or lost respectively) and the next decision round begins. If you
hesitate too long for making your decision a penalty of e 5 will reduce your wealth and
the next decision round begins. The level is completed successfully when you reached
the given level of wealth. After completing a level you are asked for a self-assessment
of your arousal on a scale from 1 (low arousal) to 5 (high arousal). Please take note
that you must complete each level within maximum 4 minutes. You realize a gain by
utilizing the advantage of your offer. Given the market price is higher than the price
that is offered to you, you realize a gain by buying the good. Anon selling the good
would lead to a loss.
Example: The mean of the three relevant clouds is e 43 and you have an offer to buy
or sell the good to a price of e 40. If you decide to buy the good you will utilize the
advantage of the available offer, because you could buy the good to a price that is lower
than the market price. You will realize a gain of e 43 - e 40 = e 3. If you decide to sell
the good in this case you will sell it to a price that is lower than the market price and
you will lose e 3.
The game ends as soon as one of the following situations occurs: 1. You are eliminated
because you need more than 4 minutes to complete the level. 2. You are eliminated
because your current wealth dropped to more than e 10 below the entry criteria of the
level (this is not possible in the first level). 3. You completed level 7 successfully.
Please take note: The higher your level of arousal is, the higher is the level of
difficulty of the game. This means: A high level of arousal increases the influence of
distracting elements and effects on the game and it will get more difficult for you to
calculate the mean of the clouds and thus to realize gains. These elements and effects
vary from level to level and will be briefly explained prior to each level.
In the remainder subjects were walked through a tutorial of the game before they
started playing.
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A.4. Comprehension Questions
Comprehension Questions for studies presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 3
and Chapter 4. Before the experiment begins, please answer the following questions,
which address the content of the instructions.
1. The winner of a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction placed...
a) ...the highest bid and pays the price of her/his bid.
b) ...the second highest bid and pays the price of her/his bid.
c) ...the highest bid and pays the bid which the second highest bidder placed.
2. What is the relationship between your payoff and your valuation?
a) The valuation is my payoff, when I win the auction.
b) The difference between my bid and my valuation determines my payoff, when
I win the auction.
c) For the payoff only the price is of relevance.
3. How do your decisions influence the computerized bidders?
a) They always place lower bids than I did in the previous round.
b) They always place higher bids than I did in the previous round.
c) My decisions do not influence the bids of the computerized bidders.
4. What is the opponent bidders’ valuation?
a) It is drawn in each auction from a distribution ranging from 0 to 100.
b) It ranges between 50 and 90.
c) It corresponds to my own valuation.
5. The “missed opportunity” indicates for the loser...8
a) ...what the winner pays.
b) ...the difference between her/his valuation and the highest bid, in case he lost
the auction and has a valuation above the highest placed bid.
8This item did not occur in the Winner Regret treatment of the study described in Chapter 2 and in
the study described in Chapter 4.
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c) ...the expected profit.
6. The “money left on the table” indicates for the winner...9
a) ...what the loser has to pay.
b) ...the difference between her/his bid and the second highest bid.
c) ...the amount he won.
9This item did not occur in the Loser Regret treatment of the study described in Chapter 2 and in
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B.1. Supplementary Analyses for Chapter 3
It can also be argued that the individual SCR after receiving the respective result
information—for various reasons—is a better baseline benchmark compared to the rev-
elation of the results. Therefore we reevaluate the experimental data using this bench-
mark. Table B.1 contrasts SCR.amp to the auction outcome as dependent variable for
two different baselines used for calculation: the left part shows SCR.amp for the baseline
average response to value information (ref_value); and the right part shows SCR.amp
to the baseline average response to result information (ref_result). Again we account
for the fact of repeated measures for each subject by using robust standard errors clus-
tered by subject. A comparison between the two regressions reveals that the results
essentially remain unchanged for the two different baselines. Both independent vari-
ables (dummy_winner and value_class) remain significant. For the purpose of clarity
we do only report the results for the chosen baseline measure ref_value in the paper.
Table B.2 represents a set of regression tables, which shows that the influence of
the variables value_class and avg_nom_payoff is significant on SCR.amp and that this
result holds for both baseline measures ref_value and ref_result. Since value_class and
avg_nom_payoff are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.799, p < .001), we only use
one variable at a time. Analogously to Table B.1 the two left columns use the baseline
measures ref_value, the two right columns use ref_result. Both variables turn out to
be significant for the regressions we carry out. For the purpose of clarity we report only
the results for the chosen baseline measure ref_value in the main thesis.
Table B.1.: Regression Models for Different Baselines (Standard Errors Adjusted for 59
Clusters in Subject)
Dependent variables
SCR.amp (ref_value) SCR.amp (ref_result)
Independent
variables B SE t-Stat p-val B SE t-Stat p-val
dummy_winner .326 .154 2.119 .038∗ .120 .059 2.045 .045∗
value_class .137 .051 2.705 .009∗∗ .070 .021 3.357 .001∗∗
auction_sequence -.125 .049 -2.579 .012∗ -.047 .022 -2.180 .033∗
c (constant) 1.844 .195 9.475 .001∗∗∗ .902 .063 14.359 .001∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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One might question whether the regret information (investigated in Chapter 2, might
influence the physiological experience of winning and losing. In the presented experi-
ment, the regret information was revealed, conditional on the treatment group (Loser
Regret (LR), Winner Regret (WR), No Regret (NR)), subsequently after the result infor-
mation. Table B.3 shows a set of regression tables which indicate that an assignment to
one of the three experimental treatment conditions (LR, WR, NR) does not influence the
SCR.amp to the auction outcome (i.e. both the variables dummy_LR and dummy_WR
remain insignificant). Again, these regressions were conducted for two different baseline
measures (ref_value and ref_result) and two alternatives for the influencing variables
(value_class and avg_nom_payoff).
Table B.2.: Regression Models for Testing the Influence of Average Nominal Payoff and
Value Classes (Standard Errors Adjusted for 59 Clusters in Subject)
Dependent variables
SCR.amp (ref_value) SCR.amp (ref_result)
Independent
variables B p-val B p-val B p-val B p-val
dummy_winner .326 .038∗ .418 .011∗ .120 .045∗ .153 .001∗∗
value_class .137 .009∗∗ .070 .001∗∗
avg_nom_payoff .026 .002∗∗ .009 .009∗∗
auction_sequence -.125 .012∗ -.136 .007∗∗ -.047 .033∗ -.052 .018∗
c (constant) 1.844 .001∗∗∗ 1.568 .001∗∗∗ .902 .001∗∗∗ .858 .001∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
With respect to SCR, a paired sample two-sided t-test shows that the difference in
SCR.amp for different auction outcomes is significant (1.744 vs. 2.206, n = 59, t =
−3.543, p < .001). Results of paired Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (Z = −3.570, p < .001,
r = .465) are consistent with those findings.
Similar to the normalization for SCR.amp values, as described in Chapter 3, for ro-
bustness checks, we reference each of the 50 HR signals to the individual baseline of the
average HR response to the valuation information. Subsequently, an average value is
computed for each bidder for the event of winning and losing. More specifically, when
analyzing the response to seeing the auction outcome, we first reference the HR signal
to the moment that the auction outcome was revealed, and then divide the result by the
absolute value of the drop in the subject’s average heart rate upon receiving the valua-
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Table B.3.: Experience of Regret Conditional on the Treatment Condition (Standard
Errors Adjusted for 59 Clusters in Subject)
Dependent variables
SCR.amp (ref_value) SCR.amp (ref_result)
Independent
variables B p-val B p-val B p-val B p-val
dummy_LR .313 .393 .236 .503 .025 .406 -.001 .963
dummy_WR .181 .449 .216 .362 .016 .552 .027 .297
dummy_winner .327 .041∗ .416 .010∗ .120 .046∗ .153 .009∗∗
value_class .137 .010∗ .070 .001∗∗
avg_nom_payoff .026 .007∗ .009 .018∗
auction_sequence -.125 .013∗ -.135 .001∗ -.047 .034∗ -.052 .001∗∗
c (constant) 1.188 .053 .978 .126 .848 .001∗∗∗ .820 .001∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
tion information. We have included two additional columns which report the results of
a t-test and a paired Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (Table B.4).
Table B.4.: Analysis of Normalized (ref_value) Phasic Changes in HR in Response to









1.0 -.45 .339 .189
1.1 -.81 .092 .099
1.2 -1.15 .028∗ .074
1.3 -1.54 .017∗ .025∗
1.4 -1.88 .008∗∗ .009∗∗
1.5 -2.20 .006∗∗ .005∗∗
1.6 -2.59 .006∗∗ .001∗∗
1.7 -2.83 .003∗∗ .001∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table B.5 depicts a factor analysis of the German version of the ERQ (Abler and Kessler,
2009; Gross and John, 2003).
Table B.5.: Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the 10 Items of the Emotion Regula-
tion Questionnaire (ERQ) (n = 104)
Item Cronbach’sAlpha Factor 1 Factor 2
Cognitive Reappraisal 1 .712 .358 -.226
Cognitive Reappraisal 2 .512 -.214
Cognitive Reappraisal 3 .467 .063
Cognitive Reappraisal 4 .699 -.099
Cognitive Reappraisal 5 .589 .107
Cognitive Reappraisal 6 .602 .110
Suppression 1 .648 -.006 .561
Suppression 2 -.191 .569
Suppression 3 -.008 .616
Suppression 4 -.003 .429
Eigenvalue 1.890 1.296
Variance Explained (per cent) .189 .130
Cumulative Variance Explained
(per cent) .189 .319
Eigenvalues were extracted according to the Kaiser criterion. As depicted in Table B.5
not all items load properly on the respective constructs and have only little mean cross-
loading of -.046. Cronbach’s alphas exceed only for Cognitive Reappraisal the critical
value of .70, however, not for suppression (.648). For this reason, the factors retained
by the factor analysis are not further employed in the following analysis.
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Table B.6 provides a regression analysis for all subjects, invariably of whether physi-
ological measurements could be assessed or not. As a comparison with Table 4.1 shows,
the results remain robust.
Table B.6.: Regression Tables For Bids. Note: The Regressions are Based on Robust
Standard Errors Clustered by 70 Subjects.
Dependent variables
Bid
Independent variables B SE t-Stat p-value
value .534 .035 15.170 <.001 ∗∗∗
dummy_competition (CMP) -2.971 .980 -3.031 .003 ∗∗
suppression 1.304 .507 2.573 .012 ∗
CMP x suppression -2.639 .899 -2.934 .005 ∗∗
reappraisal .819 .456 1.798 .076
CMP x reappraisal .085 1.050 .081 .935
safe_choices .792 .288 2.747 .008 ∗∗
dummy_gender_female .352 1.293 .272 .786
auction_round .037 .061 .597 .552
constant 12.580 3.077 4.088 <.001 ∗∗∗
n = 1047
R2 = .343
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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In this section we list complementary analyses and robustness checks for the statement
that ER and arousal influence decision performance in the Auction Game when used as
a onetime intervention.
In Evaluation Study I participants played the Auction Game and filled out the ERQ
(Abler and Kessler, 2009; Gross and John, 2003) at the end of the experiment. As
mentioned previously, in Evaluation Study II the Auction Game was followed by several
other games. Due to these constraints the ERQ was assessed before the game sessions
had started. Even though the ERQ is intended to measure reappraisal and suppression
as trait variables, which should not be influenced by chronological execution, it turns
out that subjects’ average ER score in Evaluation Study I is significantly different from
Evaluation Study II. However, there is no difference in overall game performance (.701
vs. .688, n = 80, t(78) = .480, p = .632) nor in arousal (3.258 vs. 2.871, n = 80,
t(78) = 1.393, p = .168) between the two studies.
As a robustness check for the influence of ER on decision performance, we employ a
normalized ER score (ER score (norm)). For this measure we inherently assume that




























Figure B.1.: Correlation of Decision Performance and ER Score Norm (n = 80).
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Figure B.1 illustrates the correlation of the normalized ER score and participants’
decision performance for both evaluation studies independently.
The following set of regressions in Table B.7 also confirms that the results are invari-
ably robust against usage of ER score or ER score norm with respect to arousal and
ER.
Table B.7.: Regression for Subjects’ Decision Performance on Arousal, Varying Measures
for ER and Control Variables for Subjects being in the NBF Treatment or
in Evaluation Study II (n = 80).
Decision Performance
Independent
variables B SE t-Stat p-value B SE t-Stat p-value
arousal -.032 .009 -3.370 .001 ∗∗ -.032 .009 -3.370 .001 ∗∗
ER score .041 .019 2.132 .036 ∗
ER sc. (norm) .041 .019 2.132 .036 ∗
dummy NBF -.091 .034 -2.640 .010 ∗ -.091 .034 -2.640 .010 ∗
dummy st. II -.034 .034 -0.982 .329 -.073 .030 -2.464 .016 ∗
c (constant) .858 .068 12.561 <.001 ∗∗∗ .925 .062 15.000 <.001 ∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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In the two evaluation studies the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) by Gross
and John (2003) and its validated German translation by Abler and Kessler (2009) was
used. In order to test for convergent and discriminant validity of the assumed constructs,
a factor analysis is conducted.
Table B.8.: Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the 10 Items of the Emotion Regula-
tion Questionnaire (n = 104)
Item Cronbach’sAlpha Factor 1 Factor 2
Cognitive Reappraisal 1 .834 .732 .079
Cognitive Reappraisal 2 .816 -.068
Cognitive Reappraisal 3 .420 -.003
Cognitive Reappraisal 4 .730 .076
Cognitive Reappraisal 5 .585 .196
Cognitive Reappraisal 6 .768 .212
Suppression 1 .745 -.005 .687
Suppression 2 -.008 .655
Suppression 3 .097 .743
Suppression 4 .218 .508
Eigenvalue 3.099 1.611
Variance Explained (per cent) .310 .161
Cumulative Variance Explained
(per cent) .310 .471
Table B.8 depicts the results of the conducted factor analysis in order to retain values
for the constructs cognitive reappraisal and suppression. Eigenvalues were extracted ac-
cording to the Kaiser criterion. All items load properly towards the respective constructs
and have only little mean cross-loading of .096. Cronbach’s alphas exceed .700. The re-
sults confirm discriminant and convergent validity of the constructs and are comparable
with the findings of Gross and John (2003). Analogously to the ER score we use the
retained factors in the following regressions in a measure that reflects both strategies
equally, the ER score (factor analysis (fa)).
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Table B.9 depicts a set of OLS regression tables employing the ER score and the ER
score (fa). As can be seen the influence of ER on decision performance remains both
(marginally) statistically and economically significant for both measures.
Table B.9.: Regression for Subjects’ Decision Performance on Arousal and Varying Mea-
sures for ER (n = 80).
Decision Performance
Independent
variables B SE t-Stat p-value B SE t-Stat p-value
arousal -.032 .009 -3.370 .001 ∗∗ -.032 .009 -3.354 .001 ∗∗
ER score .041 .019 2.132 .036 ∗
ER score (fa) .043 .023 1.905 .061 +
dummy NBF -.091 .034 -2.640 .010 ∗ -.088 .035 -2.543 .013 ∗
dummy st. II -.034 .034 -0.982 .329 -.034 .035 -.970 .335
c (constant) .858 .068 12.561 <.001 ∗∗∗ .859 .070 12.273 <.001 ∗∗∗
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
The same set of regressions for the No Influence (NI) version of the Auction Game
confirms that here, neither ER nor arousal significantly influences decision performance
(see Table B.10).
Table B.10.: Regression for Subjects’ Decision Performance on Arousal and Varying
Measures for ER in the NI treatment (n = 24).
Decision Performance
Independent
variables B SE t-Stat p-value B SE t-Stat p-value
arousal -.020 .023 -.893 .382 -.019 .023 -0.834 .413
ER score -.089 .074 -1.193 .246
ER score (fa) -.080 .084 -.951 .352
c (constant) .667 .102 6.539 <.001 ∗∗∗ .673 .105 6.440 <.001 ∗∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Finally, subjects’ average arousal scores are not correlated with subjects’ ER scores
(n = 104, Pearson’s r = −.053, p = .595). This provides evidence that both subjective
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